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In recent years, effective protection for the traditional 
knowledge, genetic resources, and folklore (“TKGRF”) of 
indigenous societies has emerged as a major controversy in 
intellectual property law.1  One approach is to view TKGRF as 
mere variants of the commonly accepted forms of intellectual 
property (“IP”), necessitating the same manner of protection as 
other qualifying material.  Alternatively, some IP scholars argue 
that TKGRF are inherently different and require new types of legal 
protection.  A third approach, held by a small minority working in 
the TKGRF area, advises that with so many indigenous societies 
producing infinite variations of TKGRF, one category of laws will 
not suffice. 
To use an image originating from Native American cultures, 
are U.S. officials “speaking with a forked tongue” in international 
forums when they profess the United States’ special concern for 
protecting indigenous TKGRF?  Do current U.S. laws, poorly 
implemented and often spawned for reasons unrelated to TKGRF 
protection, merely pay lip service to indigenous TKGRF 
preservation, while actually protecting corporate commercial 
 
 1 See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New 
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 929, 955–56 (2002).  One reason for the increased interest in TKGRF is that 
many countries are “rich with traditional knowledge, especially genetic resources and 
folklore,” but do not benefit from “traditional forms of intellectual property.” Id. at 956.  
Additionally, aboriginal communities have been gaining political clout in many countries. 
Id. 
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interests?  Or are these inconsistencies between stated policy and 
actual implementation—even if factually indisputable—merely 
benign examples of the normal bureaucratic shortcomings that 
commonly riddle the U.S.’s cumbersome and complex democracy? 
In the global debate on TKGRF, many U.S. and foreign 
government officials and legal scholars assert that TKGRF are 
regulated most appropriately within the traditional categories of 
well-established Western intellectual property law, i.e., the 
standard bodies of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, and 
unfair competition law.2  Even if TKGRF do not fit any of these 
categories, they would benefit most from the stable and predictable 
protections that these existing, well-defined bodies of law provide.3 
However, some legal scholars recognize that TKGRF have 
unique attributes not addressed by the standard IP categories.4  
Unlike common IP materials, TKGRF have amorphous 
characteristics that would have to be defined to achieve effective 
 
 2 But see Graham Dutfield, TRIPs-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233 (2001).  For convenience of reference only, the author uses the 
terms “Western intellectual property law” or “Western legal system” to mean the national 
legal system of a recognized government in any country in the world, without regard to 
whether such country might properly be labeled “Western” or “industrialized” in another 
context (geographical, cultural, political, etc.).  These terms are, in the context of this 
paper, interchangeable with “national legal systems of industrialized societies,” although 
this expression would not, of course, withstand careful scrutiny when referring to the 
national legal system of a largely agrarian or nomadic society, such as Cameroon or 
Mongolia, since neither is particularly industrialized or Western per se.  This rough 
terminology, is not intended to convey any greater or higher value to Western legal 
systems.  Rather, “Western” is used to distinguish the national common and civil law 
systems in use today by majority populations and national legislatures from those systems 
of customary law still traditionally employed in indigenous societies to govern their own 
internal affairs.  While some participants in the TKGRF debate have made this distinction 
based on whether or not a national legal system stems directly from European 
colonization, the author believes such an approach to be both unnecessarily pejorative 
and indeterminate. 
 3 Symposium, The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, 
and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 785 (2002).  
For a discussion regarding the usefulness but also the inherent limitations of traditional 
intellectual property law in protecting traditional knowledge, see generally David R. 
Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 
25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253 (2000). 
 4 See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 240. 
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legal protection.5  These scholars’ proposed solution for substantial 
protection of TKGRF includes: clearly delineating the nature of its 
unique attributes, locating the specific coverage voids that exist in 
traditional intellectual property law, and formulating sui generis 
laws designed to address those unique attributes and legal voids.6  
This approach could entail creating national laws or an 
international treaty to protect TKGRF outside the established 
intellectual property regimes, similar to the sui generis laws 
adopted in many countries to protect semiconductor chips or 
computer programs.7 
A third, far smaller group suggests that TKGRF material has 
exceedingly diverse properties and cannot be defined clearly.  
Since TKGRF have developed holistically, usually within many 
small communities dependent upon their natural environments, 
TKGRF are subject to nearly infinite variation.8  Thus, any attempt 
to define TKGRF per se and to determine a single substantive 
governing law will undoubtedly fail.9  Within this group of 
thinkers, some advocate that effective regulation of TKGRF lies in 
developing a flexible legal mechanism that integrates Western and 
customary law with the ideas of both Western and indigenous legal 
scholars.10  Appropriate management of any given use, publication, 
 
 5 For example, the traditional tribal communal ownership of art is not recognized by 
U.S. intellectual property schemes. See Amina Para Matlon, Safeguarding Native 
American Sacred Art by Partnering Tribal Law and Equity: An Exploratory Case Study 
Applying the Bulun Bulun Equity to Navajo Sandpainting, 27 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
211, 213–14 (2004). 
 6 See generally Elements of a Sui Generis System for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, 
Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/8 (Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter 
Elements], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_8.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 7 Gervais, supra note 1, at 951–52. 
 8 See Elements, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
 9 Id. at 11–13. 
 10 This approach has been most clearly and convincingly articulated in a variety of 
forums by Mr. Antony Taubman, currently Acting Director and Head of the Traditional 
Knowledge Division, Genetic Resources and Folklore at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.  I am very grateful to Mr. Taubman for all of his 
invaluable insights into this area of law, as well as for his unerring kindness to me and 
patience with my attempts over the last two years to understand this complex and 
fascinating area of law. See also Michael F. Brown, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE 242–
45 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002). 
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or dispute involving TKGRF could be determined in a forum 
consisting of both indigenous elders familiar with applicable 
customary law and experts in Western intellectual property 
concepts.  This would facilitate allowing for consideration of the 
diverse combination of human and environmental factors 
inevitably operating in any given TKGRF scenario. 
Within each of these three schools of thought, there are 
proponents of formal recognition of TKGRF as distinct and 
valuable forms of intellectual property needing regulation by 
international treaty in the near future.11  However, other members 
from each of these groups believe that TKGRF protection should 
instead evolve mainly out of national legislation, as other forms of 
intellectual property have historically developed.12 
The global legal debate surrounding indigenous TKGRF has, to 
date, been eclipsed in the United States by other intellectual 
property topics of greater commercial concern.  While legal 
questions relating to the patenting of genes and genetic sequences 
have received much attention in the U.S. legal community in recent 
years,13 other aspects of intellectual property law relating to 
genetic material have been less prominent.14  The U.S. legal 
community has ignored questions involving the ownership, 
control, and access to genetic material husbanded by indigenous 
people; the traditional knowledge often associated with such 
 
 11 See Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic 
Resources: The International Dimension, at 14–15, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on 
Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/6 
(Nov. 30, 2003) [hereinafter International Dimension], http://www.wipo.int-
/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 12 Such national legislation would be subject to each country’s distinctive 
jurisprudence, societal norms, and needs. Brown, supra note 10, at 55 (chronicling the 
history of copyright law in Great Britain and the United States). 
 13 Ironically, in developing countries, where most indigenous TKGRF originate, the 
larger question of whether to allow patenting of genetic resources is far from settled. See, 
e.g., Freedom from IPR: Towards a Convergence of Movements, SEEDLING, Oct. 2004, 
http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=301 (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 14 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA 
Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory 
Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001). 
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genetic material; and the traditional cultural expressions which are 
often vehicles for collecting and relaying such knowledge.15 
United States officials claim that the U.S. strongly supports 
legal protection of TKGRF and cite several tools of federal law 
that ostensibly give special protection to Native American creative 
material.16  On an international level, the U.S. advocates 
implementing protective legislation for TKGRF on a nation-by-
nation basis only, strictly within the traditional limits of existing 
intellectual property law and eschewing establishment of any 
binding international guidelines or sui generis laws.17  Yet the 
domestic legal tools that U.S. officials regularly cite abroad as 
evidence of undivided support for domestic TKGRF protection 
have not been implemented in meaningful ways, and some actions 
taken by domestic agencies in TKGRF regulation seem 
inconsistent with stated policy values.18 
Against a background of fragmented international discussion, 
this Article examines the official U.S. policy position on TKGRF, 
as reflected in selected intellectual property laws.  This Article also 
addresses whether present U.S. law and policy offer tangible, 
meaningful protection for the TKGRF of Native Americans and 
other indigenous groups in the United States, or whether such 
protection exists in theory only. 
To facilitate understanding of this law and policy discussion, 
Part I of this Article presents an overview of TKGRF, starting with 
the many difficulties of defining, conceptualizing, and working 
with TKGRF as distinct intellectual property forms.  It then 
 
 15 In 1999, WIPO’s Working Group on Biotechnology began gathering information on 
intellectual property and biotechnology from 57 countries.  Their data illustrates the 
varied responses to protection. See Information Provided by WIPO Member States 
Concerning Practices Related to the Protection of Biological Inventions, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/IP/GR/00/2 (Apr. 6, 2001), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings-
/2001/igc/pdf/grtkfic1_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 16 See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Intervention on Article XX, Intellectual Property Rights 
of the Organization of American States (“OAS”), “Draft American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” [hereinafter U.S. OAS Statement], at 
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/oas/20827pf.htm (Feb. 25, 2003). 
 17 Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273. 
 18 See infra Part II.B (discussing U.S. policy). 
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examines why effective legal protection for TKGRF within 
presently available regimes of intellectual property law may be 
problematic.  As an illustration, the article considers the wide 
variety of TKGRF controversies that have arisen in recent years 
and summarizes the various solutions being tested by international 
courts and legislatures.  Part II gives a brief overview of the 
genesis and development of the ongoing TKGRF debates at the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), introduces the 
divergent opinions among delegates to those talks, and summarizes 
the U.S. policy articulated in that forum. 
Part III examines some of the U.S. legal tools most commonly 
cited by U.S. officials as examples of U.S. protection for 
indigenous TKGRF.  These include the Indian Arts and Crafts Act 
of 1990,19 the indigenous handicraft certification scheme embodied 
in the Alaska Silver Hand Program,20 and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.21  Another frequently cited tool is the Database 
of Native American Tribal Insignia maintained by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).22  With respect to 
each of these, the Article considers the motivation for creation, 
whether the law functions as was originally intended, and whether 
it gives meaningful protection to indigenous TKGRF. 
Part IV suggests several ways in which U.S. domestic 
intellectual property laws could be amended or expanded to 
provide further TKGRF protection, while still remaining within 
established regimes of Western intellectual property law.  
Proposed changes include expanding the use of certification and 
collective marks to incorporate indigenous creations, expanding 
federal and state moral rights laws, and establishing a prospective 
U.S. system of geographical indications law for TKGRF.  This 
 
 19 Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).  For an interesting—albeit 
somewhat outdated—discussion of potential shortcomings of the Act, see generally Jon 
Keith Parsley, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An Analysis of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487 (1993). 
 20 ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.010-070 (Michie 2000). 
 21 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). 
 22 To access the database, see USPTO, Frequently Asked Questions about the Database 
of Native American Tribal Insignia, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac-
/tribalfaq.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter USPTO, FAQ]. 
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Article advocates prompt ratification of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, repair of existing, defective, federal 
legislation, and widespread education campaigns, in an effort to 
create national awareness of all IP laws, including TKGRF.  The 
Article also suggests immediate judicial recognition of a clear link 
between patent enforceability and source disclosure in patent 
applications for TKGRF-related inventions.  Moreover, state and 
federal laws should be passed to ensure minimum contracting 
safeguards in TKGRF ventures including, prior informed consent 
of indigenous participants, access to properly qualified legal 
counsel, and appropriate benefit-sharing among all parties.  This 
Article proposes removal of USPTO officials as the main de facto 
spokespeople and policymakers for the U.S., and replacing them 
with either an autonomous group of intellectual property counsel 
or an autonomous body of such counsel and officials within the 
Solicitor General’s office. 
Finally, Part V questions whether the TKGRF debate is really 
just a minor, sub-issue in the evolution of intellectual property law 
or whether it may have greater repercussions on the field than is 
presently realized in the U.S.  The Article argues the latter, 
suggesting some areas in which those repercussions may soon be 
felt, and urges a more genuine participation by the United States in 
the search for understanding and protecting TKGRF.  Greater U.S. 
openness to new ideas and to concepts originating in other legal 
systems, including customary law, will offer a more realistic 
chance of solving the TKGRF dilemma in the near future.  This 
Article hypothesizes that such a shift in approach to TKGRF might 
also provide the U.S. with new models to solve other legal 
interface and IP problems, including in cyberspace. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW: WHAT IS TKGRF, HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM 
OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND WHAT ARE SOME OF THE 
TKGRF-RELATED LEGAL CONTROVERSIES AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN RECENT YEARS? 
A. Defining and Differentiating TKGRF 
The lack of agreed legal definitions for “traditional 
knowledge,” “folklore,” or “genetic resources”23 has presented 
problems for many international groups and non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) examining the TKGRF protection issue in 
recent years.24  Some groups believe definitional clarity is a 
precondition to substantive discussion and have spent a great deal 
of time examining the limits of terminology.  Others have 
bypassed the definitional issue altogether, only to find that 
formulating solutions is impossible when the objects of protection 
remain indeterminate.  WIPO takes a more pragmatic approach: it 
continuously develops and refines definitions of TKGRF, while 
simultaneously exploring potential protection mechanisms.25  
 
 23 See generally Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, 
and Folklore, at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/publications/genetic_resources-
.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). “While ‘genetic resources’ are defined under several 
international instruments, there is to date no universally recognized definition for 
traditional knowledge as such.” Id.  
 24 See Comparative Summary of Sui Generis Legislation for the Protection of 
Traditional Cultural Expressions, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & 
Genetic Resources, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/3 (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Comparative 
Summary], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_inf_3-
.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 25 Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, at 5–6, WIPO General Assembly, WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 25, 
2000) [hereinafter Matters Concerning IP], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en-
/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/ga26_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004); Preliminary 
Systematic Analysis of National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of 
Folklore, at 6–8, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, 
Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/3 (Oct. 20, 2002) [hereinafter 
Systematic Analysis], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf-
/grtkf_ic_4_3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).  For a discussion of terminology issues, see 
Traditional Knowledge—Operational Terms and Definitions, WIPO, Intergovernmental 
Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9 (May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Operational Terms], 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_9.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004). 
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Proposed definitions and potential protections are works in 
progress, continually adjusted as understanding of the relevant 
concepts grow.26 
For the purposes of this Article, “genetic resources” refers to 
plant, animal, and human genetic material owned, cultivated, or 
otherwise arising out of the custodianship of individuals or 
collective groups within an indigenous society.  Though genetic 
material may be the most easily definable category of TKGRF, it 
recently has engendered numerous ownership and use 
controversies.27  For example, several disputes have arisen 
surrounding patent applications filed by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health for T-cell lines used to combat leukemia and 
hepatitis.28  Some of these cell lines were originally developed 
from blood samples taken from Papua New Guineans, Solomon 
Islanders, and Pandilla tribespeople.29  Many of the original donors 
have alleged that their prior informed consent was not obtained 
before the U.S. government used and patented—for its exclusive 
benefit—derivatives from their genetic material.30  Similarly,  
agricultural germplasm banks, many of which were established to 
support food crop experimentation by indigenous farmers,31 have 
generated controversy.32  Agribusinesses have become embroiled 
in a variety of patent infringement and licensing disputes involving 
indigenous farmers’ seed storage and reuse, as well as contractual 
disputes concerning required farmer repurchase of genetically 
modified seed.33  At the heart of many agriculture-related conflicts 
 
 26 Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 8. 
 27 DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES 26–27 (International Development Research Centre, 1996). 
 28 Id.  These cases are discussed further in this paper. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See, e.g., id. 
 31 Id. at 22. 
 32 Id. at 36–37. 
 33 See generally ETC group–action group on Erosion, Tech. & Concentration, at 
http://www.etcgroup.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (The ETC group was formerly known 
as the Rural Advancement Foundation International [RAFI]); Food and Agriculture Org. 
(FAO) Comm’n on Genetic Res. for Food & Agric., International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, at http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2004); Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, at http://www.iatp.org (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004). 
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lies the fact that often the newly patented plant material involved 
was developed directly from landraces husbanded by indigenous 
farmers for hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of years.34 
The definition of “traditional knowledge” is somewhat more 
problematic than “genetic resources,” and controversies 
surrounding its appropriate use are even more numerous.35  In this 
Article, “traditional knowledge” means those systems of tradition-
based knowledge developed over time by indigenous peoples or 
local communities in any sphere of scientific or artistic application, 
regardless of whether such knowledge is collected and conveyed 
through written, oral, or other form.36  This could apply to 
indigenous peoples’ inventions, discoveries (such as plant usage, 
for example), designs, symbols, and secret or sacred knowledge, 
but it is not by any means limited only to these areas.37  Often, 
traditional knowledge has scientific or practical application, such 
as knowledge about the healing properties of medicinal plants or 
the growth and reproductive habit of food plants.38  It extends, for 
example, to such matters as the particular suitability of certain 
types of animal pelts for human clothing, such as the waterproof 
properties of seal intestine for rain gear or the frost-resistant 
properties of wolverine fur for lining the facial openings of winter 
parkas.39 
There is no commonly accepted definition of “traditional 
knowledge,” in part because it covers such a diverse body of 
 
 34 POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 15, 17. 
 35 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 36 This is the author’s own current working definition, but many other definitions have 
been proposed by international organizations, research institutions, indigenous groups, 
and NGOs. See generally, George Hobson, Traditional Knowledge is Science, 20 
NORTHERN PERSP. (Summer 1992), http://www.carc.org/pubs/v20no1/science.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 37 See also Operational Terms, supra note 25, at 11; see generally Hobson, supra note 
36. 
 38 See Hobson, supra note 36. 
 39 For information on the waterproof qualities of seal intestines, see Nat’l Museum of 
Natural History, Looking Both Ways: Heritage and Identity of the Alutiiq People of 
Southern Alaska, at http://www.mnh.si.edu/lookingbothways/text/living.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004).  For information on the frost-resistant wolverine fur, see Alaska Dep’t of 
Fish & Game, Wolverine: Wildlife Notebook Series, at http://www.adfg.state.ak.us-
/pubs/notebook/furbear/wolverin.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
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information and in part because traditional knowledge tends to be 
holistic by nature.40  It is often intimately tied not just to the 
material object of the knowledge itself, but also to the larger 
environmental context of the knowledge.41  Traditional knowledge 
also is often deeply interwoven with spiritual or sacred concepts, 
and it is regularly expressed and preserved via ritualistic or artistic 
traditions that, unlike Western artistic habit, may be executed and 
passed down through generations only within firmly fixed 
parameters of expression.42 
It is this holistic quality of traditional knowledge that defies its 
neat categorization into any distinct body of Western intellectual 
property law and invites reconsideration of some of the basic 
Western definitions of intellectual property.43  In TKGRF, many of 
the legal concepts involved are novel and not yet well-understood 
in any sophisticated way by anyone other than the members of the 
relevant indigenous societies.44  Such concepts may not be easily 
reduced to a few clear and succinct legal principles.45  Thus it is 
not surprising that many of the qualities embodied in traditional 
knowledge cannot be effectively protected within the present reach 
of established intellectual property law in the industrialized 
Western world.46 
Some of the more subtle and original legal thinking concerning 
the nature of traditional knowledge is surfacing at WIPO.47  In a 
seminar last year, one leading scholar asked his audience members 
 
 40 Dutfield, supra note 2, at 240–41. 
 41 Id. 
 42 To obtain a sense of these general precepts within the specific context of Australian 
aboriginal visual art, see Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous 
Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 10 (Fall 1997). 
 43 See id. at 2. 
 44 Id. at 10. 
 45 Id. at 10–11. 
 46 Id. at 2, 30–31, 41; see also id. at 7, for a discussion of Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. 
Ltd., (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240, 244 (Austl.).  This case discusses how Western copyright 
protection would fall short of protecting sacred Australian Aboriginal images used 
without permission on carpets. 
 47 WIPO is a United Nations specialized agency and administers twenty-three 
international treaties relating to intellectual property protection.  As of Sept. 2004, some 
181 nations were member states.  For extensive information on WIPO’s general mission, 
see General Information, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/gib.htm (last visited Nov. 
5, 2004). 
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to consider the inherent nature of traditional knowledge by asking 
themselves a series of questions:48  What characteristics, if any, 
make traditional knowledge different from other known forms of 
intellectual property? 49  Might the legal means to protect it be sui 
generis?50  Or is this type of knowledge itself sui generis?51  If so, 
what makes it that way—its epistemological nature, or something 
else?52  Is it “intellectual?”53  What makes it “knowledge?”54  Is it 
actually a completely different knowledge system—cosmological, 
for example?55 
If defining traditional knowledge is difficult, establishing the 
legal parameters of “folklore” or “traditional cultural expression” 
is at least equally challenging.56  Just as with traditional 
knowledge, the parameters of folkloric terminology are frequently 
under discussion in a wide variety of international forums.57  
 
 48 For more information on WIPO’s work in TKGRF specifically, see Antony 
Taubman, Seminar sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (“AAAS”) to consider a draft version of the AAAS’s proposed handbook on 
protecting intellectual property of traditional ecological knowledge holders, Geneva, 
Switz. (Dec. 14, 2002) [hereinafter TAUBMAN PRESENTATION] (notes of discussion on file 
with author).  The AAAS is an international federation of scientific and engineering 
societies and is headquartered in Washington, D.C.  It holds accredited non-governmental 
organization status at the WIPO IGC. See generally AAAS, at http://www.aaas.org (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2004); The AAAS Project on Traditional Ecological Knowledge, at 
http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 49 Id.  All of the questions in this paragraph were presented by Mr. Taubman to seminar 
attendees. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 While this paper uses the term “folklore” for convenience, “traditional cultural 
expression” seems to be the increasingly preferred terminology. See Traditional Cultural 
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore Legal and Policy Options, at 6–7, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/3 (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en-
/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 57 See, e.g., United Nations Educ., Cult., & Soc. Org. (“UNESCO”), Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, at 2, http://portal.unesco.org-
/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15782&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (wherein UNESCO unanimously adopted a related legal 
definition for “tangible cultural heritage”). 
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WIPO has not settled on a definition yet, but WIPO experts explain 
that any definition of traditional cultural expression would have to 
cover all works characteristic of an indigenous society or local 
community that reflect its own social and cultural experiences, 
using the vehicle of its own particular artistic expectations and 
habits.58  This would include, but would not be limited to, works of 
art, handicraft, and design; written and oral verbal works, including 
songs, poetry, stories, and riddles; music; and works expressed 
through action, such as dances, rituals, and plays.  Increasingly, as 
WIPO notes, traditional cultural expressions are viewed as a subset 
of the larger concept of traditional knowledge, and these folkloric 
expressions often consist of both tangible and intangible 
components.59 
For example, a largely unpublicized but typical case of cultural 
encroachment worldwide involves the Tuareg nomads of Saharan 
Africa, whose traditional range spans several countries and who 
possess rich folkloric traditions that are currently under siege.60  
Distinctive Tuareg tribal jewelry has been repeatedly copied, 
allegedly without authorization, for sale to tourists in North and 
West Africa by Japanese and Senegalese entrepreneurs.61  Tuareg 
traditional music has similarly been recorded and produced in CDs 
widely sold in Europe and the United States.62  Since national 
patent and copyright systems are often not developed enough to 
provide any protection for the Tuareg, and because the U.N. 
Declaration of Human Rights gives only the broadest of IP 
protection guarantees, they, like other citizens of third-world 
 
 58 See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
 59 Id. at 8. 
 60 See, e.g., Press Release, Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
United Nations (May 13, 2002), http://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/2002-
/IPFbrf.doc.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 61 Interview with Saoudata Aboubacrine, representative of Tin-Hinan, a 
nongovernmental organization from Burkina Faso, at the 4th Session of the WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“IGC”), in Geneva, Switz. (Dec. 12, 2002) 
[hereinafter Aboubacrine Interview] (on file with author).  For an example of Japanese 
sale of Tuareg jewelry, see Indigenous People Collection, 
http://www.morita.ne.jp/hikkigu/delta/tuareg.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 62 See, e.g., HOGGAR, VOCAL AND INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC OF THE TAUREG (Le Chant Du 
Monde 1994). 
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countries, now feel that WIPO is the only realistic forum in which 
they can petition for help.63 
How to define TKGRF and identify its unique attributes, then, 
are two threshold questions facing legal scholars in this field.  
Western lawmakers and legal scholars should widely discuss these 
issues with as many indigenous community representatives as 
possible, so that nonindigenous thinkers can begin to understand 
more about the true nature of TKGRF.  Constructing a flexible 
legal interface between established intellectual property law and 
customary law might then become possible—a tool that is vitally 
important if this creative material is not to be either permanently 
lost or so far removed from its original context that it loses its 
meaning and usefulness. 
B.  Summary of the Legal Issues and Disputes to Date in TKGRF 
Like the definitional difficulties, the legal and social issues 
relating to TKGRF are extremely complex and diverse.64  Disputes 
are rapidly arising in a variety of venues.65  As a result, national 
legislatures, private businesses, trade associations, international 
organizations, and, increasingly, indigenous groups themselves, are 
all experimenting with a variety of potential solutions.66 
1. Complexity of TKGRF Legal Issues 
A statement given on behalf of the Saami67 Council at a recent 
WIPO conference illustrates the complexity of legal issues 
common to TKGRF discussions.68  The speaker, from the border 
 
 63 See Aboubacrine Interview, supra note 61.  
 64 See, e.g., AJEET MATHUR, MISSING MARKET IN WORLD TRADE: THE CASE FOR ‘SUI 
GENERIS’ PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Indian Council for Research on Int’l 
Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 141, Aug. 2004), http://www.icrier.res.in/wp141.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Frank Horn, National Minorities of Finland, Virtual Finland, at 
http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/minorit3.html (2004) (“The Sámi are an indigenous 
people living in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Russia.  Known widely in the past as 
Lapps, the term ‘Lapp’ is now considered derogatory by many Sámi.”). 
 68 See Report, at 19, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic 
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/15 (Dec. 17, 2002) 
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area of Finland and Norway, addressed various troubling aspects of 
the exploitation of traditional Saami culture by other, non-Saami 
Scandinavians.69  One example of this exploitation occurs when 
outsiders inaccurately copy and wear the distinctive Saami national 
dress, usually for commercial reasons.70  When authentically 
designed and appropriately worn, this clothing is used within 
Saami culture to convey extensive and specific nonverbal 
information about the wearer’s family of origin, clan, geographic 
location, marital status, and other identity factors.71  When 
inappropriately worn and inauthentically designed by outsiders, it 
is robbed of the communication characteristics integral to its 
design and use in the indigenous society in which it originates.72  
Many members of Saami society find this offensive, but are unsure 
how to remedy the situation.73 
Similarly, Saamis view emulation of their customs and 
religious rites by non-Saami travel agencies as demeaning and 
disrespectful of their culture.74  They are concerned not only about 
unauthorized and handicraft counterfeiting and the loss of tourist 
income to genuine Saamis, but about the impact of these cultural 
abuses on young Saamis.75  The Saamis are typical of growing 
indigenous populations searching for self-determination and for 
protection of their traditional cultures (part of which constitutes 
 
(statement of Piia Nuorgam, representative of the Saami Council), 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/doc/grtkf_ic_4_15.doc (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004). 
 69 Id. at 31–32. 
 70 Id. at 31.  This national costume, traditionally designed in royal blue material with 
extensive and intricate red trim, is well-known around the world and clearly inherently 
distinctive. See Bata Shoe Museum, Lapland/Saami, at http://www.batashoemuseum.ca-
/shoesections/lapland.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
 71 See Report, supra note 68, at 31. 
 72 See Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions, at 22, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3 (May 2, 2003),  
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/doc/grtkf_ic_5_3.doc (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Kati Eriksen, Address at the Meeting on Youth Policy in the Arctic (Sept. 14, 
2001), http://www.arctic-council.org/files/sahkavuorru-140901/sahkavuorru-140901.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
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intellectual property) from widespread adaptation and unauthorized 
use.76 
Many isolated ethnic communities have developed unique and 
complex visual art, music, and storytelling cultures that have been 
recently “discovered” by the outside world.77  Allegedly, 
indigenous cultural creations, like so many other artistic and 
musical works, are regularly being illegally copied and resold by 
commercial entities, often via new technologies such as digital 
sampling.78  Researchers commonly misuse (perhaps unwittingly) 
and improperly disseminate material gleaned from indigenous 
cultural traditions.79  Labor-intensive local textiles, jewelry, and 
cultural artifacts are commonly copied and passed off as the work 
of indigenous craftspeople by entrepreneurs with access to capital 
and labor-saving machinery, and the duplicates are usually mass-
produced and of poor quality.80  When cheap knockoffs flood local 
and export markets, the original artisans may cease working 
altogether.81  Traditional skills, methods, and designs, as well as 
the cultures they reflect, are thus permanently lost.82 
A more widely publicized example of the same problem 
involves pharmaceutical and agribusinesses’ “bioprospecting” 
among indigenous societies for unfamiliar genetic material and 
associated traditional knowledge.  This practice, now 
commonplace, has alarmingly and destructively invaded the world 
of traditional medical knowledge and indigenous local plants.83  
 
 76 See Tebtebba, The Kimberly Declaration—International Indigenous Peoples Summit 
on Sustainable Development, http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/wssd/ipsummitdec-
.html (Aug. 28, 2002). 
 77 See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 10; see also Mrs. P.V. Valsala G. Kutty, 
National Experiences with the Protection of Expressions of Folklore/Traditional Cultural 
Expressions: India, Indonesia and the Philippines 1 (Nov. 25, 2002), at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/expressions/study/kutty.pdf (last visited Nov. 
8, 2004). 
 78 See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 10; Kutty, supra note 77, at 2. 
 79 See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 34–37. 
 80 Id. at 11. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See generally POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27; MARK J. PLOTKIN, TALES OF A 
SHAMAN’S APPRENTICE (Penguin Books 1994); BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE: EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIPS IN PRACTICE (Sarah A. Laird ed., 2002) 
[hereinafter BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE]. 
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Bioprospecting activity, legitimate and otherwise, is now a routine 
and widely accepted industrial practice and is pursued aggressively 
by private, and occasionally public, actors all over the world.84  
Illegal acquisition activity is also increasing, occasionally 
including the outright stealing of genetic material and knowledge; 
the term “biopiracy” was thus coined to refer to the illegitimate 
appropriation and commercialization of human, plant, and other 
genetic material without the informed consent of its owners or 
traditional custodians.85 
TKGRF, and the diverse legal questions they entail, are 
inextricably intertwined with a larger debate over whether 
intellectual property law contributes positively to economic 
development in poor countries, or whether it predominantly 
protects the interests of developed countries.86  Contentious debate 
about TKGRF is underway, not only at WIPO, but in a variety of 
international forums, including the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), the Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”), the 
UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (“UN Working 
Group”), United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Social 
Organization (“UNESCO”), the Organization of American States 
(“OAS”), and the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”).87 
Among legal scholars and economists, the long-held 
assumption that strong intellectual property laws inherently 
facilitate the transfer of technology and wealth from industrialized 
 
 84 See BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 285; see also 
Telephone Interview with Eric Wilson, Deputy Director for the Office of American 
Indian Tribes, U.S. Department of the Interior (Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Wilson 
Interview 2002] (on file with author) (“Company researchers are out every day, searching 
the Internet, combing libraries for information, and dispersing themselves among 
indigenous communities to inquire about material that might lead [to profitable 
patents].”). 
 85 See BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 7–8. 
 86 See generally Comm’n on Intell. Prop. Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Integrating IP Rights], 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 
2004); Patently Problematic, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2002, at 75 [hereinafter Patently 
Problematic]; W. Lesser, The Effects of TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on 
Economic Activities in Developing Countries (Apr. 17, 2001), http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_lesser_trips.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 87 See generally UNCTAD, Seminar on Traditional Knowledge, at 
http://r0.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/meetings/delhi.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
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countries to less developed countries may be falling into disfavor.88  
In fact, the limited empirical evidence available suggests that 
strong intellectual property laws can actually inhibit such transfers 
and reinforce existing income and development disparities.89  
While few scholars in the developing world would question the 
need for a predictable intellectual property law system conforming 
to well-established international norms, they legitimately doubt the 
ability of a developing economy lacking its own technological base 
to develop efficiently while in direct competition with foreign 
technology owners who hold monopoly powers under local patent 
and copyright laws.90  At least in the short run, intellectual 
property laws tend mainly to protect the interests of current 
intellectual property owners, and in the developing world, these 
consist overwhelmingly of foreign enterprises from industrialized 
countries.91  This realization, of course, runs contrary to the 
interests of entrenched political and economic actors in 
industrialized countries, including the United States.92  In the 
TKGRF debate, analogous arguments can be made against the 
research and development transfer practices of many 
bioprospecting companies across pharmaceutical, agricultural, 
horticultural, and ethnobotanical sectors.93 
The TKGRF debate is also affected by the increasing 
polarization among member states at WIPO and the WTO on 
patentability and protection standards for plants, animals, and 
biological processes.94  Not surprisingly, developed countries seek 
 
 88 See Integrating IP Rights, supra note 86, at 23. 
 89 Id. at 23–24. 
 90 Id. at 24–25. 
 91 Id. at 21. 
 92 See Dutfield, supra note 2. 
 93 See generally Padmashree Gehl Sampath & Richard G. Tarasofsky, Study on the 
Inter-Relations between Intellectual Property Rights Regimes and the Conservation of 
Genetic Resources, Ecologic-Institute for International and European Environmental 
Policy (Dec. 31, 2002), http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-02/information-
/abswg-02-inf-ext-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 94 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND art. 
27.3(b), 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (providing that “plants, 
animals other than micro-organisms, and biological processes for producing these may be 
excluded from patentability, but Member States shall protect plant varieties, either 
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to strengthen intellectual property protection in these areas, while 
developing countries want to broaden the flexibility of applicable 
treaty standards.95  Indigenous TKGRF holders have a direct 
interest in the progress and outcome of this debate, but they are 
often not represented at these discussions.96 
This altered perception of the role of intellectual property 
rights in economic development, together with increased 
awareness of TKGRF as a potentially valuable component of IP 
rights, is causing many less-developed nations to reconsider the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(“TRIPS”).97  TRIPS was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round 
trade negotiations, which also produced the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 and established the WTO.98  TRIPS sets 
up guidelines99 and timetables100 within which all members must 
implement national legislation establishing internationally agreed 
upon minimum standards for intellectual property protection.101  It 
provides an international mechanism for settling trade-related 
intellectual property disputes.102 
TRIPS resulted from a powerful lobbying effort led by the 
United States, mainly at the joint behest of corporate copyright 
owners (who were concerned about rampant global piracy in 
computer software and digitized music and films) and 
pharmaceutical patent holders (who were interested in maintaining 
patent drug exclusivity and in limiting compulsory licensing.)103  
 
through patents, an effective sui generis system, or a combination thereof”), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.  Interpretation and application of 
this provision is the subject of considerable debate and study within the WTO at present.  
For information on Article 27.3(b) and the issues it raises, see TRIPS: Reviews, Article 
27.3(b) and Related Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_-
background_e.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 95 See Sampath & Tarasofsky, supra note 93, at 15. 
 96 See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 238. 
 97 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, art. 27.3(b), 33 I.L.M. 1197; Sampath & 
Tarasofsky, supra note 93, at 16. 
 98 See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 94. 
 99 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94. 
 100 Id. at arts. 65–67. 
 101 See generally id. 
 102 Id. at art. 64. 
 103 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481, 
481–89 (2002). (examining TRIPS history from the context of the U.S. pharmaceutical 
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Apparently, the developing countries, viewing TRIPS as part of a 
larger trade package, found it was to their advantage to make 
concessions to the United States and the European Union on 
intellectual property issues, in exchange for their promised 
reduction of agricultural export subsidies, a phasing–out of textile 
import quotas, and extension of trade concessions on tropical 
products.104  But many developing countries now feel that, while 
they have made costly concessions on intellectual property issues, 
some of the promised changes from the industrialized countries 
have not been forthcoming, especially the lowering of soaring U.S. 
and E.U. agricultural subsidies.105  This state of affairs 
undoubtedly contributed to the September 2003 breakdown in 
negotiations at the WTO Ministers’ Summit in Cancún, Mexico.106 
Given this contentious international climate, great significance 
attaches to the debate on TKGRF.  Developing countries realize 
that intellectual property laws, however distasteful, are now an 
unavoidable part of the international trade landscape; instead of 
objecting to them, they increasingly believe they must use the 
system to their benefit, by seeking intellectual property protection 
for TKGRF.107  For this to occur, TKGRF need global recognition 
as legitimate forms of intellectual property, and its custodians need 
clear and enforceable means by which to protect their ownership 
and development interests.108 
Undoubtedly the most important single event relating to 
widespread recognition of these interests and to formal legal 
protection of TKGRF was the creation and signature of the 
 
industry interests in patented drugs and compulsory licensing, and explaining the motives 
behind many developing countries’ acceptance of TRIPS). 
 104 Id. at 520; see also Special Report on Patents and the Poor: The Right to Good 
Ideas, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 2001, at 22. 
 105 See Sell, supra note 103, at 520. 
 106 See Claire Melamed, The Collapse of the WTO Talks (Sept., 16, 2003), at 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/cancun/030916feature.htm (At the summit, “[t]he 
governments of developing countries were demanding that the WTO guarantee their 
rights to help farmers facing impossible competition from cheap imports, while rich 
countries were demanding that developing countries throw open their borders as the price 
of any reduction in agricultural subsidies.”). 
 107 See Patently Problematic, supra note 86, at 76. 
 108 Id. 
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Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) in 1992.109  The 
United States signed the CBD a number of years ago, but it has not 
been ratified by the Senate, primarily due to opposition from 
biotechnology and agrochemical industries.110 
The CBD demonstrates international recognition of the need to 
protect and preserve the global natural environment through the 
conservation and preservation of biological diversity and through 
the use of environmentally sustainable methods of development.111  
In particular, Article 8(j) expresses the vital importance of 
traditional knowledge and resources held by indigenous peoples, 
and it emphasizes the need for indigenous peoples’ active 
involvement towards reaching these goals.112  Obtaining prior 
informed consent from indigenous custodians before using their 
traditional knowledge or genetic resources is mandatory for 
contracting parties under the CBD, and users are required to share 
any resultant benefits with the relevant source communities, 
including economic benefits arising from commercialization.113  A 
set of working guidelines for implementing these requirements, 
known as the “Bonn Guidelines,” has been drafted and approved 
for member use.114  These guidelines recommend that each 
member state establish a national “clearing-house mechanism” to 
oversee and ensure compliance with CBD terms for all contractual 
relationships involving access to, use, and commercialization of 
genetic material in the custodianship of indigenous 
communities.115 
Effective TKGRF legal protection involves many  
complicating factors in addition to the incendiary economic 
 
 109 See Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention Text, at 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp (last updated Dec. 6, 2003). 
 110 Rosemary Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community 
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 276 (2001) 
[hereinafter Coombe, Recognition]. 
 111 See Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth 2 (Apr. 2000), 
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf. 
 112 Id. at 6. 
 113 Id. at 9. 
 114 Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision VI/24, Access and Benefit-Sharing as 
Related to Genetic Resources, Apr. 2002, http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/?m=cop-06. 
 115 Id. at Annex, art. II.A., ¶ 13. 
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development backdrop.116  For one thing, the sheer diversity of 
cultural traditions, variety of creative and genetic material, and 
number of distinct groups of people involved are nearly 
overwhelming.117  A “one-size-fits-all” legal solution, whether in 
treaty or other form, seems far more likely to compound current 
conflict than to clarify issues and delineate responsibilities.  Many 
ethnic groups seeking TKGRF protection live and tend their crops 
in territory that overlaps several national, and thus legal, 
boundaries.118  Then, too, national intellectual property regimes 
already vary enormously from country to country.  Disparities 
among TKGRF legal protections will likely increase, at least in the 
near term, as some legislatures begin to experiment with 
regulation, and others do not. 
In addition, some of the basic concepts inherent in intellectual 
property law are directly at odds with the goals of some indigenous 
people.119  Many indigenous societies seek perpetual and exclusive 
possession of their communities’ cultural expressions and 
traditional knowledge.120  Some factions within indigenous 
societies want certain kinds of knowledge, usually those that are 
sacred or relate to the spiritual realm, to remain completely secret 
and forbidden from any use by the outside world.121  By contrast, 
many intellectual property laws are, of course, aimed at the 
eventual dissemination of information.122  Neither copyright nor 
patent law are designed to give any creator a permanent monopoly 
over his creation; one of the main objectives underlying limited 
term protection is to ensure a perpetual injection of new material 
into the public domain to stimulate further innovation.123  Whether 
or not modern patent or, especially, copyright systems function 
effectively in this way today may be debatable, but outright 
 
 116 See generally Integrating IP Rights, supra note 86. 
 117 See, e.g., Systematic Analysis, supra note 25. 
 118 See, e.g., Horn, supra note 67. 
 119 Farley, supra note 42, at 54.  Ms. Farley’s discussion of the variance between 
normative values in traditional indigenous societies and the economics-driven values of 
Western intellectual property regimes is a particularly clear illumination of this 
commonly-discussed issue. See generally id. 
 120 Id. at 14–15. 
 121 Id. at 54–55. 
 122 Id. at 55. 
 123 Id. 
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monopolistic grants of unlimited duration to specific groups of 
people would not only greatly deter the continuing evolution and 
development of their cultures and knowledge,124 but might also 
noticeably increase inter-ethnic tension and logjams in court 
systems around the world.  And while trademark and trade secrets 
laws can, at least theoretically, give protection for “unlimited 
times,” these areas of law, like the broader U.S. law of unfair 
competition, traditionally have been defined and developed on a 
strictly local basis, so lack of uniformity in protection might be 
substantial.125 
Even for indigenous stakeholders interested in allowing outside 
use or commercialization of their TKGRF, established intellectual 
property regimes are rife with other problems.126  Copyright law in 
many countries, for example, requires identification of one or more 
specific authors of a work and does not allow for the type of 
collective authorship common in folkloric works.127  Traditional 
folkloric works may also not be considered “original” in the 
copyright sense, because they are products of the cultural public 
domain, are developed incrementally over time, and are often 
executed according to strictly observed rules to which each 
successive generation of authors is bound.128  Some countries, 
including the United States, require fixation of a work before 
copyright protection can exist,129 which can be problematic in 
TKGRF because some of the most common methods for 
expressing, preserving, and disseminating knowledge in 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 50–54 (discussing the applicability and limitations of the law of unfair 
competition and trade secrets in the context of traditional art). 
 126 Id. at 17–40 (discussing the problems that indigenous stakeholders face, including 
the duration of the rights, the originality requirement, the fixation requirement, group 
rights, and the fair use exception). 
 127 Id. at 29–30. 
 128 Id. at 18–22. 
 129 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004).  “[C]opyright protection subsists in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . .” Id.  In the U.S., categories of 
copyrightable works of authorship include literary, musical, and dramatic works, 
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural works. Id. 
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indigenous societies include storytelling, riddles, songs, and other 
oral traditions.130 
From a TKGRF perspective, patent protection can be equally 
problematic.  Patenting centuries-old traditional knowledge is often 
unavailable to indigenous owners because of the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements of most patent regimes.131  Time 
bars for public use or sale132 would also operate against indigenous 
communities who might otherwise apply today for patents 
incorporating such knowledge considered new by the larger world, 
yet long used within the confines of the traditional community.133  
Laws in some developing countries may not allow any patent 
protection for genetic material from plants, animals, and 
microorganisms, while comparable laws in the United States and 
other industrialized countries do often allow such patents.134  This 
disparity can enable those who are able to obtain expensive patents 
in industrialized countries to collect monopoly rents for 
“discovering” material and knowledge originating with indigenous 
communities, who may themselves be unable to patent their 
TKGRF at home and who may have neither the sophistication nor 
the financial resources to protect it abroad in their own name.135  
Also, while much traditional knowledge presently is codified only 
in oral traditions, some countries’ patent examination procedures 
sometimes recognize only written prior art,136 further increasing 
the chances that patent protection may be granted to usurping third 
parties for “inventions” long known among local traditional 
communities.137 
 
 130 Farley, supra note 42, at 27–28; see also Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 8. 
 131 In the U.S., these requirements are found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2004).  Similar 
requirements exist in most national laws and international patent regimes. See also 
European Patent Convention, art. 54, http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ar54.html (last updated Mar. 2004). 
 132 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 133 See Heinz Goddar, Biotech Patents and Indigenous Knowledge (July 20, 2002), at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number8 (last updated Oct. 4, 2004). 
 134 See 35 U.S.C. § 102; see generally European Patent Convention, 
http://www.european-patent-office.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 135 For a more in-depth discussion of this concept, see Dutfield, supra note 2, at 255–56. 
 136 The United States, for example, limits consideration of prior art to the available, 
printed, material during its examination proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. §102. 
 137 Dutfield, supra note 2, at 256. 
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2. Representative Sampling of TKGRF Disputes 
A number of interesting and unusual copyright and patent 
disputes have arisen over the last decade relating to TKGRF, and 
courts and government agencies have begun to grapple with these 
conflicts, sometimes in creative and interesting ways. 
a) Copyright Disputes 
A recent Australian copyright case involved the importation 
into Australia of printed fabric using unauthorized designs derived 
from a local Aboriginal artist’s painting, “Magpie Geese and Water 
Lilies at the Waterhole.”138  Both the painter and his tribe’s 
representative separately sued the foreign textile manufacturer for 
copyright infringement in 1996.139  The Federal Court of Australia 
for the Northern Territory District examined customary Aboriginal 
law to determine the factual nature of the relationship between the 
painter and his tribe, as well as the painter’s authority to use sacred 
information and designs belonging to the tribe in making his 
painting.140  The court determined that under Australian law the 
painter had a fiduciary duty to the tribe to ensure that his artistic 
work would not be exploited in a manner contrary to tribal law and 
custom.141  Since the painter had successfully brought an 
infringement action against the textile manufacturer, however, he 
had appropriately discharged his fiduciary obligations to the tribe, 
and the tribe thus had no right to any further cause of action 
against the manufacturer.142 
In another landmark case, an Australian federal judge 
determined that an award of collective damages to a group of 
Aboriginal artists was appropriate redress for “cultural harm” 
 
 138 Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Pty. Ltd., 157 A.L.R. 193 (1998), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/1998/1082.html-
?query=%5e+bulun (last modified Sept. 8, 1998). 
 139 Id. at 246. 
 140 Id. at 247. 
 141 Id. at 264. 
 142 Id. 
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caused by a Vietnamese carpets importer who was found to have 
infringed the artists’ copyrighted painting designs.143 
In an earlier case, Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia,144 an 
Aboriginal artist created a Morning Star Pole, which is a sculptural 
work generally created for and used in Aboriginal ceremonies 
memorializing the death of important tribe members.145  The artist 
in this case was authorized by his tribe to create the work, and he 
held a valid copyright in the work.146  When the Bank of Australia 
reproduced an image of the work on its ten-pound note, however, 
the artist sued the bank, claiming he had no authority from his tribe 
to allow reproduction not in accordance with customary law.147  In 
addressing the juncture of customary law and Australian copyright 
law, the court ultimately found that the latter does not recognize 
protection of artistic works that are communal in origin.148 
b) Patent Disputes 
In the patent arena, patents and patent applications for 
derivations (developments from, or processes relating to, genetic 
material originating with indigenous custodians) have sparked 
increasingly frequent disputes.  Most commonly, these have 
involved plant substances that have been long used by traditional 
societies for healing and other properties, but are new to the 
industrialized world, where they are subsequently patented by third 
parties who profess to have “discovered” them.149 
 
 143 See Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., 54 F.C.R. 240 (1993), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/journals/AILR/1996/backup/20.html?query-
=%5e+milpurrurru (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 144 Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, 21 I.P.R. 481 (1991), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/unrep4955.html-
?query=%5e+yumbulul (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 145 Terri Janke, Minding Culture: Case Studies on Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Cultural Expressions, Dec. 2, 2002, at Case Study 3, p. 61 n.45 and accompanying text, 
http://wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/minding-culture/studies/finalstudy.pdf. 
 146 Id. at 61. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See id. 
 149 Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 1, 11 (2001) (citing Estelle Doris Long & Antony D’Amato, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1056–57 (West Group 2000)). 
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Probably the most famous example of this to date occurred in 
1995, when the USPTO issued a U.S. patent for turmeric,150 a 
cooking and healing substance used for these purposes for 
centuries in India.151  The Indian Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research opposed the patent, claiming prior art based on 
an ancient Sanskrit text and an Indian Medical Association paper 
published in 1953.152  The controversy resulted eventually in the 
revocation of the patent by the USPTO,153 but the “turmeric 
incident” has become a celebrated instance of TKGRF misuse and 
has contributed to widespread criticism of U.S. patent examination 
procedures.154 
Presently, over 400 patents based on various uses of turmeric 
can now be found in the USPTO patent database, including some 
for such age-old uses as breath-fresheners,155 for curing warts,156 
and as a nutritional supplement for fending off colds and sore 
throats157—uses that would be unlikely to surprise any householder 
in India.  Questioning the novelty and nonobviousness of such 
products and uses by those long familiar with them is certainly 
legitimate, as is the inquiry concerning whether such products and 
uses should be given monopoly commercial status in any country.  
These inquiries seem particularly legitimate when no disclosure is 
made in the patent application regarding the existence or source of 
the traditional knowledge lying at the heart of the patent in 
question, and where the patent holder does not share any of the 
eventual commercial benefits with the original knowledge-holding 
community. 
Another plant, neem, has been the subject of numerous patents 
and extensive global dissent, including establishment of a 
generalized anti-patent campaign by one Indian research 
foundation.158  Neem has also been widely used in Indian healing 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Coombe, Recognition, supra note 110, at 281. 
 155 U.S. Patent No. 6,511,679 (issued Jan. 28, 2003). 
 156 U.S. Patent No. 6,593,371 (issued July 15, 2003). 
 157 U.S. Patent No. 6,596,313 (issued July 22, 2003). 
 158 Ragavan, supra note 149, at 12. 
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and agriculture for centuries.159  Despite this, one much-publicized 
incident involved a neem extract patented by W.R. Grace Inc. in 
the U.S. for its storage stability properties.160  Although the Indian 
government filed a complaint with the USPTO, the patent has not 
been revoked.161  However, another patent held by the same 
company, using neem as an anti-fungal agent, was revoked six 
years after issuance by the European Union Patent Office, based on 
testimony of an employee at an Indian agricultural business that 
they had been using the same substance for this purpose several 
years before the filing of the European application.162  Other 
patents based on neem derivatives for pesticidal uses also have 
been issued in the U.S., despite the fact that these properties of the 
plant are well-known in Indian agriculture.163  At least one patent 
holder has applied for similar patent registrations in Latin America 
and Europe.164 
Another particularly celebrated plant patent controversy 
surrounded the issuance of U.S. patents to Loren Miller, owner of 
the International Plant Medicine Corporation, for processing and 
commercialization of ayahuasca, a plant sacred to many 
Amazonian peoples for ritual use.165  There is neither evidence that 
Mr. Miller obtained permission from the Ecuadorian government 
to remove the original plant sample upon which his patent claims 
were eventually based, nor evidence that the sample was taken 
with the prior informed consent of the indigenous community on 
whose land holdings it was grown.166  According to the 
Coordinating Secretariat of Organizations of Indigenous Peoples 
from the Amazon (“COICA”), the supposed new variety of 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 12. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 13. 
 165 Rosemary Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New 
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and 
the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 88 (1998) 
[hereinafter Coombe, New Dilemmas]. 
 166 Id. at 89. 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES 31 
ayahuasca that Mr. Miller claims to have “discovered” was 
actually domesticated locally hundreds of years ago.167 
A recent TKGRF controversy that has captured widespread 
international media attention involves hoodia, a cactus eaten by 
South African San tribesmen to stave off thirst and hunger during 
extended travel.168  Traditional knowledge holders revealed their 
knowledge of this plant’s properties to South African government 
researchers at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(“CSIR”), a public agency charged with helping local communities 
develop natural resources into commercial products.169  CSIR 
isolated and patented the appetite suppressant in the plant and then 
licensed it to a small British company, which in turn sublicensed it 
to Pfizer for expected commercialization into a blockbuster diet 
pill.170  The British company claimed that CSIR said that the 
original inventors had long since disappeared; CSIR claimed it had 
planned to divulge the resulting patenting and commercialization 
plans to the San, once regulatory approval was obtained.171  Since 
this often occurs a decade or more after initial isolation of the 
active chemistry of a medicinal plant, CSIR did not want to raise 
unwarranted San expectations of profits.172  When publicity 
concerning the Pfizer deal surfaced, the San became aware of the 
situation and hired counsel to protect their interests.173  CSIR was 
widely condemned for failing to earmark any of the projected 
royalties for either general conservation efforts or for the San.174  
Recently, CSIR reached an agreement with the San concerning an 
appropriate benefit-sharing scheme.175 
Closer to home, several plant patent issues are being contested 
by Native Americans and by small producers of long-established 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 Julia Finch, Bushmen Aim for Cactus Rich Pickings, Guardian Unlimited (Nov. 10, 
2001), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4296262,00.html. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 BBC News, S. African Bushmen Hail Drug Deal (Mar. 24, 2003), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/2883087.stm. 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
32 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:1 
food crop plants.176  Minnesota’s Chippewa Indians have 
informally contested a plant patent application on a type of wild 
rice filed by NorCal Wild Rice of Woodland, California, and are 
asking the company to stop genetic research on the product.177  The 
group may file an interference at the USPTO, but NorCal insists 
the controversy is merely a miscommunication about the nature of 
its patent and related research.178  Another recent case involved a 
patent infringement suit brought by the holder of a Certificate of 
Protection for a type of yellow bean that others, including the 
Mexican government and Tutuli Produce, an Arizona company, 
contend has been in existence and grown by many for years.179  
Sixteen Colorado producers and processors settled the case with 
the patent holder in 2002, but experts predict that the rights of 
indigenous peoples in genetic resources will continue to be tested, 
especially in connection with transgenic (genetically modified) 
plants.180 
Human genetic material sampled originally from indigenous 
community donors has given rise to another group of patent 
dilemmas.  One case involved isolation by Western scientists of a 
gene apparently responsible for resistance to leukemia; it was 
found in blood sample collected from a woman from the Guaymi 
tribe in Panama.181  A joint research program between Panamanian 
scientists and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), 
sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) of the U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, led to the development of a 
T-cell line out of the original blood sample, and NIH promptly 
filed a patent application.182  International protest followed, 
including complaints to the secretariats of the GATT and the 
Secretariat InterGovernmental Committee on the CBD,183 despite 
the fact that U.S. officials claim the donor gave her informed oral 
 
 176 Victoria Slind-Flor, Cultivating the Rice Wars, 3 IP LAW AND BUSINESS 16 (2003). 
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 26. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
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consent.184  Some experts question whether her consent, even if 
given, included a full understanding of the implications of patent 
applications, and many believe that the NIH eventually bowed to 
the international outcry when it withdrew the patent application.185  
However, even with the application withdrawn, the cell line may 
be deposited for a maximum of 30 years under the Budapest 
Treaty; so far, it has not been returned to the tribe.186  Some fear 
that the cell line will ultimately become public domain property, 
eliminating any possibility for the tribe to share in the benefits of 
commercialization.187 
At least two other situations involving patent applications filed 
on cell lines isolated from genetic material donated by indigenous 
peoples have occurred within the last ten years.188  Both involved 
NIH as patentee, and in each case NIH contends that the donors 
gave their prior informed consent.189  The NIH view was strongly 
disputed in both instances: in one of the cases, the government of 
Papua New Guinea unsuccessfully objected to the U.S. patent, and 
in the other, the government of the Solomon Islands has asked that 
the patent application be withdrawn.190 
3. The Current Range of Proposed Solutions to TKGRF Issues 
A variety of solutions to TKGRF disputes are currently under 
consideration and experimentation.  These range from regulating 
private contracting conduct to passing protective sui generis 
national legislation to drafting regional model laws on TKGRF.191  
Intermediate forms of management include permitting joint patent 
ownership, changing patent application disclosures, establishing 
public database registries for traditional knowledge, and creating a 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Ragavan, supra note 149, at 11. 
 187 Id. 
 188 POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 27. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See Farley, supra note 42, at 43–46 (discussing model laws for the protection of 
TKGRF). 
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flexible legal interface dispute resolution mechanism for TKGRF 
conflicts.192 
a) Resolution through Private Contracting 
Although many industry representatives do not dispute that 
bioprospecting has become an accepted and widespread business 
practice, some question how big a problem biopiracy really is, 
because no reliable empirical evidence exists on how often it 
occurs.193  There is a lack of statistical information clearly showing 
evidence of widespread inequities in commercial benefit-
sharing,194 so the perception among some industry and Western 
patent offices is that the publicity surrounding biopiracy 
exaggerates the severity of the situation.195  Some trade spokesmen 
believe that many corporate entities would be willing to accept 
reasonable source disclosure and benefit-sharing requirements in 
patent applications, so long as these legal requirements were clear, 
unambiguous, and not likely to be arbitrarily or rapidly 
overturned.196 
To a certain extent, TKGRF issues that may arise in a 
developing country are indistinguishable from the difficulties 
inherent in any transnational contracting situation involving large-
scale foreign investment in a developing country.197  The rule of 
 
 192 See Technical Proposals on Databases and Registries of Traditional Knowledge and 
Biological/Genetic Resources, at 5, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/14 (Dec. 6, 
2002) [hereinafter Technical Proposals], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en-
/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_14.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
 193 Telephone Interview with Lila Feisee, Director of Intellectual Property, 
Biotechnology Information Organization (“BIO”) (Jan. 28, 2003) (on file with author).  
BIO is a U.S.-based trade association of over 1100 research institutions, companies and 
universities, with members located in all fifty states of the U.S. and in thirty-three foreign 
countries. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id; see also Telephone Interview with Linda Lourie, Attorney-Advisor, USPTO 
(Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Lourie Interview] (on file with author). 
 196 Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Jeff Kushan, Partner, Sidley, Austin, Brown 
& Wood (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with author).  Mr. Kushan participated on behalf of the 
USPTO in the 1992 negotiations leading to creation of the CBD; he served at the time of 
interview as outside counsel to BIO. 
 197 This discussion is based on the author’s own experience as counsel with a Fortune 
100 oil exploration company in Central Africa, but any practitioner who has negotiated 
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law may not be fully established locally, and laws and 
implementing regulations governing the transaction may be vague, 
subject to constant change, or even nonexistent at the time of initial 
negotiations.  Understandably, foreign investors seek a stable 
investment environment, with clear and predictable rules of law—
including intellectual property laws—before committing the 
enormous sums of money necessary to establish a biotech or large 
agribusiness venture overseas. 
At the same time, however, indigenous communities (and 
national governments) have a legitimate interest in knowing 
exactly what their contribution to the venture will be, how it will 
be used, and how and when they are to be compensated, so that 
they can determine from the outset whether the economic and 
cultural costs and benefits justify their participation.  In particular, 
parties entering into a venture based in whole or in part on 
indigenous TKGRF should consider and negotiate contractual 
terms with regards to: requiring registration with national and local 
authorities (via national permit systems) before engaging in 
research or collection activity, obtaining the prior informed 
consent of the indigenous groups whose land will be entered and 
knowledge will be collected, sharing the data and sample 
collections with host governments and local community 
participants, and agreeing on how benefits will be shared and 
source attributions made.198  But the parties must also recognize 
that TKGRF-related negotiations are likely to be even more 
protracted than those earlier experienced in traditional foreign 
investment sectors, such as the petroleum and timber industries.  
Similarly, the education process surrounding transactions 
involving TKGRF is also likely to be more protracted because of 
the complex interplay of cultural, social, legal, and environmental 
factors involved.199 
Numerous mechanisms have been suggested to enable a more 
equitable and transparent contracting process, some of which are 
 
technical contracts in a developing country is likely to find these ideas quite 
commonplace and unremarkable. 
 198 See BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 176. 
 199 See World Bank Operational Directive 4.20, Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity in 
Latin America: A Survey of Current Information (Aug. 11, 1996) at Tables 2 and 3. 
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true advances in thinking, and some of which may not be realistic 
in what are often still, essentially, business negotiations. These 
include: having the foreign investor pay the indigenous 
community’s legal fees upfront, so that both sides have the benefit 
of counsel from the start of negotiations;200 having a third-party 
mediator participate in contract negotiations to ensure that both 
sides are fully informed of the nature and consequences of their 
proposed contractual arrangements;201 and giving the indigenous or 
local community party the right to unilaterally discontinue the 
project at any time,202 presumably even after an agreement is 
signed and the project is underway. 
This last suggestion seems particularly unrealistic, at least in 
the business context.  No responsible investor could be expected to 
enter into a deal where the other party could cancel at any time 
without incurring responsibility for the substantial adverse legal 
and economic consequences.  To allow indigenous parties to do 
this as a matter of standard policy, as advocated by some in the 
TKGRF field,203 would be both inequitable and irresponsible.  
Contractual provisions for free contract cancellation or information 
use retraction at any time must be seriously questioned, since part 
of any business deal commonly involves risk—not just with 
respect to profit realization, but that the actual project realization 
may not be what the parties envisioned when they entered the 
contract or that it may entail higher costs (not always economic) 
and lesser benefits than expected.  To a certain extent, these are 
merely the same risks borne by all parties in every business deal, 
large or small.  Insulating one party completely from the 
consequences of its own decisions would not further anyone’s 
interests in a responsible manner.  If not carefully managed, these 
kinds of provisions could also have damaging repercussions to the 
 
 200 POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 157. 
 201 Id. at 73–74 (referencing provisions of The Global Coalition for Biocultural 
Diversity Covenant on Intellectual, Cultural and Scientific Resources, 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~wgtrr/gcbcd.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004)). 
 202 Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, Negotiating Research Relationships in the North, 
Programme for Traditional Resource Rights, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~wgtrr/inuit.htm#top 
(last updated May 30, 1996). 
 203 Id. 
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host countries, by weakening the host country’s reputation for 
supporting the rule of law and the sanctity of contracts. 
However, the motivation behind the suggestion for a late-stage 
cancellation option for indigenous TKGRF contributor 
communities is sound.  Indeed, what is an indigenous community 
to do if, as a project progresses, it becomes clear that continued 
participation is having dangerously destructive and unforeseen 
effects on the community, on its natural habitat, or on the survival 
of the contributed TKGRF itself?  One solution in this scenario 
would be to enable the community to halt the project and for the 
investor to receive compensation for sunk costs and lost profits 
projected at the time of contracting, perhaps from a national or 
international fund set up for this purpose.  Such funds could also 
be used to reimburse the foreign investor for the upfront, paid-in 
costs of indigenous legal fees in completed projects, once 
profitability occurs and benefits flow to local and national 
populations. 
Ensuring that indigenous communities receive adequate legal 
representation in these types of business dealings is also a 
legitimate objective for formulators of TKGRF policy.  Local 
communities should have the benefit of objective and neutral legal 
expertise and advice (preferably in their own languages), and of 
business advice and planning as well, so that they are as well-
informed as possible about the consequences of entering into any 
particular project affecting their TKGRF.  But repaying 
cancellation costs might be impossibly high, even if an 
international or national fund were established for this purpose, 
and compensation for lost time and manpower to the foreign 
investor also would be astronomical in many cases.  Similarly, the 
forced introduction of a third party “facilitator” into what is 
already an extremely complex and time-consuming negotiating 
process could easily ensnare contracting parties in a political and 
bureaucratic mire, creating, instead of resolving, problems.  
b) Patent Disclosure and Joint Ownership of Patents 
Various changes in patent practices are often suggested as a 
means by which indigenous groups could obtain greater 
recognition for their TKGRF contributions and a greater share in 
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associated commercial benefits.204  Among the more frequent 
proposals are (1) joint ownership of patents developed from 
indigenous TKGRF, wherein both the indigenous community and 
the accessing party share the patent as co-owners, and (2) required 
disclosure of TKGRF-related information on patent applications.  
The former proposal likely could be resolved through private 
contracting or through stipulated requirements in national TKGRF 
contracting guidelines, while the latter probably would have to be 
formalized either by amending the TRIPS requirements for 
patentability,205 by changing national patent office application 
procedures, or by implementing national patent legislation in the 
country of origin of the indigenous community. 
Joint ownership by the investor and the contributor community 
is one solution often advanced as a way for indigenous groups to 
achieve some of their goals.  This solution, however, may not be 
realistic in the TKGRF context for the same reason it often proves 
unrealistic among two parties in the industrialized world: if the 
parties cannot agree on use of a jointly owned patent, the result 
may be a complete lack of exploitation.  Even worse, joint 
ownership by disagreeing parties can result in harmful licensing 
practices.  Normally, each owner of a jointly owned patent may 
grant licenses under the patent without the consent of other 
owners, and no accounting need be made to them, absent prior 
agreement to the contrary.206  Co-owners are each entitled to their 
share of licensing royalties, but nonroyalty interests would not 
have to be respected,207 and an unwitting indigenous community 
could find its patent being used in undesirable ways by other, 
uncontrolled corporate licensees.  Since sole ownership of patents 
by indigenous communities seems highly unlikely in any joint 
project, a better practice would probably be careful negotiation and 
drafting of a contractual relationship with a sole corporate owner 
concerning how the patent can be exploited and licensed.  Of 
course, indigenous community access to counsel with the 
 
 204 See Ragavan, supra note 149, at 32. 
 205 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, art. 27. 
 206 Brian G. Brunsvold & Dennis P. O’Reilley, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
10–11 (1998). 
 207 Id. 
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appropriate specialized expertise would be a prerequisite for this 
strategy to be successful. 
Mandatory disclosure of source information in patent 
applications for TKGRF-related patents is also regularly urged as 
another solution in this area.208  Many people advocate amending 
the current patentability requirements to include information about 
the geographic source of genetic material from which patent claims 
derive or are developed, as well as disclosure of the source of any 
traditional knowledge used in developing patent claims.209  Some 
even advocate requiring evidence of prior informed consent in 
patent applications.210 
Opponents often point out that TRIPS mandates minimum 
international standards for patentability,211 and that any change in 
these standards in national legislation or generally accepted patent 
office practices would be inconsistent with treaty obligations.212  
Obviously, amending the TRIPS agreement would solve this 
problem, but this is not likely to occur anytime in the near future, 
because many industrialized countries, most importantly the 
United States, oppose making this a mandatory solution.213  Even if 
TRIPS were amended, new patent office procedures and national 
legislation would still be needed to effect conformity with the 
treaty change and to ensure treatment uniformity. 
A more workable solution would be widespread recognition by 
courts and patent offices—buttressed where necessary by national 
legislation—of an equitable link between application disclosure 
and enforceability of a subsequently issued patent.214  As one 
 
 208 Downes, supra note 3, at 274. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, § 5, art. 27 (requiring for patentability a showing 
that an invention is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial 
application). 
 212 Linda Lourie, statements and comments in floor discussion on behalf of the United 
States delegation to the fourth WIPO Intergovernmental Committee (Dec. 12–19, 2002) 
[hereinafter Lourie Statements] (on file with author). 
 213 Nuño Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources 
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications without Infringing the TRIPS 
Agreement, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371 (2000). 
 214 Id. at 372. 
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eminent legal scholar has pointed out, failure to disclose 
appropriate source information in a patent application could be 
remedied by judicial refusal to enforce the patent, especially in 
situations where the patentee acted improperly in deriving an 
invention directly or indirectly from an abusive act, such as 
unauthorized acquisition and use of genetic material or traditional 
knowledge.215  Applying the U.S. patent doctrine of fraudulent 
procurement in this situation would yield a beneficial result and 
would not require treaty or legislative amendment.216  In the U.S., 
lack of candor in a patent application in nonessential matters can 
result in non-enforceability of the patent until such time as the 
patentee corrects the misrepresentation or other inequitable 
conduct, such as failure to disclose, and thus “cleans his hands.”217    
This solution seems to offer the considerable advantage of 
potentially prompt implementation by court systems and equally 
prompt results for the complaining party, since most patentees are 
likely to respond immediately to a potential threat of patent 
unenforceability.  Unfortunately, despite its reasonableness, 
practicality, and consonance with the spirit of TKGRF, this 
particular solution does not yet appear to have received widespread 
attention in the TKGRF debate. 
Recently, however, at a meeting of the WIPO Working Group 
on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), Switzerland 
made a similar proposal, suggesting that the PCT Regulations be 
amended to require a declaration of the source of genetic material 
and associated traditional knowledge for inventions directly based 
on such material and knowledge.218  Such a declaration could be 
made during or after the international filing phase of the 
application; member states’ national legislation would be allowed 
to provide for a halt in processing any application during the 
national phase until such time as the necessary declaration was 
 
 215 Id. at 395. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 397. 
 218 Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, Annex at 1, WIPO, Int’l 
Patent Cooperation Union, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), PCT/R/WG/4/13 (May 5, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/meetings-
/reform_wg//pdf/pct_r_wg_4_13.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
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provided.219  Switzerland also proposed that the Patent Law Treaty 
be changed to allow its members to pass national legislation  
requiring such declarations in national patent law applications and 
punishing the absence of such declarations by invalidating the 
patent in cases where such absence is due to fraudulent 
intention.220 
c) Database Registries 
Traditional knowledge and cultural expressions, as well as 
certain genetic material, can be registered in database “libraries” 
that chronicle indigenous communities’ ownership, use, and 
husbandry of TKGRF.221  These databases can be used 
“defensively” to combat third party usurpation of TKGRF by 
accurately recording ownership and making this information 
available to patent examiners.222  Databases can also be used 
“positively” to record and preserve TKGRF for use by future tribal 
generations or, where appropriate, for exchange with other 
indigenous communities to meet a common need.223 
Numerous projects of this nature are now underway in a variety 
of bilateral and multilateral forums.224  One of the earliest and most 
ambitious of these efforts deals with traditional medicine and is 
being spearheaded by India, with WIPO assistance.  This  database 
will eventually include all known texts on traditional Ayurvedic 
(Indian) medicine, translated from local languages to ensure the 
widest possible accessibility.225  A similar database has been 
established for Chinese traditional medicine.226 
One expert closely involved in some of the traditional 
knowledge database registry projects in India estimated in 
December 2002 that at least 700–800 U.S. patents have been 
issued that are improperly based on TKGRF, and he had revised 
 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 2. 
 221 See Technical Proposals, supra note 192, at app. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 3 (referencing Traditional Knowledge Digital Library of Ayurveda). 
 226 Id. (referencing China Traditional Chinese Medicine (“TCM”) Patents Database). 
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his estimate substantially upward by June 2003.227  He and many 
others believe that much of the foundational knowledge for such 
patents is taken directly from traditional Sanskrit documentation of 
the sort now being translated into major world languages and 
placed in these registries.228  Registration may help curtail the 
future proliferation of inappropriate patent applications, 
particularly those presently filed by scientists or entrepreneurs who 
are now employed in the West but who have grown up in 
developing countries where the knowledge originates and where it 
is viewed as available for use by anyone. 
An interesting related project in public/private TKGRF registry 
is being developed by the Tulalip Tribes in Washington State.229  
This Native American group is working on an innovative computer 
software program that can provide confidential database protection 
for such TKGRF as storytelling traditions, knowledge about native 
plants, and traditional salmon fishery management.230  The 
program is readily adaptable for use with many other kinds of 
TKGRF.231  It operates on a tiered accessibility platform, so that 
information of various types can be afforded different levels of 
confidentiality; different groups or individuals within an 
indigenous society, such as tribal councils or shamans, can control 
access to higher levels of information.232  If community members 
agree, all or part of the files can be made accessible to government 
patent examiners for defensive searching.233  Tribal representatives 
demonstrated a prototype of the program to the WIPO IGC in June 
2002, where it was particularly well-received because it was 
conceived and developed by indigenous people themselves, 
independent of government supervision and control.234 
 
 227 E-mail from V.K. Gupta, Director, National Institute of Science & Information 
Resources, New Delhi, India, June 8, 2003 (on file with author). 
 228 Id. 
 229 Technical Proposals, supra note 192, at app. 
 230 Julia Gold & Preston Hardison, Cultural Stories Project: Integrating Traditional 
Knowledge into a Tribal Information System (2003) (on file with author). 
 231 Telephone Interview with Preston Hardison, Tulalip Tribes of Washington State 
(Mar. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Hardison Interview] (on file with author). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES 43 
d) Protective National Legislation for TKGRF 
Not surprisingly, the solution that has received the most 
widespread attention in the search for TKGRF protection is 
passage of national regulatory legislation.235  This legislation is 
quite varied; it includes the collective ownership of copyrights, the 
right to contest culturally offensive trademark registrations, 
regional systems of model laws on TKGRF contracting and 
regulation, and the sui generis legislation236 mentioned earlier. 
Panama, Nigeria, Tunisia, and New Zealand are a few 
examples of the nations that have recently written protective 
TKGRF legislation using a variety of creative approaches.  Panama 
has introduced a new system of copyright-like rights that allows 
collective ownership registration in certain creative works.237  The 
first such registration was filed by an indigenous tribe, the Kuna, 
for collective ownership of its popular traditional textile form, the 
mola.238  Nigeria has criminalized the intentional distortion of 
expressions of folklore, and it also punishes source 
misrepresentation when a third party misuses an expression of 
folklore.239  Tunisian law provides blanket copyright protection for 
 
 235 This body of law is quite extensive and can only be examined thoroughly on a 
country-by-country basis.  For a brief introduction, see Systematic Analysis, supra note 
25; Revised Version of Traditional Knowledge: Policy and Legal Options, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/4 Rev. (Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Revised Policy], 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_4_rev.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 236 See supra Farley, note 42, at 43–46. 
 237 Special Intellectual Property Regime on Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples for 
the Protection and Defense of their Cultural Identity and their Traditional Knowledge, 
Republic of Panama, Law No. 20 of June 26, 2000; see also Provisions on the Protection, 
Promotion and Development of Handicraft, Republic of Panama, Law No. 27 of July 24, 
1997. 
 238 Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 11. 
 239 Presentations on National and Regional Experiences with Specific Legislation for 
the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, at Annex III, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/INF/2 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Presentation on 
Experiences], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_inf2-
.pdf  (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
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works of national folklore under a special sui generis regime,240 
together with state collection of usage fees for public domain 
cultural works.241  By statute, a part of these fees is to be 
redistributed to the source communities of the relevant folkloric 
work.242 
New Zealand is currently amending its trademark laws to 
provide for restrictive registrations based on the ethnic origin of 
mark design and authenticity of indigenous product origin.243  If 
products meet the new statutory criteria, they will be entitled to 
carry a special “Maori Made” or “Mainly Maori” mark.244  No 
mark will be granted if its use or registration is likely to offend a 
significant section of the community, including the Maori.245  This 
would preclude, for example, issuance of a mark incorporating a 
sacred Maori design. 
Some regional groups, such as the Andean Pact246 and the 
island nations of the Pacific Community,247 have taken a very 
assertive stance in TKGRF legal management and have developed 
extensive new laws for TKGRF protection.248  Regional laws are 
often based on the earliest model laws relating to TKGRF, which 
were originally developed jointly by WIPO and UNESCO in 
 
 240 Law 94-36 of Feb. 24, 1994 (concerning literary and artistic property); see also 
Comparative Summary, supra note 24. 
 241 Comparative Summary, supra note 24. 
 242 Id. 
 243 See Trade Marks Act, cl. 17, 2002 (N.Z.), available at http://www2.piperpat.co.nz-
/tmlaw/s000.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 The members of the Andean Pact are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela. See http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 
2004). 
 247 The Pacific Community has 27 members: American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, Wallis, Futuna, Australia, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America. See Secretariat of the Pacific Community, SPC Members, at 
http://www.sidsnet.org/pacific/spc/members.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2002). 
 248 See, e.g., Grain & Kalpavriksh, Traditional Knowledge of Biodiversity in Asia-
Pacific, http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/tk-asia-2002-en.pdf (Nov. 2002). 
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1982.249  In 1996, the five countries of the Andean Pact passed 
legislation creating a common legal regime on access to genetic 
resources.250 
Some regional groups are actively lobbying for WIPO’s direct 
assistance in drafting extensive national and regional TKGRF 
legislation.251  U.S. government officials, though, point out that 
overly aggressive regulatory legislation has resulted in a scientific 
research moratorium in various ecosystems in the Andes area and 
in the Philippines, an effect that was largely unforeseen and 
probably unintended by legislators.252  This is counterproductive 
for all parties and may even unintentionally undermine the 
legitimate preservation and conservation objectives of the CBD.253 
e) Flexible Jurisprudential Interface Mechanism 
A few voices in the TKGRF debate have put forth the idea that, 
because of the diversity of TKGRF and the equal diversity of the 
cultures and social contexts within which TKGRF disputes arise, 
part of the solution lies in creating a flexible legal mechanism to 
provide an interface between Western and customary law that can 
be adapted to specific cultural contexts and factual situations.254  If 
traditional knowledge is indeed fundamentally different from the 
other forms of intellectual property presently known to us, its 
effective legal management may also require a novel approach.255  
Participation of native elders, consideration of customary law 
concepts, and use of traditional dispute settlement mechanisms 
may need to be integrated systematically with the Western IP 
judiciary, laws, and enforcement methods to achieve meaningful 
 
 249 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore 
against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions, WIPO & UNESCO (1985) 
[hereinafter Model Provisions], http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/pdf/1982-folklore-
model-provisions.pdf. 
 250 Andean Community, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision 391–
Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade-
/JUNAC/decisiones/DEC391e.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2004). 
 251 Telephone Interview with U.S. State Department officials (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file 
with author). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 TAUBMAN PRESENTATION, supra note 48. 
 255 Id. 
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legal protection of TKGRF.256  Whatever the ultimate—or even 
interim—solutions in this area, it is evident that with the 
complexity of TKGRF issues, legal thinkers and indigenous 
stakeholders must engage in creative thinking and experiment with 
novel approaches. 
A main interest of some traditional knowledge holders is 
effective control of, and equitable participation in, 
commercialization of their knowledge and cultural material.  But, 
as mentioned earlier, other traditional knowledge holders are more 
interested in preventing any dissemination whatsoever of their 
knowledge and cultural expression to the outside world.257  From 
this perspective, certain knowledge, particularly sacred or ritual 
knowledge and symbols, should remain secret and should never be 
subject to any dissemination.  A middle view might allow limited 
dissemination for specific purposes, such as demonstrative use 
only of a dance or painting in a formalized cultural setting to 
educate outsiders about the indigenous society, without granting 
third party rights to replicate or reproduce the material in any 
fashion whatsoever.258 
As has been ably discussed in the TKGRF legal literature to 
date,259 these are radically different viewpoints that directly affect 
analysis of the appropriate legal protections.  Since a main 
underlying purpose of many types of intellectual property law is to 
facilitate, rather than to prevent, dissemination of knowledge, 
determining which of these perspectives is at issue in any given 
instance is critical in assessing whether any given body of 
intellectual property law offers appropriate protection.  This 
characteristic of TKGRF issues seems to necessitate a flexible 
solution system, in which the particular TKGRF at issue can be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, within its particular indigenous 
and environmental context. 
 
 256 Id. 
 257 See generally text accompanying notes 67–76. 
 258 See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 34, ¶ 117 et seq. 
 259 See generally Farley, supra note 42; Coombe, New Dilemmas, supra note 165; 
Downes, supra note 3. 
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The ayahuasca dispute referred to earlier was an early example 
of a “sacred-use” situation,260 and COICA cogently expressed the 
offense felt at the ability of a single person to appropriate, assert 
proprietary rights in, and derive monetary benefit from the sacred 
symbol the plant embodies.261  This dilemma—how to protect the 
sacred aspects (or, at least, the holistic essence) of TKGRF via the 
laws of dominating cultures that tend to view and protect 
intellectual property as a commodity—is one of the perplexing 
problems that cuts across all TKGRF sectors and presents one of 
the thorniest legal issues confronting legislators and scholars.  It is 
a core dilemma that may justify creation of sui generis laws.  It 
certainly also justifies Western judges in exploring and seeking 
guidance from applicable customary law in appropriate 
circumstances. 
II. HOW DID THE TKGRF DEBATE EVOLVE AT WIPO, AND WHAT 
IS THE U.S. POLICY POSITION IN THAT DEBATE? 
To fully understand the TKGRF controversy, it is useful to 
look at how TKGRF evolved as a discrete topic of discussion at 
WIPO and the current explorations taking place there.  Each 
Member State articulates its national policy at WIPO, and it is 
interesting to compare U.S. policy statements at WIPO with the 
existing U.S. legislation relating to domestic indigenous TKGRF 
protection. 
A. Evolution of the International TKGRF Debate at WIPO 
It is instructive to look at how the international TKGRF debate 
has evolved within WIPO for three reasons.  First, WIPO is the 
only international organization examining TKGRF from a 
technical intellectual property standpoint, although it appropriately 
attempts to analyze current and potential legal protections within 
their larger trade-related, economic, and social contexts as well.262  
 
 260 Coombe, New Dilemmas, supra note 165. 
 261 Id. at 89. 
 262 Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources—An Overview, at 3, WIPO, Meeting on 
Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, WIPO/IP/GR/00/2 (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter WIPO 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
48 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:1 
Secondly, it is important to understand the evolution of WIPO 
analysis in TKGRF because many other international 
organizations, particularly those under the United Nations 
umbrella, are currently either temporarily deferring their own work 
in the TKGRF arena until WIPO reaches membership consensus 
on a protection plan, or they are working in tandem with WIPO in 
attempting to develop their own guidelines for TKGRF use and 
protection.263  Finally, the manner in which the TKGRF debate has 
evolved within WIPO loosely parallels the course of the present, 
slower awakening of U.S. awareness of and interest in TKGRF.264 
Formal and systematic exploration of TKGRF at WIPO 
evolved through two parallel, but initially unrelated, developments.  
One line of inquiry emerged out of growing member interest in 
examining genetic resources and intellectual property issues in the 
biotechnology area.265  The other developed independently through 
a contemporaneous probe into the theoretical legal intersection of 
intellectual property law and indigenous peoples’ traditional 
knowledge.266 
With respect to the former, WIPO first began regularly 
addressing issues related to intellectual property and genetic 
resources under an exploratory program called “Biological 
Diversity and Biotechnology” in 1998–1999.267  In conjunction 
with the United Nations Environment Program, WIPO 
commissioned a joint study on the role of intellectual property 
rights in benefit-sharing related to the use of biological resources 
and associated traditional knowledge.268  Intellectual property and 
genetic resources issues also arose simultaneously in the third 
 
GR Overview], http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/word/ipgr002.doc (last visited Nov. 
12, 2004). 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 2. 
 266 Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Observations and Current Developments on the 
Protection of the Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, Opening Address at the 
WIPO Roundtable on Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples [hereinafter Daes 
Opening Address] (July 23–24, 1998), available at http://www.wipo.int-
/eng/meetings/1998/indip/daes.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 267 Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 2. 
 268 WIPO GR Overview, supra note 262. 
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session of the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents.269  At 
this committee’s request, WIPO’s Working Group on 
Biotechnology formulated a questionnaire to gather information on 
genetic resources from member states, and this group subsequently 
recommended convening a special meeting on these issues for the 
larger WIPO membership.270  There, members discussed “access 
to, and in situ preservation of, genetic resources” and the 
relationship of this material to other intellectual property.271  
Separately, during meetings relating to the Patent Law Treaty in 
2000, another clear focus point arose concerning patent formalities 
specifically associated with genetic resources.272  This evidence of 
a recurring theme led member states to decide that WIPO needed 
to begin examining the genetic resources/traditional knowledge 
area in a more systematic fashion.273 
At about the same time as the early genetic resources 
examination was starting in 1998, WIPO also began independently 
examining the field of “traditional knowledge, innovations, and 
creativity,” as it was then called.274  A roundtable discussion was 
held in Geneva and attended by WIPO member states, numerous 
representatives from various indigenous peoples’ NGOs, and the 
Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations.275  During the remainder of that year and the next, 
WIPO conducted hundreds of interviews in nine fact-finding 
missions among 28 countries “to identify and explore the 
intellectual property needs and expectations of new beneficiaries, 
including the holders of indigenous knowledge and 
innovations.”276 
 
 269 See Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 2. 
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 272 Id. at 3. 
 273 Id. 
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 275 Daes Opening Address, supra note 266. 
 276 Annual Report 2000, WIPO, at 34 [hereinafter WIPO Annual Report 2000], 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/441/wipo_pub_441_2000.pdf 
 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
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A comprehensive report of the results was published in 
2001.277  Among the needs identified were 1) “capacity-building, 
awareness-raising, and dialogue” on traditional knowledge and IP 
issues “among indigenous and local communities, government 
departments,” and other stakeholders; 2) greater use of existing 
intellectual property rights by indigenous and local communities; 
and 3) development of new sui generis rights for more effective 
legal protection of traditional knowledge.278 
Efforts at WIPO to address the intersection of intellectual 
property and folkloric expressions predate the inquiries into 
intellectual property law’s convergence with genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.279  In fact, WIPO began exploring 
intellectual property protection of folklore as far back as 1978, in 
cooperation with UNESCO.280  The “Model Provisions for 
National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore against 
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions”281 were drafted as a 
result of this joint effort.  The majority consensus at WIPO, after 
four subsequent WIPO-UNESCO joint regional consultations, was 
that ongoing work was needed, preferably via a new WIPO 
committee created specifically to explore folklore and traditional 
knowledge.282 
In 2001, as a result of these three experiences, WIPO created 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (the 
 
 277 Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders, 
WIPO Report on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Knowledge (1998–1999) 25 (Apr. 2001), WIPO Publication No. 768(E)(2001), 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 278 Annual Report 2001, WIPO, at 38, http://www.wipo.int/freepublications-
/en/general/441/wipo_pub_441_2001.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).  Interestingly, the 
first two identified needs closely mirror the recommendations made in 1999 by the 
USPTO in conjunction with its preliminary study for creation of the Database of Native 
American Tribal Insignia. See infra Part III.D. 
 279 Traditional cultural expressions are now conceptualized within WIPO as “a subset of 
traditional knowledge,” despite the fact that examination into folkloric tradition and 
intellectual property began well before that of traditional knowledge. Matters Concerning 
IP, supra note 25, at 3. 
 280 WIPO Annual Report 2000, supra note 276, at 3 n.289, 33–34. 
 281 Model Provisions, supra note 249. 
 282 Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 3. 
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“IGC”).283  This created a forum for systematic exploration of 
these three growing areas of creativity, whose linkages had become 
increasingly obvious in recent years but were, until then, 
considered separately in a variety of disparate venues.284  The IGC 
also provided a means for examining TKGRF from an 
interdisciplinary intellectual property context, not limited to any 
single field of intellectual property law.285 
The initial mandate from the WIPO General Assembly required 
the IGC to meet semi-annually for two years, beginning in the 
spring of 2001.286  It was directed to study and then make 
recommendations for action to the General Assembly concerning 
intellectual property issues arising in the context of 1) access and 
benefit-sharing pertaining to genetic resources; ii) “protection of 
traditional knowledge, innovations, and creativity, whether or not 
associated with” any genetic resources; and iii) “protection of 
expressions of folklore, including handicrafts.”287 
Pursuant to this mandate, the IGC completed its first report in 
July 2003.288  During the course of its work, the IGC accumulated 
valuable information about the mandated topics, commissioned 
several fascinating studies relating to TKGRF, and made much of 
this material freely available to the public.289  This material is an 
invaluable addition to the scant systematic material that was 
available just a few years earlier in these areas of law and policy.  
The IGC not only served as a central collecting point for heretofore 
scattered or completely unavailable national information on 
relevant subjects, but the WIPO Secretariat (“Secretariat”) made a 
 
 283 Id. at 5. 
 284 Id. at 3. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. at 4. 
 287 Id. at 5. 
 288 Program Performance Report for the 2002–2003 Biennium, at 3, WIPO, Assemblies 
of the Member States of WIPO, A/40/2 (July 23, 2004), http://www.wipo.int-
/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ab/pdf/a_40_2.pdf (last visited on Nov. 12, 
2004). 
 289 Voluminous documentation of all meetings of the IGC and supporting material is 
available on the Internet. See Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Folklore, 
http://www.wipo.int/globalissues/igc/documents/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
52 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:1 
substantial contribution of its own to TKGRF scholarship in the 
course of collecting, organizing, and summarizing the material. 
Information published by the Secretariat during this time 
period pertains to the following diverse topics: a composite study 
on the protection of traditional knowledge (including specific 
national experiences with and legislation concerning traditional 
cultural expressions),290 a practical intellectual property 
management toolkit for communities wishing to document their 
own traditional knowledge,291 reviews of existing intellectual 
property protection of traditional knowledge in national legislation 
around the world,292 a study of the necessary elements of a sui 
generis system to protect traditional knowledge and a consolidated 
summary of national sui generis legislation in the folklore area,293 
an electronic database of contractual practices and clauses 
presently in use relating to genetic resource access and benefit-
sharing,294 a technical study of disclosure requirements relating to 
 
 290 Composite Study on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8 (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Composite Study], 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_8.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004); see also Consolidated Analysis, supra note 72; Presentation on 
Experiences, supra note 239. 
 291 Report on the Toolkit for Managing Intellectual Property When Documenting 
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on 
Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/5 
(Apr. 1, 2003),  http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic-
_5_5.pdf  (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Draft Outline of an Intellectual Property 
Management Toolkit for Documentation of Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/5 (Oct. 20, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/documents-
/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 292 Consolidated Survey of Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 
WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. 
Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/7 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.wipo.int-
/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdr/grtkf_ic_5_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 293 Elements, supra note 6; Comparative Summary, supra note 24; see also Composite 
Study, supra note 290. 
 294 Contractual Practices and Clauses Relating to Intellectual Property, Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. 
Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/9 (Mar. 
31, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_9.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Report on Electronic Database of Contractual Practices and 
Clauses Relating to Intellectual Property, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
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genetic resources and traditional knowledge,295 technical proposals 
for databases and registries for traditional knowledge and 
biological/genetic resources,296 policy and legal option studies of 
traditional knowledge and of traditional cultural expressions,297 a 
study of the international dimension of TKGRF,298 and a catalogue 
of periodicals and online databases of traditional knowledge.299  
The Secretariat effectively used the expertise of personnel 
possessing the highly specialized legal knowledge required to 
gather, cull, digest, and process raw TKGRF data into intelligible 
and systematic documentation, and it continuously updated and 
made this documentation available for use by national 
governments, private industry, legal scholars, and members of the 
public with each successive meeting of the IGC membership.  
Overall, the IGC seems to have made admirable progress on its 
information gathering goals. 
As required, the IGC reported to the General Assembly in the 
early autumn of 2003.300  At that time, it reported having acquired 
 
Sharing, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. 
Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/10 (Oct. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Report on 
Electronic Database], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf-
/grtkf_ic_4_10.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 295 Draft Technical Study on Disclosure Requirements Related to Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic 
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/10 (May 2, 2003),  
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_10.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004); Initial Report on the Technical Study on Disclosure Requirements 
Related to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/11 (Nov. 
20, 2002),  http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_11.pdf  
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 296 Technical Proposals, supra note 192. 
 297 Revised Policy, supra note 235; International Dimension, supra note 11. 
 298 International Dimension, supra note 11. 
 299 Inventory of Traditional Knowledge-Related Periodicals, WIPO, Intergovernmental 
Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/5 (Apr. 30, 2002),  http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings-
/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Inventory of Existing Online 
Databases Containing Traditional Knowledge Documentation Data, WIPO, 
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & 
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6 (May 10, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/-
meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 300 The report was made to the Thirtieth (16th Ordinary) Session of the WIPO General 
Assembly, which met in Geneva, Switzerland on Sept. 22–Oct. 1, 2003. Matters 
Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
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a “strengthened understanding of the policy basis and legal 
mechanisms for protection” of TKGRF, identified “specific steps 
to strengthen defensive protection of traditional knowledge and 
associated genetic resources . . . including the enhanced practical 
recognition of [traditional knowledge] as prior art in the 
examination of patents,” developed “capacity building tools for the 
practical protection” of TKGRF, and prepared a “draft technical 
study on patent disclosure requirements relating to TKGRF in 
response to an invitation from the Conference of Parties of the 
CBD.”301  The member states of the IGC were not, however, able 
to reach internal agreement on recommendations to the General 
Assembly concerning a potential future mandate to continue their 
work on TKGRF.302 
Fortunately, however, this lack of consensus did not prevent 
the General Assembly from recognizing the need to continue this 
work and approving an extended mandate.303  The IGC has now 
been directed to continue its work on an accelerated basis, focusing 
in particular on the international dimension of TKGRF and 
intellectual property.304  “The new mandate excludes no outcome 
for the IGC’s work, including the possible development of an 
international instrument or instruments in this field.”305  The 
international community has, thus, clearly recognized the 
importance of this work.  It intends to ensure that the relation of 
TKGRF to the field of intellectual property law is fully explored 
and that appropriate legal protections for TKGRF are developed. 
 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WIPO, General Assembly, 
WO/GA/30/5 (Aug. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Report to the General Assembly], 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_30_5.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 301 See id. at 2; see also Convention on Biological Diversity: Disclosure Requirements 
Concerning Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, General Assembly, 
WO/GA/30/7 (Aug. 15, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document-
/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_30_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 302 Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3. 
 303 See Press Release, WIPO, WIPO Member States Agree to Fast-Track Work on 
Traditional Knowledge (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom-
/en/releases/2003/p362.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). 
 304 See id. 
 305 See id. 
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This is truly encouraging.  Future work by WIPO, however, 
would benefit from certain structural changes concerning direct 
participation in the work by indigenous peoples and other private 
parties.  Currently, work is necessarily constrained to reflect the 
interests and policy goals of national governments, which in many 
cases may not reflect the interests of indigenous people.  One of 
the problems the IGC has faced in its work on TKGRF is that 
WIPO’s organizational structure is not conducive to participation 
by non-state actors.306  This means that valuable input from 
members of local and indigenous communities, NGOs, private 
enterprise, and academic institutions and faculty has been 
somewhat limited.  As a specialized UN agency, WIPO carries out 
its work via a general assembly of national government 
representatives from its member states.307  The IGC, consisting 
also of member state officials, meets in its own assembly and, like 
other WIPO bodies, allows “relevant intergovernmental 
organizations and accredited international and regional non-
governmental organizations . . . to participate in an observer 
capacity.” 308  WIPO has an accreditation procedure through which 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations may apply 
for observer status, but individuals may not be accredited.309  The 
ICG has its own “fast-track” accreditation process, whereby an 
organization, but not individuals, may be allowed to observe the 
IGC meetings.310 
Unfortunately, even the IGC “fast-track” accreditation process 
is both time-consuming and cumbersome.  An applicant 
organization must file a form describing its organizational mission 
and projects, including a written statement of the specific relevance 
 
 306 Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3. 
 307 See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (July 14, 
1967, amended Sept. 28, 1979) arts. 5–6, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo-
/wo029en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 308 See Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 4. 
 309 See generally WIPO, Member States, Criteria for Admission as Permanent Observer 
with WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/members/admission/ (last visited Nov. 
12, 2004). 
 310 See Application Form for Accreditation as Ad Hoc Observer to the WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (documents available on request from the WIPO 
Secretariat and on file with author). 
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of intellectual property to its work, after which the Secretariat staff 
vets the application.311  Once the organization’s qualifications are 
initially verified and approved by the Secretariat, member states 
vote on whether or not to grant the organization accreditation and 
admit it as an observer.312  Since the vote on new applicants is held 
in Geneva at the opening of each IGC session, an organization 
awaiting accreditation cannot, theoretically, determine in advance 
of the opening of the session whether its representatives will be 
admitted.  Thus, long lead times can thus be required for a non-
state actor to: 1) learn about the existence and work of the IGC, 2) 
submit a written application, 3) determine whether the application 
has been pre-approved by the Secretariat, 4) determine after the 
start of the session whether or not the accrediting vote has been 
cast in its favor, and 5) send its representatives to Geneva for the 
remainder of that session and following sessions.  Of course, an 
organization can gamble that it will succeed in being accredited 
and can appear on-site at the start of the session (though it will be 
denied entry if approval is not granted), or it can merely wait to 
participate until the next session following its approval.  Neither of 
these alternatives seems particularly satisfactory, however, for 
organizations or indigenous communities that have limited 
financial resources and desire immediate collaboration with other 
IGC participants. 
The accreditation voting mechanism would theoretically allow 
member states to block observation by any politically unpopular or 
otherwise “undesirable” organization.  While this does not appear 
to have been a major problem to date, the IGC’s work is clearly 
becoming more politicized and is only now becoming moderately 
known outside official government circles.  Whether groups such 
as the Tibetan government-in-exile or activist groups identified 
with politically sensitive issues will be widely allowed to 
 
 311 Id. 
 312 See Draft Agenda, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic 
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/1 Prov. (Dec. 1, 2003), 
http://www.wipo.org/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_1prov.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2004).  This document from a recent session provides a typical example 
of the first part of any session agenda.  After formal opening of the session, election of 
the chair, and adoption of the prepared agenda, the Members address accreditation of 
nongovernmental organizations. 
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participate remains unknown.  Also, since many indigenous 
communities tend to be politically marginalized or even actively 
repressed by their national governments, the accreditation 
procedure could potentially become a highly selective filter of 
participants, information, and dissent as the debate unfolds.  It 
would be most unfortunate if this were to occur, since it would, 
ultimately, call into question the legitimacy and viability of 
proposed TKGRF protections.  Unless such protections are based 
in meaningful participation by, and recognition of, a representative 
cross-section of indigenous stakeholders and their concerns, rights, 
values, and jurisprudential perspectives, proposed legal solutions 
are unlikely to produce the desired results. 
Although the occasional indigenous representative is invited by 
its national delegation to participate at the meetings, and although 
with each subsequent meeting of the IGC increasing numbers of 
indigenous NGOs apply for observer accreditation, a more 
immediate flaw in the IGC’s work to date is that relatively few 
indigenous people have been directly involved in the 
discussions.313  Since indigenous communities are often among the 
most socially marginalized and least politically powerful groups in 
their own countries, they frequently do not have any real voice in 
official national position statements presented by their 
governments at WIPO—or even at their own national 
legislatures—on the matters affecting them most directly.314  Also, 
indigenous groups interested in participating often lack the 
financial means to do so, since IGC meetings are held in Geneva, 
Switzerland.315 
 
 313 See Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3. 
 314 A discussion at the 4th IGC in December 2002 illustrates this problem.  During one 
question and answer session, a member of an NGO organization representing the interests 
of various Berber tribes in North Africa asked a Tunisian government delegate why there 
are no specific protections for Berber culture in Tunisia.  The government delegate 
replied that there is no reason for Tunisian law to provide such protection, since, he said, 
Tunisia has no indigenous minorities.  Statement of delegate from Tunisia, Exposé sur la 
Protection des Expressions Culturelles Traditionnelles en Tunisie, 4th WIPO IGC, Dec. 
10, 2003 (on file with author). 
 315 Telephone Interview with Maxine Hillary, Legislative Assistant, Navajo Nation (Jan. 
29, 2003) [hereinafter Hillary Interview] (on file with author). 
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In fact, this conspicuous absence of indigenous TKGRF 
owners from discussions involving their interests has been a 
pervasive problem in most international discussion forums, not just 
at the IGC.  Lack of input from indigenous communities is 
probably the largest current obstacle to progress in the search for 
TKGRF protection in any international forum, with the possible 
exception of the UN Working Group.  Thus, in the main, decision-
making that may have far-reaching implications is currently being 
led by actors who, however intelligent and well-intentioned, are 
unlikely to have an accurate sense of the true characteristics of the 
material at issue or of the cultural and customary legal context of 
that material within the relevant indigenous societies. 
Without this dual awareness, attempts to fashion TKGRF 
protection, both against and within industrialized societies, can 
only result in ineffective and inappropriate solutions.  The best 
way to optimize the search for TKGRF protection is to ensure that 
a meaningful cross-section of stakeholders from all interest groups 
participates in equal partnership in all phases of the exploration 
and solution-seeking process. 
Successive U.S. delegations to the IGC have suffered from the 
same near-absence of indigenous members as have other national 
delegations.  Tribal members and some United States government 
representatives agree that direct involvement of indigenous people 
in intellectual property discussions has been extremely limited.316  
Some representatives of Native American groups have voiced 
frustration that they do not have a realistic avenue for participating 
in the discussions at WIPO or in similar discussions at other 
international and regional forums.317  Many tribes in the Southwest 
were not aware of the WIPO conferences until recently.318  Even 
 
 316 Hillary Interview, supra note 315; Hardison Interview, supra note 231; Telephone 
Interview with Eric Wilson, Deputy Director for the Office of American Indian Tribes, 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Mar. 13, 2003 [hereinafter Wilson Interview 2003] (on 
file with author); see also USPTO, Report on the Official Insignia of Native American 
Tribes (Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter USPTO Report], at 14, 44. That study notes that, in 
1994, it sent out letters to more than 500 federally recognized tribes concerning its 
interest in compiling a list of official tribal insignia, but only received about ten answers. 
Id.  The study itself was compiled on the basis of only thirty-six responses. Id. 
 317 Hillary Interview, supra note 315. 
 318 Id.; Hardison Interview, supra note 231; Wilson Interview 2003, supra note 316. 
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for those who wish to participate in the international dialogue, it 
can be hard to find tribal funds for everyday needs, much less to 
send representatives to meetings in other parts of the world.319 
The IGC has recognized this shortcoming in its work, and the 
recent report to the General Assembly reflects the IGC’s 
concern.320  WIPO has already begun to take concrete steps to 
solve this problem, responding in part by holding a series of 
regional discussions and intellectual property education meetings 
at various locations around the globe in 2002 and 2003, which 
generated “a significant contribution” to the IGC’s work.321  In 
December 2002, the IGC requested that the Secretariat prepare a 
report addressing formalized participation of indigenous and local 
community representatives.322  The issue was also included in the 
formal agenda for the 5th session of the IGC in July 2003,323 and 
the requested report was published at the end of March 2003.324  
This report discusses various alternatives for direct and indirect 
funding of indigenous and local community representatives to 
attend IGC meetings, together with various mechanisms for 
choosing such representatives.325   
Unfortunately, present consensus among the IGC membership 
is that national government members should determine which 
indigenous groups receive funding, and present accreditation 
constraints are to remain in place.326  Evidently, no real progress 
has been made on this issue to date. 
Other international forums have also been attempting to 
include more indigenous and NGO groups in their TKGRF 
discussions.  Among those actively seeking indigenous input are 
 
 319 Hillary Interview, supra note 315. 
 320 Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3. 
 321 See Global Intellectual Property Issues, at http://www.wipo.int/aspac-
/en/activities/global_ip.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 322 See Report, supra note 68. 
 323 See id. 
 324 See Participation of Indigenous and Local Communities, WIPO, Intergovernmental 
Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/11 (Mar. 28, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en-
/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_11.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 325 Id. at 12, 14–15. 
 326 See generally id. 
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the FAO, the CBD membership, the United Nations Committee on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), and the OAS.327 
The OAS is making significant headway toward meaningful 
indigenous participation.  In February 2003, numerous indigenous 
representatives attended a working session in Washington, D.C. on 
the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (“OAS Draft Declaration”).328  This document contains a 
provision specifically devoted to the intellectual property rights of 
indigenous people.329  To increase indigenous participation in that 
meeting, the OAS established a voluntary member donor fund for 
travel expenses of indigenous representatives.330  Also, in contrast 
to WIPO, the OAS Draft Declaration working meetings are open to 
the public, so there is no need to obtain prior approval to attend 
and any group or individual may participate in these working 
sessions.  Thanks to widespread participation of indigenous groups 
at the February 2003 meeting, floor discussion was lively, and 
differing perceptions about TKGRF and Western forms of 
intellectual property were clearly evidenced. 
Through the TKGRF debate at WIPO and elsewhere, 
substantive intellectual property law is being simultaneously 
considered and conceptualized as much on the international level 
as at the national level.  Given the lack of consensus at WIPO, 
international development and implementation of TKGRF 
 
 327 See, e.g., Press Release, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Indigenous Knowledge—A Key Weapon in Fighting HIV/AIDS (Nov. 29, 2001), 
http://www.fao.org/News/2001/011108-e.htm; Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing, at http://www.biodiv.org/programmes-
/socio-eco/benefit/project.aspx?id=8030 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Press Release, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New Avenues Needed to Protect 
Traditional Knowledge, Urge Experts at UNCTAD Meeting, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=2670&intItemID=2023&lang=1 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2000); U.S. Dep’t of State, Resolution on the Specific Fund to 
Support the Elaboration of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, CP/RES. 817 (1319/02) [hereinafter Fund Resolution], 
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/oas/20822.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 328 See generally Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at 
its 1333rd session, 95th Regular Session), OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997), 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1919.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 329 See id. 
 330 See Fund Resolution, supra note 327. 
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protection would be more likely to advance through international 
discussions concerning best practices in TKGRF and other “soft” 
law sources, such as nonbinding international guidelines, rather 
than through binding and enforceable international instruments.  
But passage and implementation of substantive national legislation 
in TKGRF seems to be receiving much of its impetus and 
substance from the formal international discussions and 
interactions in these various forums. 
This is remarkable, since, prior to TRIPS in 1995, substantive 
intellectual property law was strictly a creature of national law.331  
With the exception of the establishment of the dispute resolution 
mechanism, even TRIPS is aimed mainly at harmonizing member 
laws to standards already developed domestically in industrialized 
countries.  The emerging law of TKGRF, on the other hand, is 
perhaps the first substantive area of intellectual property law to be 
developed in its definitions, use, management, and regulation from 
a uniquely international platform.  Substantive and procedural 
TKGRF law is now being forged internationally, through 
cooperative conceptualization, collective observation, review, and 
analysis of national legislative experiments, and continuing joint 
international efforts to reach consensus. 
B. The U.S. Policy Position 
The official U.S. policy position advanced at WIPO is 
essentially this: legal treatment of TKGRF should be determined 
by each country under its national legislation and in accordance 
with its own sovereignty and laws, rather than determined by treaty 
or other international mechanism, and TKGRF should preferably 
be regulated within traditional regimes of intellectual property and 
other established bodies of law.332  This national treatment should, 
according to the U.S., be supplemented by a contract-based access 
 
 331 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, art. 64. 
 332 Lourie Statements, supra note 212.  This was the policy position of the U.S. at the 
time of the author’s first attendance at the 4th IGC in December 2002, and it did not 
appear to have changed appreciably at the time of the author’s most recent attendance in 
March 2004.  
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and benefit-sharing system that includes periodic reporting.333  
Dismissing the potential need for either sui generis laws or 
international treaty regulation for TKGRF, United States officials 
at international forums point to existing domestic U.S. laws,334 
policy,335 and contract practices336 as sufficient and meaningful, or 
even model,337 protections for TKGRF and indigenous owners.338 
In the opinion of U.S. officials, it is premature, and perhaps 
unnecessary altogether, to establish sui generis laws for 
TKGRF.339  Protections available under established intellectual 
property laws should first be fully examined, as well as the 
potential effects that proposed sui generis laws might have on 
other laws already in place.340  The limited case law in TKGRF 
should also be very carefully considered, with an eye toward 
minimizing disruption and conflict among existing laws.341  The 
U.S. believes, correctly, that for contracting parties, potential 
litigants, and the judiciary, predictability is crucial to effective 
functioning of the international legal system, and radical 
departures from laws that have been developed and tested over 
time are likely to result in unforeseen problems and dislocations.342 
 
 333 Linda Lourie, letter to the editor, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003 [hereinafter Lourie 
Letter] (responding to Nancy Kremers, Stolen Legacy: Indigenous Peoples Push to 
Protect their Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources, and Folklore, LEGAL TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2003); E-mail from Ruth Ann Nyblod, Deputy Press Secretary, USPTO (Apr. 9, 
2003) (on file with author). 
 334 Lourie Statements, supra note 212 (referencing the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 
1990 (25 U.S.C. § 305 (2003)), the USPTO Database of Native American Tribal Insignia, 
and U.S. intellectual property laws); see also infra Part III. 
 335 Application Procedures and Requirements for Scientific Research and Collecting 
Permits, Nat’l Parks Service, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter National 
Parks Service Application], available at http://www.nps.gov/grca/research-
/ApplicationGuidelines.pdf; see POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 71; BIODIVERSITY 
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 316. 
 336 POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 71. 
 337 National Parks Service Application, supra note 335; see Report on Electronic 
Database, supra note 294, at 9 (Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Developmental Therapeutics Program Division of Cancer Treatment and Diagnosis, 
National Cancer Institute). 
 338 Lourie Statements, supra note 212. 
 339 Id. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. 
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The U.S. also advocates that as much TKGRF as possible 
should be placed in searchable databases and made accessible to 
patent examiners.343  This, U.S. policymakers say, would both 
lessen the likelihood of issuing patents improperly based on others’ 
prior knowledge and diminish current objections to USPTO 
novelty determinations, which are based purely on a “printed 
material” prior art standard.344 
While a cautious approach to any new area of law is 
understandable, the official position of the United States on 
TKGRF is at odds with many of the concerns voiced in the 
international community.345  Unquestionably, tact and diplomacy 
skills vary among individual U.S. officials, and perhaps the current 
administration’s foreign policy style allows its delegates in the 
various international forums to take greater attitudinal liberties 
than at some earlier time.  Even allowing for this possibility, 
though, U.S. spokespeople in the TKGRF debate often come 
across to others as nationalistic, obstructionist, and myopic.346  
While this surely is the result of an interplay of many complex 
factors, most foreign delegates to the IGC seem to believe that U.S. 
trade protectionism and the USPTO’s own interest in maintaining 
high revenues from its corporate clients are important motivating 
forces behind current U.S. TKGRF policy.347 
Extensive examination of U.S. trade policy and empirical 
analysis of the composition of paying clients for patents and 
trademarks are topics outside the scope of this Article.  But it is 
hard to ignore the clear harmony between the U.S. TKGRF legal 
policy articulated at WIPO and the industrial and trade interests of 
the U.S.  American TKGRF policy at present is curiously 
consonant with continued U.S. protectionism, with its enormous 
farm subsidies, with corporate interests in maintaining private 
contractual control over transgenic plant research and 
 
 343 See Lourie Interview, supra note 195; Lourie Letter, supra note 333. 
 344 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004). 
 345 See generally Weerawit Weeraworawit, Formulating an International Legal 
Protection for Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Challenges for 
the Intellectual Property System, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 769 (Summer 2003). 
 346 These opinions are based on numerous background conversations between the author 
and a variety of Member State representatives at the 4th and 6th IGCs. 
 347 See supra note 346. 
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commercialization, and with the predominance of large corporate 
patent and trademark holdings throughout the U.S. pharmaceutical, 
dietary supplement, and personal care products industries.348  It 
would not be surprising if the USPTO, in particular, were 
influenced or biased to some degree in its TKGRF policy position, 
since the bulk of patent and trademark examination fees come from 
corporate clients, and those fees directly subsidize the operation of 
the USPTO, unlike many other national patent offices.349 
Despite its preeminent position at global TKGRF talks, the 
USPTO is only one of a number of U.S. government bodies 
regularly participating in TKGRF discussions.  The Department of 
State, the Department of the Interior, the Copyright Office, and the 
American Folklife Center of the Library of Congress, also 
regularly appear on U.S. delegations abroad to discuss TKGRF 
issues.  USPTO representatives, however, tend to be the de facto 
lead U.S. spokespeople on TKGRF matters, ostensibly because so 
many of the points currently at issue in TKGRF involve 
intellectual property law.350  According to fellow U.S. delegates, 
USPTO officials also often take the lead in organizing interagency 
preparatory meetings, in an effort to “harmonize” a uniform 
internal government stance prior to attending international 
conferences.351 
Unfortunately, for many reasons, USPTO leadership of the 
U.S. delegations tends to cast doubt on the validity and impartiality 
of all U.S. agencies in the TKGRF debate.352  This is due to some 
of the USPTO’s internal practices and to the obvious conflict of 
interest between the USPTO’s paying clientele and its duty to the 
 
 348 Stevan M. Pepa, International Trade and Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes, 29 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 415 (1998). 
 349 See Letter from Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intell. 
Prop., to Hon. Howard Coble, Chairman & Hon. Howard Berman, House Subcomm. on 
Courts & Intell. Prop. (June 9, 2000); see also Statement of Fédération Internationale des 
Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (June 12, 2000) (submitted to the USPTO in regard to 
Proposed Fee Legislation, pursuant to FICPI Resolution on Official Surpluses in 
Intellectual Property Offices). 
 350 See Coombe, Recognition, supra note 110. 
 351 See id. 
 352 See id. 
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larger public interest of the American people.353  As one highly 
respected legal scholar recently wrote, it is commonly recognized 
in the world intellectual property community that there are great 
shortcomings in the practices and procedures of the USPTO that 
need to be addressed before its stance on traditional knowledge 
appropriation will be considered seriously.354  According to this 
scholar, the U.S. intellectual property regime has been brought into 
widespread disrepute by the USPTO practices that: (1) create 
internal incentive structures to reward examiners financially for 
granting patents and penalize them for conscientious prior art 
examination, (2) narrowly restrict the forms of prior art that can be 
considered during the search process, and (3) lack an affirmative 
obligation to respect the public interest.355  Moreover, the United 
States has not endeared itself to the international community 
through its dogmatic position against requiring patent application 
source disclosure; though the articulated conflict with TRIPS is 
technically correct, the United States refuses to consider amending 
the TRIPS agreement to require TKGRF-related disclosure.356  
With USPTO leadership of many delegations, it is not 
surprising that the U.S. consistently has advocated using only 
national legislation and private contracting to regulate TKGRF.357  
It is unclear just what the proposed attendant “periodic reporting 
requirements” might entail.  Nor do U.S. TKGRF policy 
statements support the otherwise adamant international call for 
greater transparency in patent applications and examining 
procedures, not just in the U.S., but in patent offices around the 
world. 
In light of U.S. enthusiasm for decentralized TKGRF 
regulation and the United States’ longtime failure to ratify the 
CBD, it also seems unlikely that the United States would be 
willing to adhere to the national clearinghouse structure espoused 
by the CBD membership for verifying benefit-sharing and prior 
 
 353 See id. 
 354 Id. at 281. 
 355 Id. 
 356 See generally Pires de Carvalho, supra note 213. 
 357 See supra notes 332–38 and accompanying text. 
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informed consent issues in TKGRF-related contracts.358  Nor is it 
clear whether the USPTO, some other government agency, or the 
contracting parties themselves would have the main responsibility 
for self-monitoring and reporting, thus meeting “quasi-CBD” 
responsibilities.  The latter option would seem to be particularly 
ill-advised, because of the clear inequalities in access to 
information and in bargaining power between the parties in 
TKGRF situations.  Where an indigenous community 
independently is faced with negotiating its own contract with a 
multinational corporate entity, the specific details of proposed 
reporting requirements would be crucial in determining whether 
the proposed contracts-based model would be likely to 
substantively improve present practices. 
A recent USPTO spokesperson to the WIPO IGC has voiced 
the belief that the TKGRF controversy is more about human rights 
and self-determination than about intellectual property or the 
patent system.359  In her view, countries wanting to fix perceived 
patent problems in TKGRF protections may be ignoring presently 
available legal mechanisms that already provide effective legal 
protection in the patent field, specifically the reexamination 
procedure available in the USPTO.360  This procedure provides that 
any person at any time may, upon payment of a fee, file a request 
for reexamination of any claim of a patent on the basis of prior art 
consisting of other patents or printed publications having a bearing 
on the patentability of any claim of the patent at issue.361  If the 
filing presents a substantial, new question of patentability affecting 
any claim in the patent, re-examination will be ordered.362  In 
addition, anyone may anonymously provide the USPTO with 
written evidence of other patents or of written publications that 
may bear on the patentability of any patent claim, and this 
information becomes part of the official patent file.363  Presumably, 
 
 358 Bonn Guidelines, Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision VII/19, Access and 
Benefit-Sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, Feb. 2004, http://www.biodiv.org-
/decisions/?m=cop-07. 
 359 Lourie Interview, supra note 343. 
 360 Id. 
 361 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2004). 
 362 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2004). 
 363 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2004). 
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such evidence can be submitted prior to issuance and will be 
considered by the examiner. 
The USPTO believes these available mechanisms make the 
U.S. patent system “self-correcting” if any errors are made in 
patent examination and issuance, including in the TKGRF 
context.364  But while it is true that these procedural mechanisms 
exist, they place significant burdens on the potential victims of 
patenting abuses to continuously monitor national patent filing 
systems for early detection of pirated inventions, to pay possibly 
substantial fees if large numbers of improper applications have 
indeed already been filed and patents issued, and to pay high 
attorney fees for proper submission of prior art citation 
explanations and reexamination requests.  It is ludicrous to imagine 
that many of the least educated, and most poverty-stricken 
communities in the world even have access to this information, 
much less the sophistication and financial resources to undertake 
continuous surveillance and monitoring.  Advocating such an 
avenue as a realistic approach to protection is merely one more 
reason why the USPTO currently lacks international credibility in 
the TKGRF debate. 
Another USPTO view often chided by the global community is 
that improperly granted patents in the TKGRF area to date have 
occurred mainly due to examiners’ lack of access to foreign 
information, rather than because of any real defects in the 
examination system itself.  Official USPTO agency wisdom also 
holds that few indigenous groups could ever hope to make any real 
money from patents based on TKGRF, because the percentage of 
patented inventions, particularly in the pharmaceutical area, that 
are ever successfully commercialized is extremely low.365  If third 
party assessments of the large numbers of improperly granted U.S. 
patents in the TKGRF area are correct,366 however, there would 
presumably also be a concomitant increase in the estimated 
number of patents that have been successfully commercialized 
without attribution to, or benefit-sharing with, the traditional 
knowledge holders. 
 
 364 Lourie Letter, supra note 333. 
 365 Cf. BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 249. 
 366 Gupta, supra note 227. 
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One key feature of U.S. official statements about domestic 
protection of TKGRF is the presumption that, under U.S. law, all 
persons, whether indigenous or otherwise, already have a universal 
right to equal access to all of the protections afforded by federal 
patent, trademark, and copyright laws, as well as to any rights that 
may be available under applicable state trade secret, trademark, 
and unfair competition laws.367  It would be both unconstitutional 
and against international treaty obligations, the USPTO has opined 
(most recently at the IGC, but also in a study of its own), to grant 
to indigenous U.S. populations any special intellectual property 
protections that are not available to other U.S. citizens.368 
While this concept may be true in the general sense, race-based 
discrimination, which would presumably present the gravest 
constitutional challenge to any legislation along these lines, has 
been found to be constitutional in many other situations.369  So 
long as the allegedly discriminatory policy or law survives a 
judicial strict scrutiny test—that is, so long as the law in question 
serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest—it may be likely to survive a constitutional 
challenge on equal protection grounds.370  Particularized 
intellectual property protection for indigenous U.S. TKGRF, which 
constitutes a priceless part of U.S. heritage and much of which is 
indisputably bound for extinction unless it rapidly receives better 
protection, could likely meet a constitutional challenge of this type.  
Under the proper factual conditions and with proper drafting, 
protective TKGRF laws conceivably could be shown to conform to 
various other legitimacy factors used by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
racial discrimination cases, including the righting of past wrongs 
caused by prior governmental discrimination.371 
The constitutional aspects of TKGRF legal protection deserve 
full study before dismissing this approach out of hand as a policy 
and legal option.  Unfortunately, this has apparently not been done 
to date.  U.S. officials’ tendency to eliminate the option of 
 
 367 Lourie Statements, supra note 212. 
 368 Id.; USPTO Report, supra note 316 (also discussed in detail in Part III.D, infra). 
 369 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 370 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
 371 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
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specialized protection laws is premature and simplistic thinking, 
and it is inconsistent with such presently existing, ethnically-
oriented protective laws as the Indian Arts and Crafts Act 
(“IACA”)372 and the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act.373  The unconstitutionality of ethnic-based 
protections is probably not nearly as settled as present official 
spokespeople imply.  More importantly, this dismissive attitude 
may preempt creative thinking about a potential workable avenue 
for protecting TKGRF within the already-established domestic 
intellectual property law regime. 
The U.S. government claims that all United States citizens 
have equal access to intellectual property law protection.  
Certainly, indigenous artists face the same difficulties as other 
artists in terms of their limited access to legal counsel, financial 
hardship, and unequal bargaining power with potential purchasers 
of creative material.374  But indigenous communities in the United 
States suffer from lower education levels and more pronounced 
poverty than most other United States citizens, as well as greater 
social and political marginalization.375  The official position 
completely fails to acknowledge the vast gulf between the 
financial, cultural, educational, political, and social opportunities 
available to a middle-class white male Silicon Valley inventor 
seeking a patent and those realistically available to a poor female 
Native American rug weaver living on a remote plot of reservation 
land.  These unacknowledged differences and practical inequalities 
force the conclusion that much of current U.S. official policy on 
TKGRF is both unworkable and unrealistic. 
Another aspect of U.S. official policy that is somewhat 
misleading and inaccurate is the apparent government belief that 
many of the TKGRF legal problems faced by indigenous peoples 
outside the United States do not exist for domestic Native 
 
 372 Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
 373 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2004) (“NAGPRA”). 
 374 See generally Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising 
Questions about Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001). 
 375 See generally Richard Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American 
Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111 (1995–96). 
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Americans or Eskimo and Aleut populations.  Federal officials 
point out that Native Americans own their own land and are 
viewed as sovereign nations within the U.S. legal system.376  This, 
they say, gives Native Americans the ability to control access to 
and use of their traditional knowledge and cultural expressions in a 
way that many foreign indigenous groups cannot.377  While these 
statements may be true for many indigenous U.S. groups, control 
over land access alone does not ensure proper legal protection for 
indigenous TKGRF.378  Control over land has little effect on 
bargaining power inequalities between indigenous communities 
and multinational corporations, and on the enormous differential 
between them with respect to education and access to legal support 
and financial opportunities.379 
Spokespeople for domestic indigenous communities say they 
experience many of the same difficulties in protecting their 
TKGRF as do indigenous people outside the United States.380  
While the few federal laws passed in the 1990s to protect Native 
American cultural artifacts,381 to encourage Indian arts and crafts 
marketing,382 and to create a reference tribal insignia database for 
 
 376 Lourie Interview, supra note 343; Wilson Interview 2002, supra note 84. 
 377 Lourie Interview, supra note 343; Wilson Interview 2002, supra note 84. 
 378 See Chetan Gulati, The “Tragedy of the Commons” in Plant Genetic Resources: The 
Need for a New International Regime Centered around an International Biotechnology 
Patent Office, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 63 (2001). 
 379 See id. 
 380 Hillary Interview, supra note 315.  Ms. Hillary expresses the Navajos’ concern about 
non-tribal copying of Navajo weavings and silver jewelry, and acknowledges that 
Navajos need to find more effective ways to protect themselves by using the present legal 
system.  But she insists—as do many indigenous representatives—that the far greater 
problem lies in the fact that the non-indigenous world does not understand that much 
indigenous cultural expression is inextricably linked to the spiritual and sacred aspects of 
life and to nature.  This is part of the reason the Navajos do not want certain TKGRF 
available at all to outsiders.  Ms. Hillary cites as an example the propensity among non-
Navajo people to use terms such as “myth” or “dance” for certain Navajo cultural 
expressions, but, she explains, these actually have far deeper meaning within Navajo 
society than the English terms “myth” or “dance” or the activities those terms describe  in 
Western culture.  She points out that the Navajo people, in a comparable reverse 
situation, do not generally presume to refer to the Bible as a “myth.” 
 381 IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
 382 Id. 
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trademark examiners383 are useful, they do not provide widespread 
legal protection for indigenous U.S. TKGRF.384  Nor do these laws 
address any of the larger philosophical and legal questions that 
remain unanswered at the IGC.385  Yet U.S. government officials at 
WIPO and the OAS have represented these laws to be particularly 
meaningful intellectual property protections, specifically reflecting 
a U.S. policy interest in protecting domestic TKGRF.386  The 
USPTO, however, has formally acknowledged that laws currently 
protecting indigenous U.S. creations are not widely known 
domestically—to indigenous people or to anyone else—and 
considerable educational effort is needed before these laws can be 
considered effective.387 
In contrast to the rest of the world, the U.S. is discussing 
TKGRF issues only in a scattered and piecemeal fashion, if at all.  
Just as WIPO’s rather rigid organizational structure has influenced 
international activity on TKGRF, U.S. governmental attitudes and 
its laissez-faire policy position influence domestic perceptions 
about the relative importance (or, perhaps more accurately, 
unimportance) of TKGRF issues.  Consequently, the level of 
general awareness in the U.S. about TKGRF issues is much lower 
than abroad.  Additionally, because many of the member states at 
WIPO are developing countries that increasingly perceive their 
TKGRF to be a significant national resource, their interest in the 
topic is far greater than the United States’.  As U.S. public 
consciousness is raised, however—and especially as awareness of 
these issues increases among domestic indigenous communities—
U.S. thinking will evolve.  Widespread acceptance of many ideas 
 
 383 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 et seq. (2004). 
 384 See Guest, supra note 375. 
 385 See id. 
 386 Questionnaire on National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of 
Folklore, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. 
Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/7 (June 22, 2001), http://www.wipo.int-
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National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of Folklore: Response of 
the United States of America, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/questionnaires/ic-2-
7/usa.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Questionnaire Response]; see also U.S. 
OAS Statement, supra note 16. 
 387 USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 46. 
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that are currently anathema to domestic stakeholders, particularly 
government officials, is then likely to follow. 
III. THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING U.S. LAWS FOR PROTECTING 
TKGRF 
A. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 
The IACA388 is the provision of U.S. domestic law most 
frequently cited at international forums by U.S. officials as 
evidence of the great interest U.S. policymakers and legislators 
have in protecting the TKGRF of Native Americans and other 
domestic indigenous groups.389  IACA, its technical amendments 
that were passed a decade later,390 and its associated implementing 
regulations391 are the main sources of law relating to the Indian arts 
and crafts portion of indigenous U.S. TKGRF. 
To effectively evaluate IACA’s usefulness in protecting 
TKGRF, we must consider a number of interrelated factors: 1) the 
statutory language and administrative framework, 2) the makeup 
and activities of the government board charged with implementing 
IACA, 3) actual implementation of the law, 4) the legislative 
history and intended usage of IACA, 5) the context of IACA 
within the broader framework of domestic intellectual property and 
consumer protection laws, and 6) IACA’s use by U.S. officials as 
an illustrative tool of articulated U.S. TKGRF policy.  Examination 
of these factors reveals a gap between avowed official U.S. interest 
in protecting indigenous TKGRF and the realities of available 
protection under IACA. 
 
 388 Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).  Congress passed IACA on a 
unanimous voice vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on November 
29, 1990.  Whether this indicates unusually broad interest in and unanimous support for 
the bill, or general apathy toward an unobjectionable bill perceived by many to be 
innocuous, or any number of other views, can only be a matter of speculation. 
 389 See, e.g., U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16; Lourie Statements supra note 212. 
 390 Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-497, 114 Stat. 
2219 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 305e). 
 391 See generally 25 C.F.R. § 309.1–.27 (2003). 
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Under IACA, “[i]t is unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell 
any good . . . in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian 
produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian 
or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization, resident 
within the United States.”392  IACA is implemented mainly 
through the Indian Arts and Crafts Board (the “Board”), which has 
been in existence since the 1930s.393  In 1990, however, Congress 
expanded the Board’s mandate considerably, giving it the rather 
grandiose new responsibility of “implementing the [IACA], 
promoting the development of U.S. Indian and Alaska Native arts 
and crafts, improving the economic status of members of federally 
recognized Tribes, and helping to establish and expand marketing 
opportunities for arts and crafts produced by U.S. Indians and 
Alaska Natives.”394 
The Board characterizes IACA as a “truth-in-advertising law” 
designed to prevent the marketing of products misrepresented as 
produced by Indians.395  Case law interprets IACA as a strict 
liability statute with the dual purposes of: 1) protecting Indian 
artists from unfair competition from counterfeiters, and 2) 
protecting consumers from unknowingly purchasing imitation 
products.396  Statutory violations carry fairly severe civil397 and 
criminal398 penalties. 
Both the structure and language of IACA and its associated 
politics have been controversial ever since its passage more than a 
 
 392 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2004). 
 393 See 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2004); William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A 
Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1018 
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early activity, and events leading to the later passage of IACA). 
 394 Protection of Products of Indian Art and Craftsmanship, 66 Fed. Reg. 27915 
(proposed May 21, 2001) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 309.1–.21). 
 395 See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Indian Arts & Crafts Bd., The Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act of 1990, at http://www.doi.gov/iacb/act.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) (summarizing 
the IACA). 
 396 See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880, 882 
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 397 See 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2004). 
 398 See 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (2004). 
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decade ago.399  One of the more problematic aspects of IACA is 
that it arbitrarily limits those people defined as “Indian” to 
members or certified artisans of a state or federally recognized 
Indian tribe.400  This drastically limits the size and makeup of the 
group of indigenous artisans that may unqualifiedly represent their 
artistic creations to be Indian products.  An “Indian tribe” is “[a]ny 
Indian tribe, band, nation, Alaska Native village, or any organized 
group or community which is recognized as eligible for the special 
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians 
because of their status as Indians” or “[a]ny Indian group that has 
been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature 
or by a State commission or similar State organization legislatively 
vested with State tribal recognition authority.”401  People not 
formally enrolled as tribal members may be certified as non-
member Indian artisans of the tribe,402 but such people must be of 
Indian lineage through one or more members of the certifying 
tribe, and each certification must be documented in writing by the 
governing body of the certifying tribe.403 
Under some factual scenarios, these definitional provisions 
may conflict with well-settled case law that an Indian tribe has the 
authority to determine its own membership.404 IACA definitions 
may also conflict with the many definitions of “Indian” used for 
other federal statutory law purposes.405  In addition, there are many 
legitimate reasons—including political and ideological ones—why 
an individual of clear Indian descent might fail or refuse to be 
officially enrolled in the membership records of a tribe or certified 
as an artisan.406  This is likely to affect increasingly large numbers 
of individuals, as more Native Americans move to urban areas and 
 
 399 See Hapiuk, supra note 393. 
 400 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1). 
 401 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(e). 
 402 See id. § 309.2(b). 
 403 See id. § 309.25. 
 404 See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1012 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 72 n.32 (1978)). 
 405 See id. at 1012 n.12 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 
(Rennard Strickland ed., 1982)).  There is no single federal definition of “Indian tribe.” 
See id. 
 406 See id. at 1013, 1063. 
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a unitary, “pan-tribal” Indian identity emerges.407  Under IACA, 
these people cannot unqualifiedly sell or market their artistic 
creations as Indian or Native American products, even if both of 
their parents are full-blooded members of the same tribe.408 
As mentioned above, the Board, an independent board within 
the Department of the Interior (and not, as often assumed, part of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs),409 is the main vehicle for Indian arts 
and crafts promotion.410  Since 1990, the Board has been assigned 
primary government responsibility for market research concerning 
sales opportunities for Indian arts and crafts products, for engaging 
in related technical research and assistance, and for coordinating 
related activities among other U.S. government and private 
agencies.411  The Board is also required to manage specific related 
projects and to make recommendations concerning government 
loans to support production and sale of Indian products.412  The 
Board itself cannot borrow or lend money, nor can it deal in Indian 
goods.413 
It is particularly relevant to current TKGRF discussions that 
since 1990, Congress has intended the Board to create, on a cost-
free basis, trademarks for qualifying Indian arts and crafts 
producers.414  According to at least one legal thinker, this was 
considered the most promising part of IACA at the time of its 
passage.415  On the facial language of the statute, the Board has the 
power to create trademarks for Indian products, either in the name 
of the Board itself,416 or for individual Indians or Indian tribes or 
 
 407 See id. at 1063. 
 408 See 25 C.F.R. § 309.24; see also supra notes 402–03 and accompanying text. 
 409 See U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16 (oral clarification made at presentation). 
 410 See supra note 393 and accompanying text. 
 411 See 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2004). 
 412 See id. 
 413 See id. 
 414 See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1069 (quoting 25 U.S.C § 305a(g)(3) (1994)). 
 415 See id. at 1067 (citing To Expand the Powers of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board: 
Hearing on H.R. 2006 Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs Held in 
Santa Fe, NM, 101st Cong. 13 (1989) (statement of Leo Calac, Vice Chairman, IACB). 
 416  Art and craft goods handmade by American Indians and Alaskan natives may be 
trademarked as “Indian Arts and Crafts Board Genuine Handicrafts Certified Indian 
Enterprise U.S. Department of the Interior” (certification mark registration number 
2479552). See USPTO, Trademark Electronic Search System, at 
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Indian arts and crafts organizations.417  The Board also has the 
authority to establish standards and regulations for use of 
government-owned trademarks in the Indian arts and crafts area, 
including setting licensing fees for trademark use.418  IACA gives 
the Board power to register these government-owned trademarks 
with the USPTO, free of charge, and to assign them and their 
associated goodwill to individual Indians or Indian tribes, also free 
of charge.419  The Board can pursue or defend court appeals or 
proceedings with respect to any final determination of the USPTO 
in relation to these trademarks.420 
Unfortunately, the intended free trademark program for 
qualifying Indians has never been implemented.  One of the 
longstanding problems with the law as drafted is that registration 
of a mark that is intended at the time of filing not to be used by the 
Board itself, but instead to be subsequently assigned to an Indian 
tribe or other third party, legally results in a void mark.421  This is 
because the Lanham Act requires that an applicant for registration 
of a trademark must itself use that mark in commerce or in good 
faith intend to so use it.422  Applications for registration of marks 
that are intended from the start to be owned and used only by 
Indians or Indian tribes obviously cannot meet this requirement. 
Ironically, only the Board’s own certification mark meets the 
statutory requirements.  Today, an Indian producer who has 
independently paid for and registered its own trademark can get 
permission to use the Board’s mark in conjunction with the 
producer’s own mark, thus certifying that the producer’s goods 
meet the Board’s standards.423  But qualifying Indian individuals 
 
http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter 
TESS] (allowing searches by registrant’s name to access trademark registration 
information). 
417  See 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(1).   
 418 See 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(2). 
 419 See id. § 305a(g)(3). 
 420 See id. § 305a(g)(4). 
 421 See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1069 (noting that the Lanham Act requires that the 
registrant be the user of the mark, and that such mark may not be one the government 
intends to use).  
 422 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2004). 
 423 See 25 C.F.R. § 308.2(a) (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN ARTS AND 
CRAFTS BOARD, FACT SHEET (“FACT SHEET”). 
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and entities cannot obtain free trademarks of their own and use 
them independent of the U.S. government’s name, standards-
setting and control. 
The Board is aware of the trademark problem and thus has not 
attempted to register any Indian marks for assignment.424  In fact, 
the chair of the Board explained the nature of this trademark 
dilemma to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs prior to 
passage of the Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000 and 
offered draft language to resolve the problem,425 but the suggested 
changes were not incorporated into that law.426  Today the problem 
continues to exist. 
In the summer of 2002, Senators Inouye and Campbell 
introduced the “Indian Programs Reauthorization and Technical 
Amendments Act of 2002” in the U.S. Senate during the 107th 
Congress.427  The bill addressed many indigenous peoples’ issues, 
ranging from Native Hawaiian health care improvements to 
provisions concerning oil shale reserves and water feasibility 
studies for particular tribes.428  Among the diverse items contained 
in the bill as introduced were remedial amendments to IACA.429  
After significant revisions, the bill passed the Senate in November 
2002 as the Native American Omnibus Act of 2002, unfortunately 
without the IACA amendments.430  The IACA corrections have not 
been reintroduced in the 108th Congress, so the law remains 
unchanged at this time. 
Ironically, then, the only way the trademark provisions of 
IACA have been implemented is that the Board has registered its 
 
 424 Telephone Interview with Ken Van Wey, Program Assistant, Indian Arts and Crafts 
Board (Apr. 29, 2003) (on file with author). 
 425 See Implementation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act: Hearing before the Senate 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Faith Roessel, Chair, Indian 
Arts and Crafts Board). 
 426 See 25 U.S.C § 305e (2004). 
 427 S. Res. 2711.IS, 107th Cong. (2002) (as introduced in the Senate). 
 428 Id. 
 429 Id. § 301 (amending § 2(g) of the IACA). 
 430 S. Res. 2711.ES, 107th Cong. (2002) (as passed by the Senate).  The revised bill was 
referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources on November 22, 2002, but it did 
not come before the full House for a vote before the session ended. See S. Res. 
2711.RFH, 107th Cong. (2002) (as referred to House Committee after being received 
from the Senate). 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
78 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:1 
own certification mark and established government standards for 
Indian products and a procedure for indigenous use of the 
government’s mark.431  According to the “Fact Sheet” published by 
the Board on intellectual property matters relating to Indian arts 
and crafts, “[e]ach eligible Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut crafts 
marketing enterprise has the privilege of attaching to its [own] 
registered trademark a certificate declaring that the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Board recognizes their [sic] products as authentic Native 
American handicrafts.”432 
In this rather paternalistic style, the regulations require that an 
Indian enterprise wishing to participate in its certification program 
must 1) be entirely Native American owned and organized, 2) offer 
for sale only genuine Native American handicraft products, and 3) 
agree to apply the Board’s certificate of genuineness only to 
products that meet the Board’s quality standards.433  Additionally, 
it is implicit in the regulations that the Indian artist must first 
register his or her own trademark in order to pay for and participate 
in the program.434  This is a considerably narrower and more 
difficult set of standards to meet than those which Congress 
attempted to authorize on the face of the IACA statutory 
language.435  In addition, the Fact Sheet gives readers wishing to 
participate no definition of the terms “Native American” or 
“genuine Native American handicraft products,” so it is difficult to 
know from the publication how to meet the requirements of the 
Fact Sheet.436 
The Fact Sheet promises that the Board “is in the process of 
setting up a trademark program, which will enable the Board to 
 
 431 See 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(1)–(3) (2004) (establishing the Board’s power to create and 
license trademarks conferring “genuine” status); 25 C.F.R. § 308.3 (2004) (defining the 
conditions for use of the government’s mark); FACT SHEET, supra note 423. 
 432 FACT SHEET, supra note 423. 
 433 See 25 C.F.R. § 308.3. 
 434 See id. § 308.2 (“[T]he Indian Arts and Crafts Board offers each such enterprise the 
privilege of attaching to its trademark a certificate declaring that it is recognized by the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Board as an Indian enterprise dealing in genuine Indian-made 
handicraft products, and that its trademark has the approval of the Board.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 435 See IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
 436 See FACT SHEET, supra note 423. 
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register trademarks for federally recognized tribes and their 
members.”437  In truth, however, the Board is waiting for new, 
curative legislation to be passed before deciding on any of the 
details of this trademark program.438  Of course, even if the 
trademark program is implemented as originally envisioned, it may 
not be attractive to some tribes or individuals who, quite 
legitimately, wish to operate autonomously and without 
government participation in, or direct knowledge of, their creative 
endeavors. 
In 1999, the USPTO recommended in a Congressionally-
mandated study that concerted government education efforts were 
necessary to inform Native Americans and other members of the 
U.S. public about the existence of IACA.439  Although that study 
was written nearly a decade after the original passage of IACA, it 
did not mention the trademark voidness issue.440  Instead, it stated 
unambiguously that the Board has the power to create trademarks 
on behalf of Indian tribes without charge;441 thus, it appears that 
the USPTO was unaware that in this respect, IACA could not be, 
and had never been, implemented. 
The USPTO also noted in the same study that “enforcement is 
the key to full enjoyment of [intellectual property] rights,” and it 
opined that IACA provides an effective enforcement mechanism 
through the Board’s power to refer IACA investigation and 
enforcement actions to the FBI and the Attorney General.442  
Unfortunately, the USPTO did not provide any statistical or 
anecdotal analyses in the study that illustrate how many 
investigations or formal legal enforcement proceedings had 
actually been undertaken pursuant to Board referral during IACA’s 
first nine years of existence.443 
 
 437 Id. 
 438 Written correspondence with Meredith Z. Stanton, Acting Director, Indian Arts and 
Crafts Board  (June 9, 2003) [hereinafter Stanton Correspondence] (on file with author). 
 439 See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 45. 
 440 See generally id. 
 441 See id. at 27, 39. 
 442 Id. at 39. 
 443 See id. 
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No statistical information concerning IACA investigations and 
enforcement is readily available to the public today, and the 
recommended educational effort has apparently not taken place.  
Additionally, it cannot be easily assessed whether the enforcement 
referral mechanism is a meaningful feature of IACA or whether 
IACA is independently enforced (without Board referral) by state 
and federal agencies, since these activities, at least by federal 
agencies, are not conducted transparently.444  It is clear, however, 
that reported case law does not reflect widespread litigation under 
either the civil or criminal enforcement provisions of IACA.445 
Despite this, at the February 2003 meeting of the OAS, the 
United States’ written statement relating to the intellectual property 
rights provision of the OAS Draft Declaration proclaimed that the 
Board’s top priority is enforcement and implementation of 
IACA.446  The statement also specifically mentioned that one of 
the purportedly available “special measures for Native American 
Tribes”447 empowers the Board to register “government trademarks 
 
 444 In an attempt to determine the validity of policymakers’ claims of the value of IACA 
to protect indigenous TKGRF through vigorous enforcement, I queried the Acting 
Director of the Board, Ms. Meredith Stanton, in mid-2003 about the number of matters 
the Board had referred to other agencies for investigation under the statute since 1990.  
Unfortunately, Ms. Stanton agreed to consider only written questions and also would 
respond only in writing.  The written response to my general query about how many 
matters had been referred by the Board to other agencies for civil or criminal 
investigation since 1990 was only that on-going investigations could not be discussed.  
The written response to a series of questions concerning the number of civil and criminal 
convictions obtained under IACA since 1990 was that, though the Board is aware that 
other agencies have filed legal actions, the Board does not know the status of any of 
them. See Stanton Correspondence, supra note 438.   
 Sources at the Department of Justice were equally unforthcoming and were willing to 
say only that the Department of Justice does not make available to the public any 
information about investigations, that it does not keep statistics on convictions or 
judgments obtained under IACA, and that its officials know of no other agency that does 
so, either.  This combined official reticence about IACA enforcement seems curious, in 
light of the emphasis put on the value of IACA, and to its enforcement provisions 
specifically, by U.S. officials in international TKGRF discussions. 
 445 See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18322 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2004); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14289 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2004); Flodine v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4006 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2003); Native Am. Arts v. Earthdweller, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9750 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2002). 
 446 See U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16, at 6. 
 447 See id. at 5. 
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of genuineness and quality on behalf of individual Indians and 
Indian tribes.”448  U.S. officials made a similar representation at 
the 4th WIPO IGC in late 2002.449  These representations 
obviously do not reflect the realities of actual implementation and 
enforcement of IACA. 
B. Alaska’s Silver Hand Program 
Whatever IACA’s shortcomings in the federal venue, there is 
an analogous, state-based program that is gaining popularity 
among indigenous local artisans and local consumers.  Alaska’s 
unique indigenous handicraft certification program is known as the 
“Silver Hand Program.”450  While state officials view it as a 
“branding” mechanism or a kind of consumer protection 
program,451 the Silver Hand Program actually functions much like 
a state-owned certification mark.452  Not surprisingly, the Alaska 
State Council on the Arts consulted the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Board prior to launch of the Alaska program,453 and both parties 
continue to confer concerning their respective program 
development.454 
The Alaska Native handicraft certification scheme was 
designed in 1961.455  The Native certification program was 
originally aimed at certifying the authenticity of one-of-a-kind 
items created by individual Alaska Native artisans in cottage 
industry settings, whereas the parallel program for non-Natives 
was intended to cover the products of larger (even if still relatively 
 
 448 Id. at 9. 
 449 Lourie Statements, supra note 212. 
 450 ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.65.010–.070 (Michie 2003). 
 451 Telephone Interview with Saunders McNeill, Native Arts Program Director, Alaska 
State Council on the Arts (Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter McNeill Interview] (on file with 
author); see also Alaska State Council on the Arts, Silver Hand Permit Application, 
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/forms/individuals/sh.pdf (last visited on Nov. 15, 2004). 
 452 State ownership and control of the mark—the Silver Hand seal—is analogous to 
Board ownership and administration of its federal certification mark under IACA.  One  
very notable difference, however, is that an Alaska Native artist is not required to obtain 
his or her own individual trademark before applying for and using the Silver Hand seal. 
 453 Stanton Correspondence, supra note 438; McNeill Interview, supra note 451. 
 454 McNeill Interview, supra note 451. 
 455 See FTC Takes Action against Fake Native Artwork, KENAI PENINSULA ONLINE, Oct. 
8, 2002, at http://peninsulaclarion.com/stories/100802/ala_100802alapm0010001.shtml. 
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small) arts manufacturing concerns.456  Under the statutory 
scheme, a person who makes an authentic Native handicraft within 
Alaska may, under certain conditions, obtain a permit to affix a 
state-administered seal attesting to the origin and authenticity of 
the article.457  The seal consists of a silver hand symbol bearing the 
words “Authentic Native Handicraft from Alaska” and includes a 
blank line on which the individual artist can write in his or her 
name and the place of origin of the article.458  Tags or labels 
bearing this seal are issued by the state to Alaska Native permit 
holders for use solely on their own handicrafts; the permits are 
issued for two years and must be renewed periodically,459 though 
the permit number is assigned to the holder for life, whether or not 
he or she continuously uses it.460  Silver Hand seals may be used 
only when an article is made solely by an individual permit 
holder,461 precluding works made jointly by an Alaska Native 
permit holder and any other person who is not also a separate 
permit holder in his or her own right, whether or not such person is 
an Alaska Native. 
By statute, the Alaska State Council on the Arts administers 
issuance and control of the seals, supervises their use, issues 
permits to agents who can distribute the seals to persons creating 
qualifying handicrafts, and enforces associated laws and rules.462  
It is also responsible for determining the design of seals, their 
method of affixation, and their preparation and control.463  
Although the statute does not specifically require it, the Alaska 
State Council on the Arts in fact maintains a central registry of all 
 
 456 Id.  The parallel program, “Made in Alaska,” was “designed to promote products 
made or manufactured in the state and handicrafts produced by both Native and non-
Native craftspersons.” ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 58.040(a) (2004); see also Made in 
Alaska, About MIA, at http://www.madeinalaska.org/mia/about.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 
2004). 
 457 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.010(a) (Michie 2004). 
 458 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.030(a) (Michie 2004). 
 459 See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 58.020(d) (2004); Silver Hand Permit Application, 
supra note 451. 
 460 McNeill Interview, supra note 451. 
 461 See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 58.020(c)(3)(A) (2004). 
 462 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.020(b) (Michie 2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 
58.005–.035, .060–.900 (2004). 
 463 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.020(b). 
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permit holders qualified to use the seal on their handicrafts.464  Use 
of the plural form of “seals” in the statutory language may mean 
that more than one type or class of seal could be created for 
various Native handicrafts, or possibly even different seals for 
different tribes or indigenous groups, but presently only one seal 
exists for all qualifying handicrafts. 
Under Alaska’s statute, “‘authentic Native handicraft’ means 
an article made in the state which is composed wholly, or in some 
significant respect, of natural materials, and which is produced, 
decorated or fashioned by an Alaska Native.”465  “‘Native’ means 
[an Alaskan] resident having not less than one-quarter Eskimo, 
Aleut or Indian blood.”466  An artisan must document this fact 
either through possession of a Certificate of Indian Blood from the 
United States Department of the Interior, “an official letter from a 
village or regional corporation” established under the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, or an “official letter from a 
village council or tribe in which the applicant is a member,” 
together with a state driver’s license or other photo 
identification.467  According to the Silver Hand permit application, 
“American Indians whose tribes are indigenous to other states are 
not eligible” to participate in the Silver Hand program,468 although 
this is not clear from the statute itself.  Presumably, this means that 
an Alaska resident from the Navajo Nation could not use the Silver 
Hand seal for his or her handicrafts, even if the articles met the 
other required criteria; he or she could qualify only to participate in 
the non-Native handicraft certification program, despite Alaska 
resident status. 
Criminal penalties attach to violations of the Alaska statute.469  
Knowing or willful affixation of a seal to a non-authentic article, or 
offer of sale or actual sale of a non-authentic article bearing such a 
seal, is a Class B misdemeanor if the individual affixing or selling 
 
 464 McNeill Interview, supra note 451.  The registry is available through the Alaska 
State Council on the Arts website. See List of Silver Hand Permit Holders,  
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/SilverHand2004.xls (last modified June 29, 2004). 
 465 ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.070(1) (Michie 2004). 
 466 Id. § 45.65.070(5). 
 467 Silver Hand Permit Application, supra note 451. 
 468 Id. 
 469 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.060 (Michie 2004). 
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the article knows that the article is not an authentic Native 
handicraft.470  Similarly, an agent who knowingly or willfully 
issues a seal permit for an article that is not an authentic Native 
handicraft is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor,471 as is anyone who 
“knowingly or willfully alters, changes, or counterfeits” a Silver 
Hand Program seal.472 
The Silver Hand program envisions that the permit holder will 
use the seal in connection with advertising and on marketing and 
business materials associated with the handicrafts, so long as the 
use is not false or misleading and so long as the seal is not 
incorporated directly into a business logo or label or used in a 
dominant manner in a product.473  Interestingly, the Alaska State 
Council on the Arts, using its discretion, has discontinued a part of 
the Silver Hand Program outlined by the state statute.474  The result 
is that agents can no longer be appointed by the state to issue 
permits to individual Native artisans.475  The Council took this 
action because agents were failing to register individual artisans 
properly and because it wanted to ensure appropriate quality 
control of certified handicrafts.476  Since this change was effected 
in 1998, the Silver Hand Program registry has grown from roughly 
350 to more than 1100 permit holders.477 
The program’s legal requirements and state-based regulatory 
support are reminiscent of the requirements for establishing and 
policing a certification mark in the federal trademark system.478  
Although the Silver Hand seal is not specifically referred to in state 
statutory or administrative materials as a certification mark or 
trademark per se—and it is apparently not viewed as such by its 
 
 470 See id. § 45.65.060(a)–(b). 
 471 See id. § 45.65.060(f). 
 472 See id. § 45.65.060(c). 
 473 See id. 
 474 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.045(b) (Michie 2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 
58.030 (2004). 
 475 McNeill Interview, supra note 451. 
 476 Id. 
 477 Id.  As of June 29, 2004, there were 1125 registered Silver Hand permit holders. See 
List of Silver Hand Permit Holders, supra note 464. 
 478 See infra notes 487–93 and accompanying text. 
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administrators479—it actually appears to function in a strikingly 
similar manner.  The seal enjoys growing popularity among 
artisans, and it appears to be quite successful and useful, both to 
them and to consumers.480 
The Silver Hand program could be a useful model for other 
indigenous groups and states interested in locally run government 
certification programs for TKGRF.  This type of program seems to 
function effectively in providing a reliable system under which 
consumer familiarity and confidence in the uniform quality of 
indigenous handicrafts and works of art can grow, so long as the 
certifying entity plays an active role in ensuring that quality control 
with proper supervision is supported by meticulous registration and 
records keeping. 
One advantage of this kind of state certification program 
(especially if it includes criminal as well as civil penalties), which 
lies outside a “pure” state trademark rubric but within the province 
of consumer-type statutes, is that both state and federal agencies 
may have concurrent jurisdiction and, thus, greater willingness to 
jointly participate in enforcement than in a formal trademark 
scenario.  With respect to Alaska’s statute, the State Attorney 
General’s office, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the 
Department of Justice, and the U.S. Customs Service have all, 
from time to time, been involved in investigating complaints 
arising in connection with the Silver Hand Program.481  Also, from 
an indigenous peoples’ standpoint, state-run programs dispense 
with the necessity of using scarce tribal financial resources for 
program operating expenses, trademark registrations, and attorney 
fees, though state programs also prevent tribal autonomy over the 
specifics of certification standards.482 
 
 479 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.045(b) (Michie 2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 
58.030 (2004). 
 480 See, e.g., note 477 and accompanying text.  
 481 Id.; Telephone Interview with Chuck Harwood, Regional Director, Northwest 
Region, FTC (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Harwood Interview] (notes from interview on 
file with author); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Distributes 300,000 Postcards and 
Brochures to Educate Shoppers Seeking Authentic Alaska Native Art (July 22, 2003),  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07-/alaska.htm; FTC Takes Action against Fake Native 
Artwork, supra note 455. 
 482 See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1065. 
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C. Federal Trade Commission Act 
In conjunction with the Alaska experience, the Federal Trade 
Commission has become interested in handicraft authenticity 
issues and has investigated numerous violations of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).483  The FTC Act applies in 
the TKGRF context when there allegedly has been a material 
misrepresentation to consumers concerning goods supposedly 
created by Native Americans, but in fact produced by others.484  
The FTC has also made a modest effort to educate Alaska’s 
summertime tourists about this problem, distributing brochures and 
postcard information to cruise companies, travel agencies, airlines, 
and others, informing them about how to determine the 
authenticity of indigenous handicrafts.485  It has investigated 
several complaints about related consumer protection violations in 
the state over the last few years, and it successfully settled one case 
in 1996, in which Eskimo carvers were producing handicraft items 
and falsely marketing them for sale in the United States as the 
creations of Northwest Coastal Indians.486 
D. USPTO Database of Native American Tribal Insignia 
Another feature of U.S. law that is widely cited by U.S. 
officials as evidence of government support for legal protection of 
indigenous TKGRF is the Database of Native American Tribal 
Insignia (“Database”), which is maintained by the USPTO.487  
Contrary to its name, the Database is not an independent database, 
separate from other USPTO information, but is just one component 
of the general trademark database administered by the USPTO.488  
It may be accessed and searched electronically via the Trademark 
 
 483 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). 
 484 Harwood Interview, supra note 481. 
 485 Press Release, FTC, FTC Heads Education Campaign to Help Shoppers Assure 
Alaskan Native Art is Authentic (May 14, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/05-
/akart.htm. 
 486 See Press Release, FTC, Ivory Jack’s and Northwest Tribal Arts Agree to Settle FTC 
Charges that They Sold Fake Native American Artwork (Apr. 12, 1996), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/04/ivory-j.htm. 
 487 See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22. 
 488 See id. (at response to question 2). 
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Electronic Search System, or TESS.489  “‘Official insignia of 
Native American tribes’”—“the insignia that may be registered in 
the database—”means the flag or coat of arms or other emblem or 
device of any federally or State recognized Native American tribe, 
as adopted by tribal resolution and notified to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.”490 
The tribal insignia database is maintained as a reference tool 
for federal trademark examiners.491  If, for example, a third party 
attempts to register a mark that falsely suggests a connection with 
a Native American tribe that has its official insignia on file, the 
examiner refers to the collection in the database and can, where 
appropriate, refuse registration to the third party mark.492  While 
this is somewhat useful, U.S. officials at recent IGC and OAS 
meetings have gone so far as to champion the Database as a 
valuable legal tool that demonstrates the U.S. government’s 
commitment to protecting the intellectual property rights of 
indigenous peoples.493 
This position is more than a little misleading.  In reality, the 
Database appears to be a rather pro forma attempt to comply with 
international treaty terms, rather than to represent any real or 
concerted effort to protect indigenous TKGRF.  It seems to have 
been created for reasons largely unrelated to government concern 
for TKGRF.  The Database was the result of a Congressionally-
mandated USPTO study,494 which in turn resulted from the United 
States’ desire to accede to the Trademark Law Treaty495 in the late 
1990’s.  That treaty is aimed mainly at eliminating the enormous 
 
 489 See id.; see also TESS, supra note 416. 
 490 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
25:67.1, at 25-152–25-153 (4th ed. 2002) (quoting USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 
24). 
 491 See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 8). 
 492 Id. 
 493 See Lourie Statements, supra note 212; see also U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16. 
 494 USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 2.  The study was mandated by Title III of Public 
Law 105-330. 
 495 WIPO, Trademark Law Treaty, adopted at Geneva, Switz. Oct. 27. 1994 [hereinafter 
Trademark Law Treaty], http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/tlt (last visited Nov. 15, 
2002). 
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variation among countries in trademark registration formalities.496  
When Congress passed the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation 
Act497 in 1998, it required, incidentally, an insignia protection 
study as part of the overall treaty compliance package.498 
While the USPTO had, in 1994, contacted all federally 
registered Native American tribes with the objective of compiling 
a list of official insignia for use in determining general trademark 
registrability, “to ensure that third parties do not register 
trademarks that give a false impression of the true origin of the 
goods or services,” no database had resulted.499  Conveniently, 
however, this initial tribal contact was repackaged five years later 
in the USPTO Report, under the somewhat dubious heading, “The 
PTO Takes an Active Role in Protecting Native Americans.”500  In 
reality, the Database was finally created as a direct result of the 
later treaty obligations, a fact substantiated in a much later official 
U.S. response to a WIPO questionnaire on TKGRF.501  This survey 
response was submitted by the USPTO itself, through the then-
Administrator for External Affairs, Robert Stoll, well after 
completion of the USPTO study.502  This sequence of events lends 
credence to the theory that creation of the Database did not, reflect 
any pronounced interest by the U.S. government in protecting 
indigenous intellectual property, contrary to present U.S. policy 
characterization in international discussion forums. 
The 1998 Congressional mandate required that the USPTO 
study the impact that a tribal insignia database, along with 
concomitant changes in U.S. trademark law or policy potentially 
prohibiting marks identical to official tribal insignia, would have 
on Native American tribes, on the agency itself, and on other 
 
 496 Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998). 
 497 Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 
(1998) (enacted Oct. 30, 1998 and codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 498 See id. § 302(a)(2). 
 499 See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 14, 45. 
 500 See id. at 14. 
 501 Questionnaire Response, supra note 386, at 1. 
 502 Id. 
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interested parties.503  The USPTO was also directed to study the 
effects of prohibitions on new uses of such insignia, and changes in 
law or policy with respect to defenses to claims of insignia 
infringement.504  The administrative feasibility and cost of 
protecting official tribal insignia were examined, as well as the 
effect of prohibiting registrations or new uses.505  Congress 
unequivocally directed the Commissioner of the USPTO to solicit 
public comment and to use “any appropriate additional measures, 
including field hearings, to obtain as wide a range of views as 
possible from Native American tribes, trademark owners, and other 
interested parties.”506 
In response, the USPTO published notice of the upcoming 
study in the Federal Register.507  The agency scheduled field 
hearings to consider the study’s issues in Albuquerque, NM; San 
Francisco, CA; and Arlington, VA.508  Those wishing to testify 
were required to give written notice to the USPTO prior to the first 
of the series of hearings, along with a written copy of planned 
testimony.509  The agency allocated between five and fifteen 
minutes per speaker, and prior agency approval was required.510  
Only information that speakers wished to be electronically 
accessible for public dissemination was to be submitted.511 
Under these circumstances, the agency received only thirty-
three written responses, and a mere thirty-six witnesses gave oral 
testimony.512  Among the respondents were the powerful American 
Intellectual Property Law Association, DaimlerChrysler, the 
International Trademark Association, Mohawk Carpet 
Corporation, the National Coalition on Racism in Sports and 
 
 503 See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 7–8; see also Trademark Law Treaty 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, § 302, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998). 
 504 See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 7–8. 
 505 See id. at 8. 
 506 Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act § 302(b)(1). 
 507 Request for Comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 71619 (Dec. 29, 1998). 
 508 Notice of Hearings, 64 Fed. Reg. 29841 (June 3, 1999). 
 509 Id. at 29842. 
 510 Id. 
 511 Id. 
 512 See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 3.  The USPTO’s 1994 inquiry had received 
only approximately ten responses. See id. at 14. 
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Media, the New Mexico Book Association, two state universities, 
and two Congressional offices; twenty-five responses came from 
individuals or from Native American tribal representatives 
identifiable as such by their names.513 
This can hardly be said to be a representative cross-section of 
opinion of the nearly 600 federally recognized Native American 
tribes.514  Of course, U.S. government communications are not 
always user-friendly, and intellectual property issues can be 
complex, even when the intended audience has the necessary 
educational and business background.  It would not be surprising, 
though, if the considerable advance notice and written preparation 
requirements were off-putting obstacles, especially for participants 
wanting only to testify orally.  Financial and travel burdens were 
likely also to have been insurmountable for many potential 
participants, particularly since many indigenous U.S. peoples live 
in remote locations, far from the three scheduled testimony points, 
including in Alaska and Hawaii. 
The USPTO, however, apparently viewed its actions as 
tantamount to taking all “appropriate additional measures, 
including field hearings, to obtain as wide a range of views as 
possible” from North American tribes.515  Based on this miniscule 
sampling of indigenous opinion, the USPTO posted written 
comments and hearing transcripts on its website several months 
earlier than the Congressionally imposed deadline of September 
30, 1999.516 
The USPTO Report recommended that it “should create, 
maintain, and update” an “accurate and comprehensive database 
containing the official insignia of all State and federally recognized 
Native American tribes.”517  It concluded that existing trademark 
law already provided legal tools sufficient to prohibit registration 
 
 513 Id. at 4–6. 
 514 See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United 
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003) (giving notice of “the 
current list of 562 tribal entities recognized and eligible for funding and services from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribes”). 
 515 Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, § 302(b)(1), 112 
Stat. 3064 (1998). 
 516 See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 3. 
 517 Id. at 47. 
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of official insignia or simulations in cases where the applicant is 
not the tribal owner.518  It deemed new legislation aimed at 
examination and registration unnecessary, as this could potentially 
cause unforeseen complications for innocent parties.519  The 
agency concluded that both retrospective and prospective changes 
in existing law would be unfair to members of the public who had 
in good faith been using terms or designs similar or identical to 
tribal insignia before the USPTO Report, so long as they did not 
intend to associate themselves falsely with a tribe and their goods 
or services were not so associated in the minds of consumers.520 
The agency also recommended against amending Lanham Act 
§2b,521 which prohibits registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or 
comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United 
States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or 
any simulation thereof.”522  The USPTO concluded that additional 
protection was not necessary “and might risk violation of U.S. 
international treaty obligations if it [offered] exclusive trademark 
protection to a particular indigenous group.”523 
In the fall of 2003, USPTO personnel confirmed that, more 
than four years after its inception, the entire Database consisted 
only of five tribal insignia.524  Usage was believed to be low, partly 
because, as even the USPTO admits, the Database is mainly useful 
to examiners, and there are no immediate advantages to trademark 
 
 518 See id. at 44. 
 519 See id. 
 520 See id. at 26. 
 521 MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 25:67.1, at 25-151. 
 522 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2001); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 25:67.1, at 25-
151 n.3; cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 25:67.1, at 25-154 (citing Mohegan Tribe of 
Indians of Conn. v. Mohegan Tribe and Nation, Inc., 255 Conn. 358, 769 A.2d 34 (Conn. 
2001) (holding “that one group of people from the Mohegan Indian tribe could not 
prevent another group of Mohegans from using the terms ‘Mohegan’ and ‘Mohegan 
Tribe’ because the designation “Mohegan” was a generic name for all Native American 
Indians of Mohegan descent”)). 
 523 USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 45. 
 524 Telephone Interview with Ari Liefman, Trademark Examining Attorney, Office of 
the Commissioner for Trademarks (Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Liefman Interview] (on 
file with author).  At the time of the interview, the agency had, however, just completed 
the positive step of sending out a mass mailing about the Database to all recognized 
tribes, in an effort to raise awareness. Id. 
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owners that would provide an incentive to participate.525  Tribes 
that do register their insignia in the Database are not, on this basis 
alone, afforded any of the benefits of trademark registration.526  
Rather, tribal owners must separately register their insignia as 
trademarks—and they must themselves pay the concomitant 
administrative and legal fees to do so—before trademark 
protection is available.527  Low participation may also be due to 
somewhat cumbersome Database registration requirements.528 
All of the foregoing factors tend to show that the Database, 
despite official representations to the contrary at international 
meetings, does not offer any broad or meaningful legal protection 
for indigenous TKGRF, nor does its creation signify any 
significant governmental policy interest in indigenous TKGRF 
protection. 
IV. HOW COULD U.S. LAW BE EXPANDED TO GIVE GREATER 
PROTECTION TO INDIGENOUS TKGRF, YET STILL REMAIN WITHIN 
ESTABLISHED REGIMES OF WESTERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW? 
Limited, but still meaningful, improvement in U.S. TKGRF 
protection could be attained within a relatively short time period by 
amending or improving implementation of current laws that 
specifically address Native American TKGRF.529  As discussed 
above, more meaningful implementation of the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act, through prompt amendment of its trademark 
provisions, expansion of state certification mark programs, greater 
enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act within a 
TKGRF context, and more substantial use of the USPTO’s 
Database of Native American Tribal Insignia, is a necessary step 
toward greater TKGRF protection in the U.S.530 
 
 525 Id.; see also USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 8). 
 526 See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 6). 
 527 See id.; see also USPTO, Basic Facts About Trademarks, at http://www.uspto.gov-
/web/offices/tac/doc/basic (last modified Nov. 8, 2004). 
 528 See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 5). 
 529 See supra Part III. 
 530 See supra Part III.A. 
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A further, important step, which respects current U.S. policy 
goals, is to expand indigenous use of U.S. intellectual property 
laws generally through: 1) wider use of certification and collective 
trademarks by indigenous creators;531 2) increased use by 
indigenous groups of Lanham Act §2 to prevent offensive or 
disparaging trademark registrations;532 3) expansion of the current 
moral rights regime, particularly on the state law level;533 and 4) 
establishment of a domestic system of geographical indications law 
for TKGRF protection.534  These topics are discussed below and 
followed by general observations on U.S. law and policy 
concerning TKGRF. 
A. Encourage Wider Indigenous Use of Current Trademark Tools 
Present U.S. trademark law contains provisions that could be 
more effectively implemented to provide indigenous U.S. peoples 
with better protection of certain TKGRF.  In particular, two special 
types of trademarks, certification marks535 and collective marks,536 
could be more frequently and effectively used to protect Native 
American products and services that embody or are derived from 
TKGRF.  The trademark provisions of IACA should be redrafted 
as explained above.537  Its implementation should be as originally 
intended,538 but with special emphasis on certification and 
collective marks.  Specialized, free legal expertise concerning 
certification and collective marks in the TKGRF context should 
also be made available to Native Americans wishing to take 
advantage of an amended IACA trademark program.  Section 2(a) 
of the Lanham Act, which prevents registration of offensive or 
disparaging marks, could be publicized and used more widely by 
indigenous U.S. populations and others to ensure proper treatment 
of TKGRF in the trademark field.  The resulting body of 
 
 531 See discussion infra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 532 See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
 533 See discussion infra Part IV.B.4. 
 534 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 535 See generally Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 17, and 28 U.S.C.) (2004). 
 536 See id. 
 537 See supra notes 421–29 and accompanying text. 
 538 See supra notes 414–19 and accompanying text. 
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interpretive law in this area could delineate constitutional 
boundaries of any new legislation that might give special 
protection to indigenous TKGRF. 
However, a major limitation of all trademark law for protecting 
TKGRF is that trademarks are merely indicators that provide 
reliable information about the source of goods and services to 
consumers, to prevent confusion as to origin.539  Trademarks offer 
no protection for the actual knowledge itself; they protect only the 
source designation of products (whether goods or services) created 
from that knowledge, and they are applicable only in a commerce-
oriented context.540  But for portions of TKGRF that indigenous 
groups do wish to commercialize, trademark law could be quite 
useful in delineating indigenous origin and production methods, as 
well as in educating the larger public about and creating wider 
respect for traditional goods and services. 
1. Certification Marks and TKGRF 
As previously mentioned in the Saami example, one of the 
concerns among indigenous people is that their knowledge, 
creations, and methods of creation may be taken by others, without 
authorization, and used in a manner that does not reflect 
indigenous origin at all or used to create another work that is not 
authentic and does not embody proper respect for the indigenous 
source society.541  In the context of the U.S., this means that goods 
or services may be passed off as “Indian” or as somehow 
originating in Indian culture, when actually they do not.  While 
IACA resolves some of this issue in the arts and crafts area, it does 
not address TKGRF material that is neither art nor craft.542  And 
though the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act may also address 
part of the problem in the commercial context,543 neither of these 
federal statutes facilitates development of public awareness of the 
specific identities, geographic homes, and creative contributions to 
 
 539 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004). 
 540 Id. 
 541 See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text. 
 542 See generally IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
 543 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2004). 
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U.S. society by the wide variety of indigenous groups in the United 
States.  This is a key facet of what indigenous groups are rightfully 
asking for now: greater recognition of who they are and their 
specific contributions to our present society.544 
For many indigenous groups, their geographical origin is an 
important part of their societal identity.  In light of the unique 
interdependence of many indigenous communities with their local 
natural environments,545 this is not surprising.  Only two areas of 
established intellectual property law, however, afford protection 
based on geographic origin: 1) geographical indications, which are 
discussed further below and which have not traditionally existed in 
U.S. law,546 and 2) and certification marks, which exist within the 
larger body of trademark law.547  Neither of these methods of 
protection has been greatly emphasized in international TKGRF 
discussions, but both may offer a partial solution for certain kinds 
of TKGRF protection. 
Until the signing of TRIPS, the only method available in the 
U.S. for registering a property right in a geographic source 
indicator was by registering a certification mark with the 
Trademark Office.548  The Lanham Act defines a certification mark 
as: 
any word, name, symbol, device or any combination 
thereof . . . used by a person other than its owner . . . to 
certify regional or other origin, . . . material, mode of 
manufacture, . . . or other characteristics of such person’s 
good or services or that the work or labor on the goods or 
services was performed by members of a[n] . . .  
organization.549 
 
 544 See Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the United States, National 
American Indian Heritage Month Proclamation (Nov. 19, 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011112-4.html; see generally 
Systematic Analysis, supra note 25. 
 545 See Presentation on Experiences, supra note 239, at Annex III. 
 546 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 547 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004). 
 548 See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:90. 
 549 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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The purpose of a certification mark thus differs somewhat from 
that of a “regular” trademark or service mark: a certification mark 
is owned by one party but used by others to certify that their goods 
or services conform to specified characteristics (which can include 
geographic or labor origins) set by the owner.550 
In the U.S. federal trademark system, there is no government 
control over the standards that are set for using any particular 
certification mark, apart from those for certification marks owned 
by the government itself.551  Instead, the mark owner sets the 
relevant standards.552  Then the owner convinces consumers, 
usually via advertising, that his certification system provides useful 
and reliable information about the quality and origins of associated 
products.553  This means that a Native American tribe, for example, 
could organize an entity to register a certification mark for tribal 
products or services and could require that they actually be 
produced or performed by tribal members, using only specified 
components and particular traditional methods.  Producers not 
meeting these standards would not, by definition, have access to 
use of the mark.  Consumers would, over time, come to associate 
the certification mark only with tribal products of a particular 
quality and method of production. 
There are special criteria for certification mark registration and 
maintenance in the U.S.  A certification mark may not be 
registered, and it is grounds for cancellation of an otherwise valid 
mark, if the owner of the mark: 
(A) does not control . . . the use of such mark, or (B) 
engages in the production or marketing of any goods or 
services to which the certification mark is applied, or (C) 
permits the use of the certification mark for purposes other 
than to certify, or (D) discriminately refuses to certify or to 
continue to certify the goods or services of any person who 
 
 550 MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19.91. 
 551 See id. 
 552 See id. 
 553 See id. 
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maintains the standards or conditions which such mark 
certifies . . . .554 
A certification mark thus functions as a kind of guarantee of 
certain characteristics common to the certified goods or services, 
rather than as a direct indicator of source.555  A certifier-owner also 
cannot produce goods under the certification mark, however, 
because the party who is setting the standards for certification is 
presumed to lose his objectivity concerning those standards if he is 
also a competitor in the same market.556 
Additionally, the certifier-owner cannot refuse to license the 
mark to anyone who meets the standards for using the mark, so the 
owner needs to think carefully about the characteristics of the 
audience to whom he will be required to license, in addition to the 
desired qualities of the certified goods themselves, when setting 
certification standards.557  In the TKGRF context, then, it might be 
especially important to require the creation of goods solely by 
tribal members or exclusively by using a form of traditional 
knowledge in the production methods, which could require 
supervision by shamans or other indigenous authorities.  Because 
the tribe itself could not own a certification mark and also sell the 
certified products and services, it would probably want to form 
some other legal entity to own the mark. 
It may be possible to develop common law rights in a 
certification mark without registering it federally, so long as the 
mark owner defines and requires adherence to certification 
standards.558  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and 
at least one court in the Eighth Circuit have stated that such 
common law rights can be created in certification marks.559  For 
indigenous groups unable to raise the fees associated with 
registering a federal certification mark, this might provide a viable, 
if somewhat risky, strategy for establishing a certification mark.  
 
 554 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2001). 
 555 See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:94. 
 556 See id. 
 557 See id. 
 558 See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:90. 
 559 See id. (citing Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746 (8th 
Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 (1995)). 
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Of course, such a mark might be judicially determined to have 
inherent local geographic and market limitations, a problem not 
faced by a federally registered mark.560 
Presently, only a few indigenous groups have independently 
registered their own federal certification marks.561  The current 
lack of popularity of certification marks among indigenous U.S. 
groups may result from various sources.  First, lack of information 
among indigenous people about these specialized types of marks is 
extremely likely, since detailed knowledge and understanding 
about trademarks in general is probably very limited among all 
U.S. citizens who are not trademark attorneys.  Second, registering 
a trademark requires paying a fee,562 and usually also attorneys’ 
fees, and this can present a substantial obstacle to many indigenous 
groups.  Third, proper use of certification marks requires 
considerable effort on the part of the mark owner to set standards 
and to ensure that producers’ goods and services consistently meet 
them.563  At the very least, this requires some sort of centralized 
 
 560 See Lourie Statements, supra note 212. 
 561 Author’s search of USPTO registration information (conducted on April 26, 2003, 
using the TESS search engine (see supra note 416)), specifically for certification marks 
containing such terms as “Native American,” “Indian,” “American Indian,” “Eskimo,” 
“Aleut,” “Shaman,” “Apache,” “Arapaho,” “Navajo,” “Hopi,” “Zuni,” “Sioux,” 
“Lakota,” “Tulalip,” “Six Nations,” “Athabascan,” “Yupik,” “Inuit,” “Tribe,” “Tribal,” 
and other similar terms revealed four such live marks.  Three of these marks belong to the 
Council of the Cowichan Indian Band in Canada (certification mark registration numbers 
2222979, 2219102, and 2221870), and one mark belongs to Mountain Chief Corp. in 
Montana (certification mark registration number 2392744).  The latter mark certifies that 
goods using the mark are made by Native Americans.  Another certification mark 
(registration number 1384860), owned by the Council of American Indian Artists 
Charitable Trust, was registered but has been cancelled for over ten years. 
 The author conducted a similar series of searches in connection with collective 
marks.  These searches obviously are not exhaustive, and special marks not containing 
the designated keywords in their registration documentation are not identified in these 
searches.  The author offers no conclusions concerning the status of any other type of 
U.S. trademark that may be held by indigenous groups, since, according to USPTO 
personnel, there is no way to verify accurately how many standard trademarks and 
service marks may be owned by indigenous groups. Liefman Interview, supra note 524. 
 562 See Basic Facts About Trademarks, Application Filing Fee, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic/appcontent.htm#fee (last modified Nov. 
8, 2004).  The current registration fee is $375 for paper filings and $325 for electronic 
filings. See FY 2005 Fee Schedule, Trademark Processing Fees (Jan. 4, 2005), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs-/ope/fee2004oct1.htm. 
 563 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2004). 
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record keeping and quality control, which may be costly and hard 
for indigenous owners (or anyone else) to establish and 
consistently maintain. 
If these obstacles could be overcome, however, certification 
marks could be far more valuable than standard trademarks for 
protecting some Native American TKGRF.  While standard 
trademarks identify only the source of goods or services, 
certification marks can convey much more specific quality, labor, 
and geographic origin information to consumers, who may in turn 
become loyal to that mark over time. 
2. Collective Marks and TKGRF 
Another special type of trademark that could be useful in the 
TKGRF context is the collective mark.  A collective mark is a 
trademark or service mark used by the members of a cooperative, 
an association, or other collective group or organization.564 
There are two different types of collective marks.565  The first 
type is used to identify members of a particular group, all of whom 
produce specific goods or services; it is intended to show that the 
relevant goods or services are produced by qualifying members 
meeting the membership standards of the organization.566  In 
contrast to certification marks, qualification is based on the 
producer’s ability to meet the standards for membership in the 
group, rather than whether the attributes of his goods and services 
meet specified standards.567  The second type of collective mark 
can be thought of as a collective membership mark, and members 
of a group or organization use this kind of mark merely to show 
their membership in that entity.568  This type of collective mark is 
the only registrable symbol not used by the sellers of anything; it 
merely reflects membership and does not refer at all to goods or 
services.569 
 
 564 See id. § 1127. 
 565 MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:99. 
 566 See id. 
 567 See id. 
 568 See id. 
 569 See id. § 19:101. 
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Both types of collective marks are of interest for indigenous 
TKGRF protection because, while either could be used to show the 
creator’s membership in an Indian arts and crafts organization or 
tribe or other ethnic group, neither would require the exacting 
product standards and quality control of a certification mark.570  A 
collective mark would thus be less difficult and expensive to 
register and maintain than a certification mark.571  If appropriately 
structured, the first type of collective mark could communicate 
much of the same information about indigenous producers as 
might a certification mark.  And collective marks could provide a 
potential intermediate vehicle through which to create public 
awareness of specific tribes and of individuals’ membership in 
those tribes, for later development into certification mark 
standards.  A collective membership mark might also be used to 
promote useful public awareness of tribal identity, even if the mark 
were only indirectly linked to TKGRF. 
Like certification marks, collective marks originated at 
common law, when clubs, churches and schools often had “trade 
names” protected under common law unfair competition principles 
developed prior to the Lanham Act.572  This characteristic may 
allow some indigenous groups, initially unable (for financial or 
other reasons) to register formal collective marks, to develop 
unregistered marks to build local market identity. 
At present, a few Native Americans have registered collective 
marks in the federal system.  Among these are the Navajo Code 
Talkers Association,573 the Cowlitz Indian Tribe,574 and the Inter-
Tribal Indian Ceremonial Association, Inc.575  Unfortunately, 
collective marks are not widely exploited by indigenous groups; 
probably, like certification marks, their potential for TKGRF 
protection is not widely understood. 
 
 570 See id. 
 571 See id. 
 572 See id. § 19:98. 
 573 See TESS, supra note 416 (search using registration number 2487105). 
 574 See TESS, supra note 416 (search using registration number 2326707). 
 575 See TESS, supra note 416 (search using registration number 1567693).  According to 
its registration application, this collective association “promotes the preservation of the 
Native American or American Indian culture, traditions, art and related activities.” Id. 
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Collective and certification marks are registrable and 
enforceable in the same manner as other trademarks.576  A useful 
characteristic of these marks for indigenous groups—whose 
members may be physically isolated from population centers and 
each other, and who have limited financial resources—is that a 
registrant does not need an industrial or commercial establishment, 
if he maintains proper control over the mark.577 
Thus, for many reasons, both collective and certification marks 
might be much more valuable tools than “regular” trademarks for 
protecting the unique characteristics of indigenous TKGRF.  
However, any government trademark registration program, under 
IACA or other legislation, must offer specialized trademark 
expertise and advice so that applicants may effectively utilize these 
specialized tools. 
An effective marketing and advertising plan needs to 
accompany proper choice of mark and registration, to ensure 
optimal development of consumer awareness of the meaning and 
ownership of the mark.578  Since the Board’s congressional 
mandate under IACA encompasses identifying and developing 
market opportunities for Indian arts and crafts, perhaps federal 
funding and assistance with tribal marketing plans could also be 
given directly to tribes.  Of course, financing and expertise for 
policing marks would also be needed in all cases to ensure 
successful goodwill development and mark maintenance after 
registration.  If such an integrated approach were used, indigenous 
certification and collective marks could, over time, effectively 
create sophisticated consumer markets for traditional products, 
including public awareness of specific tribal identities, practices, 
and knowledge and materials components. 
 
 576 See 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2004). 
 577 See id. § 1054 (2004). 
 578 See Mark Abell & Michael Stirling, Assessing and Enhancing Trademarks’ Value, 
Int’l Bar Ass’n (May 12, 2004), at http://comml-iba.org/modules.php?-
name=News&file=article&sid=59. 
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3. Lanham Act § 2(a) 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act579 is another provision in the 
U.S. trademark law regime that could be more widely used to 
protect indigenous peoples’ TKGRF.  Though little used until 
recently, this section enables the USPTO to refuse to register 
marks that may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with 
persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring these 
into “contempt or disrepute.”580  This provision of U.S. law is 
analogous to a similar provision in New Zealand’s new trademark 
act, discussed earlier, though the New Zealand provision makes 
specific reference to the act’s special applicability to its indigenous 
Maori community.581 
Indigenous people have not often used the U.S. provision, but 
it has the potential to provide unique protection against culturally 
and religiously offensive uses of indigenous TKGRF by third 
parties—uses that might in many other contexts be protected by the 
First Amendment.582  Its drawback, of course, is that it applies only 
to offensive uses in connection with federal trademarks,583 an 
inherently narrow segment of TKGRF material. 
Under Lanham Act § 2(a), the test for false suggestion of a 
connection requires: 1) that the name point uniquely to the opposer 
and be unmistakably associated with the person or institution 
opposing the mark application, and 2) that a connection with the 
 
 579 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2004). 
 580 Id. § 1052(a) ( “No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
register on account of its nature unless it—(a) [c]onsists of or comprises immoral, 
deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a 
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring 
them into contempt, or disrepute.”) 
 581 See Trade Marks Act, cl. 17, 2002 (N.Z.), available at http://www2.piperpat.co.nz-
/tmlaw/s000.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).  Among other things, in clause 17, it 
updates the registrability standard, which previously prohibited marks that were 
“scandalous” or “contrary to law or morality.” See Trade Marks Act, cl. 16(1), 1953 
(N.Z.) (repealed 2002), available at http://www2.piperpat.co.nz/tmlaw/tmact.html.  It 
will, instead, now prohibit marks that are “likely to offend a significant section of the 
community, including Maori.” Trade Marks Act, cl. 17(1)(b)(ii), 2002 (N.Z.). See also 
supra note 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 582 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 583 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
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opposer be presumed by a potential purchaser seeing the mark used 
on the applicant’s goods or services.584  A few religious and 
political groups have successfully sued, and marks such as Senussi 
(the name of a Muslim religious sect) cigarettes585 and Madonna 
wines586 have been refused.  One interesting decision of the 
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“TTAB”), made during the 
Cold War, held that a mark depicting a hammer and sickle with a 
cross through it could not be registered because it tended to 
disparage a national symbol of the then-Soviet Union.587   By 
contrast, “Buddha Beachware” was held not to be disparaging to 
the Buddhist religion.588 
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia decided a prominent case interpreting disparaging 
marks.589  In Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., the TTAB cancelled the 
REDSKINS trademark of the Washington, D.C. professional 
football team because it disparaged Native Americans.590  The 
D.C. District Court reversed the TTAB’s finding of disparagement 
based on insufficient evidence and the applicability of the laches 
defense.591  Nevertheless, Harjo established that “[w]hether . . . 
 
 584 See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:76 (citing United States Navy v. United 
States Mfg. Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1254 (T.T.A.B. 1987)). 
 585 See id. § 19:77 (citing In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.m.b.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 
339 (T.T.A.B. 1959)). 
 586 See id. § 19:77 (citing In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). 
 587 See id. § 19:76 (citing In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Congress, Inc., 161 
U.S.P.Q. 304 (T.T.A.B. 1969)). 
 588 See id. § 19:77 (citing In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994)). 
 589 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).  For a complete 
discussion of the Harjo decision, see generally Rachel Clark Hughley, The Impact of 
Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark Protection of Other Marks, 14 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327 (2004). 
 590 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1743 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. 
Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 591 Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 145.  “The Court’s conclusions in this case, as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence before the TTAB and the applicability of the laches defense, 
should not be interpreted as reflecting, one way or the other, this Court’s views as to 
whether the use of the term ‘Washington Redskins’ may be disparaging to Native 
Americans.” Id. at 98. 
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trademarks disparage Native Americans is ultimately a fact-bound 
conclusion that rests with the fact-finder in the first instance.”592 
Prior to Harjo, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit judged 
applications according to whether they would be considered 
disparaging by a “substantial composite” of the general public.593  
In cases of doubt, opposing applications were published so that any 
disparagement determination could be based on public response, 
rather than on the TTAB’s own judgment as to what constitutes 
offensiveness.594 
In Harjo, although not at issue on appeal, the D.C. District 
Court found no error in the TTAB’s approach to the 
“disparagement” inquiry.595  The TTAB determined that the 
“scandalous” and the “may disparage” language of the statute 
constitute two distinct bars to registration, each involving an 
independent analysis.596  “Scandalous” looks to the reaction of 
U.S. society as a whole to the usage, while “may disparage” targets 
an identifiable group of persons.597  Only the perceptions of the 
specific, identifiable group’s members are relevant in a “may 
disparage” determination.598  Evaluating the “may disparage” 
language involves a two-step process: 1) determining whether the 
designation would be understood as referring to persons in an 
identifiable group, and 2) determining whether the designation is 
viewed as disparaging (or offensive) by a “substantial composite” 
of the persons in that identifiable group.599  The TTAB thus found 
that the REDSKINS registration disparaged Native Americans, as 
perceived by a substantial composite of Native Americans, 
 
 592 Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (“The issue of disparagement, like the issue of 
likelihood of confusion, requires a fact-based judgment that depends heavily on the 
particular circumstances of each case.”). 
 593 See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:77 (citing In re Malvety Media Group, 33 F.3d 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 594 See id. (citing In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994)). 
 595 See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124. 
 596 See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738; see generally MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 
19:77.1. 
 597 See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124. 
 598 See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739. 
 599 See id. at 1739.  “Offensive” was viewed by the TTAB as the equivalent of the 
“disparaging” test. See id. at 1734 n.86.  According to the TTAB, a “substantial 
composite” can be less than a majority if it is “an appreciable number.” Id. at 1746 n.120. 
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although the district court found this determination not to be 
supported by substantial evidence.600 
Determining disparagement by analyzing the target group, 
rather than by viewing U.S. society as a whole, provides a more 
clearly defined standard for indigenous opposers to meet.  Where 
the specific customs, practices, and religious beliefs of the 
offended group are not widely known to the U.S. population at 
large, the standard provides courts with identifiable criteria to 
determine disparagement.601  This recent interpretation of the law 
may noticeably increase the usefulness of Lanham Act § 2(a) for 
protecting indigenous TKGRF.602 
Also useful is the fact that standing to sue under this law is 
extremely broad.603  Individuals can bring suit even though they 
are not representatives of a disparaged group—mere moral outrage 
at a potential registration can be sufficient.604  This would tend to 
eliminate problems that might otherwise arise if, for example, a 
person wishing to sue in a TKGRF-related situation is not a 
formally enrolled member of the relevant tribe or is a member of a 
tribe not formally recognized by federal authorities and thus unable 
to sue under other laws such as IACA.605  It also would appear to 
allow any member of the U.S. public, whether an indigenous 
person or not, to bring suit.606 
 
 600 See id. at 1743. 
 601 See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124 n.25. 
 602 Although the TTAB’s holding was reversed, the disparagement standard established 
by the TTAB in Harjo remains the standard used by TTAB and the Federal Circuit to 
determine if a mark is disparaging. See, e.g., In re Mothers and Fathers Italian Ass’n, 
2000 TTAB LEXIS 52, at *6; Boswell v. Malvety Media Group, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600 
(T.T.A.B. 1999); Order Sons of Italy in Am. v. Memphis Mafia, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1364 (T.T.A.B. 1999).  The standard announced in Harjo was applied in each of these 
cases. 
 603 See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:77.2 (discussing the ease of establishing 
standing under Lanham Act § 2(a)). 
 604 See id. § 19:77.1 (citing Ritchie v Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978)). 
 605 Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
 606 Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:77.2 (stating that offended individuals in a 
non-commercial group may have standing to sue, even though such members are not 
affected in a related business and have not suffered commercial damages) (citing 
Bromberg, 198 U.S.P.Q. 176)). 
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U.S. trademark law thus has several features that could be 
exploited more effectively by indigenous communities and on a 
much broader scale, at least for the TKGRF that tribes wish to 
commercialize.  In combination with redrafting the trademark 
provisions of IACA,607 greater education and government support 
are also needed to encourage widespread tribal use of amended 
IACA benefits and the USPTO’s existing tribal insignia database.  
Certification marks, collective marks, and the preventive 
provisions of Lanham Act §2(a) are tools available in the current 
intellectual property law that could also be more widely used for 
greater protection of indigenous TKGRF. 
While wider use of trademark varieties and registration features 
could help Native Americans establish and demarcate markets for 
their traditional products (and, potentially, services—such as 
traditional healing practices), trademarks cannot legally sequester 
the traditional knowledge itself from use by others.608  Also,  
specialized trademarks, like patents, require considerable, 
expensive legal expertise for proper mark registration and later 
enforcement, which may be virtually unobtainable by many 
indigenous groups.609 
B. Expand State and Federal Moral Rights Protections 
U.S. moral rights law, if expanded and developed, might also 
afford some interesting and creative avenues of protection for 
indigenous TKGRF.  Moral rights are new to the U.S. legal 
system,610 but they are well-developed in many civil law copyright 
systems and are a familiar part of the intellectual property law 
regime in most of the world.611 
1. Background 
Consideration of this issue in the TKGRF context requires 
comparing the underlying philosophies of U.S. intellectual 
 
 607 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 608 See supra notes 539–40 and accompanying text. 
 609 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 610 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[A] 
(2003) (discussing the adoption of moral rights under U.S. intellectual property law). 
 611 See id. § 8D.01[A] (discussing the basis of French copyright law). 
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property law with its European and international treaty 
counterparts and examining the protection goals of TKGRF 
owners. 
The general idea behind U.S. patent and copyright law is that 
an inventor or artist should be granted a period of monopoly 
control over his or her creation during which he or she may reap 
any associated economic rewards.612  Thereafter, the creation falls 
into the public domain and may be freely used by others for 
personal enjoyment or further creative uses.613  In theory, without 
such a period of monopoly control, little or no incentive to create 
exists, because a would-be creator knows he or she will later face 
ruinous competition from subsequent innovators who can freely 
exploit the work without incurring the same initial costs of 
creation.  Subsequent innovators bear but only the incremental 
costs of reproducing and distributing their innovations.614 
This strictly economics-based model of intellectual property 
has traditionally been the sole measure of “the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts” 615 in the United States.  In the TKGRF context, 
then, an inherent limitation of the U.S. view is that it values only 
the economic potential of a creative work and is aimed at 
maximizing innovation via commercialization.616  By contrast, 
TKGRF often is considered to have intrinsic value apart from the 
marketplace, and, while indigenous owners sometimes may wish to 
commercialize all or part of their TKGRF, in other cases, they may 
prefer to prevent its use and dissemination.617 
In contrast to the U.S. model, European intellectual property 
law has not been shaped solely by economic theory, but by other 
useful concepts as well.  One such concept is moral rights, or le 
droit moral.618  The idea is that, at the time of creation of a literary 
 
 612 See id. § 1.05[D] (discussing the reasoning for limiting the period of copyrights). 
 613 See id. 
 614 See id. § 1.03[A] (discussing the purposes of copyrights as an incentive to creativity). 
 615 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 616 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 1.03[A] (discussing the purposes of 
copyright as an incentive to creativity). 
 617 See, e.g., supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text; cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 610, § 8D.01[A] (discussing the view that certain works deserve value for non-
economic reasons and that moral rights are owed to the creator of a work). 
 618 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[A]. 
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or artistic work, some part of the artist’s own being or personality 
is incorporated into the work, and, as a result, certain perpetual 
rights arise in the artist that can affect future treatment of the 
work.619  These so-called “moral” rights are often thought to be 
non-transferable because they are inherent in, and arise solely 
from, the unique relationship between the artist and the creation.620  
Moral rights, however, generally can be waived by the artist, and 
 
 619 Id. Nimmer notes, as many English-speaking legal scholars have, that English 
terminology for various legal concepts found in le droit moral is both off-putting and 
unfortunate. Id.  The author agrees with this observation and believes that this translation 
problem is especially acute for U.S. citizens who, on the one hand, are still widely 
influenced by their Puritanical heritage, yet, on the other hand, are equally devoted to 
personal freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment and the developing law of 
personal privacy.  Might the U.S.’s general lack of understanding of or interest in the 
European moral rights tradition—and resistance to incorporating moral rights into our 
jurisprudence—stem in part from the somewhat offensive and overly intimate 
connotations conveyed by the English-language terms for core concepts in this area of 
law?  The French “droit morale,” “personnalité,”  “traitement dérogatoire,” and “droit de 
divulgation” are often directly translated into English as “moral rights,” “personality,” 
“derogatory treatment,” and “right to divulge,” respectively. See DENIS GIRARD, THE NEW 
CASSELL’S FRENCH DICTIONARY 254, 265, 270–71, 496, 556, 729 (1982).  These words, 
at least in the U.S. cultural context, are enthymemes carrying strong underlying 
connotations. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[A].  It is not at all clear 
that the English terms accurately convey their French (European) conceptual 
counterparts, and it seems likely that they imply pejorative or negative connotations that 
are in fact not present in the original terms. See S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 § 8.112 (1987). 
 Non-native readers may be confused further by the various French terms used by 
French legal scholars to describe concepts that in U.S. law have only one meaning and a 
single nomenclature.  For example, current U.S. copyright law uses the term “works of 
authorship.”  By comparison, French legal writer Henri Desbois uses the term oeuvres de 
l’esprit (“works of the spirit”) to describe what are apparently works of authorship when 
he discusses the dual system of French copyright law. See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT 
D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE (2d ed. 1978).  In that system, intellectual and moral rights (droit 
intellectuelle et moral) take legal precedence over their associated economic rights of 
copyright (droits d’auteur). Id.  By contrast, another French legal scholar, A. 
Chambellan, uses the term “works of the intellect” to refer, apparently, to these same 
works in her English-language summary of French copyright law. See generally 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995). 
 In the TKGRF context, because of the spiritual or sacred element present in much 
indigenous creative material, these subtle linguistic and conceptual distinctions could 
become exceedingly important when assessing whether particular types of Western law 
may be suitable for protecting specific TKGRF. 
 620 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[B] (citing GAVIN, LE DROIT 
MORAL DE L’AUTEUR § 255 (1960)).  Many national laws prohibit the transfer of moral 
rights. See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.104. 
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thus extinguished permanently, when the work is sold or otherwise 
transferred to a third party.621  In contrast to the United States, 
moral rights protections in the civil law tradition are usually widely 
available to the creator of any artistic, literary, or musical work.622 
Moral rights originated in France in the 19th century, and they 
still remain stronger there than in any other country.623  But moral 
rights have since been incorporated into the legal regimes of many 
other European countries, including Germany, where they are 
known as das Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht (“the author-
personality right”),624 and Italy, where they are known as il diritto 
d’autore (“the right of the author.”).625  Moral rights are well-
established in the law of many developing countries, particularly 
those that were colonized by France or Belgium and that have 
continued Napoleonic Code and other French legal traditions, 
including, for example, Senegal, the Congos, Benin, the Central 
African Republic, Cameroon, and Gabon.626  Moral rights have 
also long been recognized in Mexico and throughout much of 
Central and Latin America.627  The trend among common law 
countries now is to recognize these rights, at least to some degree, 
and the United States, Australia, and Great Britain have all passed 
protective legislation in this area since 1990.628  The Berne 
 
 621 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[B] (stating that nothing in the 
Berne Convention requires unwaivability). 
 622 See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.92.  For a discussion on U.S. moral rights law, 
see infra Part IV.B.2. 
 623 See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.93–.94. 
 624 Colleen P. Battle, Note, Righting the ‘Tilted Scale:’ Expansion of Artists’ Rights in 
the United States, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 441, 446 (1985/86). 
 625 See RICKETSON, supra note 619, at § 8.94–.101; see also Italian Copyright Act, arts. 
20–24, available at http://www.certh.gr/cordis/t_en/p/it/p_r51_en.asp-adtid=1010.htm 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2004). 
 626 See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.104 n.510. 
 627 Cf. Report on the Review of Existing Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge, at 2–5, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic 
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/7) (Nov. 5, 2002) 
[hereinafter Existing IP Protection Report], http://www.wipo.int/documents-
/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 628 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.06[D]. 
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Convention’s international copyright regime has also long required 
recognition and protection of moral rights.629 
Legal and philosophical treatment of works of authorship can 
vary widely between the United States and Europe, in part because 
of the moral rights tradition.  U.S. copyright law encourages 
viewing a picture or book, at least from a legal standpoint, quite 
superficially—merely as tangible property to be commoditized.630  
The European moral rights tradition, on the other hand, facilitates 
the understanding of these same creative works as possessing not 
only the superficial characteristics of commodities, but also as 
embodying something more, i.e., an intangible part of the creator 
himself631—analogous, perhaps, to that “something” that 
differentiates a living organism from a dead object. 
This distinction becomes crucial in the TKGRF context.  Some 
forms of TKGRF may be viewed by tribal owners as partially 
embodying the identity of the tribe itself, a notion analogous to 
moral rights concepts.632  TKGRF owners may also be particularly 
concerned with attribution of origin and unauthorized alteration, 
concerns for which established moral rights law concepts (further 
discussed below) may provide appropriate protections.633 
In addition, often the legal thinkers and policymakers at WIPO 
discussions who seem most open to broad TKGRF protections tend 
to come from civil law countries in which the moral rights tradition 
has long been accepted; the underlying philosophical similarities in 
thinking may account in part for this pattern of easier 
acceptance.634  This could also partially explain why the United 
 
 629 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 
1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available 
at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm. 
 630 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 1.03[A]. 
 631 See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.93. 
 632 Cf. id. (discussing the moral rights ideology that a work embodies a part of its 
creator). 
 633 See infra note 743–44 and accompanying text. 
 634 In all fairness, however, there are notable exceptions.  Australia and New Zealand, 
both common law countries, have been pioneers in innovative exploration of legal 
protections for TKGRF, though not in the moral rights area per se. See Paul Kuruk, 
Protecting Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the 
Tensions between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 
AM. U. L. REV. 769, 846 n.549 (1999).  Presumably, these countries have been greatly 
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States’ position on TKGRF is so noticeably at odds with that of so 
many other countries.  Those delegates who have long been 
comfortable with droit moral in the copyright context may find it 
easier than U.S. delegates to intuit and accept analogous concepts 
for TKGRF protection.  Longstanding familiarity with moral rights 
may indirectly predispose non-United States delegates toward 
accepting other proposed TKGRF protections, such as source 
attribution in patent applications or nonderogation and right of 
withdrawal of sacred material in copyright laws. 
Historical U.S. antipathy towards moral rights law may also 
negatively influence U.S. views regarding TKGRF protection.  
Apart from not having a moral rights tradition, the United States 
vociferously resisted incorporating these rights into domestic 
copyright law for an entire century, and long refused Berne 
Convention membership for this reason.635 
In the late 1970s, however, individual U.S. states, beginning 
with California, began enacting their own moral rights 
legislation.636  While most of these laws are noticeably more 
restrictive than many foreign moral rights laws, this state-based 
activity was extremely important, because it represented the first 
formal incursion of moral rights into U.S. jurisprudence.637  Now, a 
resurgence of state legislative activity could provide an effective 
route for expanding moral rights in the TKGRF context, and it 
could facilitate the spread of other TKGRF protective legislation 
relating to state trade secret, unfair competition, and contract laws. 
 
motivated by their well-defined and vocal indigenous communities, in comparison to 
Great Britain, another common law country lacking a moral rights tradition, which lacks 
identifiable indigenous communities.  The U.S., without a moral rights tradition but 
possessing easily identifiable indigenous communities, cannot be considered a similar 
pioneer. 
 635 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915. 
 636 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987, 989 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996) (California’s current 
moral rights statutes). 
 637 Fourteen states now have moral rights legislation. See infra note 681, and 
accompanying text. 
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2. Development of U.S. Domestic Moral Rights Law 
To understand the protections that expanded moral rights could 
provide indigenous TKGRF holders, it is useful to look at the 
historical development of moral rights in the United States. 
Moral rights law was incorporated into the U.S. system in 1988 
for reasons similar to those leading to the creation of the Database 
for Native American Tribal Insignia, i.e., legislators made this 
specific concession in exchange for gaining access to broader 
international treaty benefits.638  By the late 1980s, the U.S. 
recognized that the advantages of harmonizing U.S. domestic law 
with prevailing global standards outweighed the minor 
inconveniences of international copyright treaty compliance, 
including in moral rights.639  Even then, however, the United States 
initially took the position that its domestic copyright law, 
substantially revamped in 1976 but still lacking any federal 
acknowledgement of moral rights, was sufficient to meet its Berne 
Convention obligations to protect moral rights.640  This argument 
was supported by the state legislative activity during the prior 
decade concerning artists’ moral rights.641 
Only two years later, however (and perhaps unsurprisingly in 
light of subsequent widespread international criticism and 
Congress’ own recognition of the inadequacy of domestic moral 
rights law),642 the national legislature enacted the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).643  VARA formally created federal 
moral rights for the first time in U.S. history. 
VARA recognizes moral rights only for a narrow range of 
visual artists, however, and even those rights are limited to strictly 
circumscribed rights of integrity and attribution.644  The federal 
law establishes conditions under which state moral rights laws are 
 
 638 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915. 
 639 See generally id. 
 640 Id. at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917. 
 641 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918. 
 642 Id. 
 643 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101, 102, 106A, 107, and 601 (2004)). 
 644 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2004). 
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preempted,645 but the extent and nature of that preemption is by no 
means clear, even today.  It is clear, though, that federal 
recognition of moral rights in the United States is still extremely 
limited646 and would have to be expanded considerably to provide 
meaningful protection in the TKGRF context.  Nearly fifteen years 
later, VARA has been neither widely used nor extensively tested in 
the courts, undoubtedly because, not unlike indigenous groups, 
many artists do not possess the considerable financial resources 
required to litigate and enforce legal protection of their work.647  
Nor are artists likely to incorporate effective moral rights 
protection in private contracts, since many lack the means to hire 
counsel during negotiation and drafting.648 
Like VARA, the Berne Convention protects rights of integrity 
and of attribution.649  In the classic French droit moral, however, 
numerous other protections exist, and moral rights consist of a 
broad bundle of inalienable and perpetual rights belonging to the 
author of a creative work.650  The protected work can be within any 
of the creative realms normally falling within copyright law, 
whether literary, pictorial/graphical, or musical.651  The main rights 
comprising classic droit moral are: 1) the right of attribution,652 2) 
the right to prevent others from making deforming changes in the 
 
 645 17 U.S.C. § 301(f ) (2004). 
 646 Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Right and Moral Righteousness, 1 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 65, 66 (1997). 
 647 See generally Maralee Buttery, Blanket Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and 
Encouragement of Artistic Endeavor, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1245 (1983). 
 648 In light of artists’ often limited financial means, an increasing number of states have 
established volunteer organizations that provide pro bono legal and accounting services 
for artists. See, e.g., Texas Accountants and Lawyers for the Arts, at 
http://www.talarts.org/abouttala.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); Washington Area 
Lawyers for the Arts, at http://www.thewala.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 649 See Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis. 
 650 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.02[D][1]. 
 651 See id. § 8D.02[A]. 
 652 Le droit au respect du nom (“right to respect of the name”) or droit à la paternité 
(“right to paternity”).  Nimmer explains that he uses “attribution” in place of “paternity” 
to avoid linguistic gender bias. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[A] n.8.  
This is another example of the importation of American cultural and social mores into 
foreign legal terminology, whereas the original terminology may not convey such gender 
bias to a French audience.   
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work,653 3) the right to publish the work or to withhold it from 
publication,654 4) the right to withdraw a published work from 
distribution if it no longer represents the views of the author,655 and 
5) the right to resale royalties from the work.656 
The French right of attribution consists of various components, 
including the right to be known as the author of the work, the right 
to prevent attribution to the author of any work that is not his, and 
the right to prevent others from being named author(s) of his 
work.657  It includes the author’s right to publish the work 
anonymously or pseudonymously, as well as his right to change his 
mind later and use his own name.658  A particularly important 
aspect of the French right of attribution is the author’s right to 
prevent others from using his work or name in a way that reflects 
adversely on his professional standing.659 
By contrast, as mentioned above, the Berne Convention 
recognizes only two moral rights: attribution and integrity.660  An 
author has the right to claim his authorship, and he has the right to 
object to any distortion, mutilation, modification of, or derogatory 
action relating to his work when it is prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.661  Like the French droit moral, but in contrast to 
VARA, the Berne Convention protects the integrity of the work as 
long as it exists, but it does not prevent outright destruction of the 
work.662  Integrity and attribution constitute the minimum agreed 
international moral rights standard under the Berne Convention, 
although national laws can provide for greater protection.663  
 
 653 droit au respect de l’oeuvre—“right to respect for the work.” 
 654 droit de divulgation—“right to divulge.” 
 655 droit de retrait—“right of retraction” or droit de repentir—“right to repent.” 
 656 droit de suite—“right of following” or, more colloquially, “right of follow-up.” 
 657 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.06[B][1]. 
 658 Id. 
 659 Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in 
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24 n.122 
(1994). 
 660 Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis(1). 
 661 Id. 
 662 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2004); Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis(1). 
 663 Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 19. 
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Redress for violation of the treaty’s moral rights provisions664 is 
left to national legislation.665 
Under VARA, an author of a qualifying work of visual art is 
entitled to rights of attribution and integrity666 similar to those 
provided by the Berne Convention, and he or she may prevent any 
distortion, mutilation, or modification that would be prejudicial to 
his or her honor or reputation.667  “Right of integrity” under VARA 
means the right of an artist to prevent the mutilation, distortion or 
destruction of his creation without his consent.668  “Right of 
attribution” means the right of an artist to have his name properly 
and publicly associated with his creation,669 including the right to 
prevent such attribution if his creation has been so mutilated or 
distorted by someone else that attribution to him would somehow 
damage or reflect negatively on his reputation or honor.670  If the 
work is of recognized stature, the artist may be able to recover 
damages for willful or grossly negligent destruction of the work, 
subject to certain limitations for destruction of works that are 
incorporated into buildings.671 
As mentioned above, moral rights in the civil law tradition 
usually apply to works of authorship of all types normally 
regulated by copyright law, and this is also true under the Berne 
Convention.672  Under VARA, however, moral rights apply only to 
authors of specified works of visual art.673  A “work of visual art” 
is restrictively defined under VARA, and is limited to paintings, 
drawings, prints, sculpture, and still photographic images produced 
for exhibition purposes only, any of which may exist as a single 
copy or in a limited edition of 200 or fewer copies that are signed 
 
 664 Id. art. 6bis(3). 
 665 Id. art. 36. 
 666 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). 
 667 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
 668 Id. § 106A(a). 
 669 Id. 
 670 Id. 
 671 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 672 Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 2(1). 
 673 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).  This limitation appears to conflict with the Berne Convention 
and, if so, arguably brings the United States out of treaty compliance in this respect. 
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and consecutively numbered by the author.674  The VARA 
definition specifically excludes works made for hire, unfixed 
works, and a long list of other creative works, including 
audiovisual works, motion pictures, electronic publications, 
applied art, and merchandising or promotional material.675 
Moral rights under VARA may be waived in writing, but they 
may not be transferred.676  This is also generally thought to be the 
case under the Berne Convention.677  This transfer limitation is 
consistent with the civil law tradition, as explained earlier: the 
rights exist only as a function of the artist’s “personality” extends 
into his creation, and that personality cannot be owned by anyone 
other than the creating artist.678 
VARA rights endure in most cases only during the life of the 
artist, but for any work of visual art which was created before June 
1, 1991, and for which title has not been transferred away from the 
artist, moral rights duration under VARA is the same as other U.S. 
copyright rights (usually measured at present by the life of the 
author plus seventy years).679  Under the Berne Convention, by 
contrast, moral rights endure for the same length of time as the 
author’s economic rights in the work, subject to national legislation 
of member states, which may provide that moral rights cease to 
exist upon the death of the author.680 
Statutory moral rights protection for artists are provided by a 
number of states, including California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
 
 674 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). 
 675 Id. 
 676 Id. § 106A(e). 
 677 See Berne Convention, supra note 630, art. 6bis(1) (“Independently of the author’s 
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”). But see RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.104 
(Moral rights are inalienable under many national laws; however, there is nothing in the 
Berne Convention “which prohibits national laws from allowing authors to assign their 
moral rights either temporarily or permanently.”). 
 678 See supra note 619 and accompanying text. 
 679 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). 
 680 Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis(2). 
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and Utah.681  Many of these laws were originally passed prior to 
enactment of VARA.682  Nearly all of the state moral rights laws 
extend protection only to visual artists or creators of works of fine 
art, but a few, such as Massachusetts and New Mexico, extend 
protection to other creative works containing a visual 
component.683  Several states extend protection to craft items as 
well as more traditional “fine art.”684  A particularly crucial 
difference between VARA and some state moral rights laws is that 
the latter provide protection not only to original visual art and 
limited editions, but also to reproductions.685  This expands moral 
rights coverage well beyond VARA’s limits, especially in states 
where the definition of fine art may include works in digital 
media.686 
Moral rights legislation in most states follows one of two main 
models, either that of the California Art Preservation Act 
(“CAPA”)687 or that of the New York Artists Authorship Rights 
Act (“NYAARA”).688  While both models have certain elements in 
common, the CAPA model contains a public interest element689 
that distinguishes it from the New York model, as well as from 
VARA and the Berne Convention.  In addition to granting moral 
rights to artists themselves, CAPA also grants independent 
standing to California arts organizations to pursue injunctions to 
preserve or restore the integrity of works of fine art, so long as 
 
 681 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987–89 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 42–116t (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 320/0.01 (West 
1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§  2151–56 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 
303 (1985 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 597.720–.760 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A (West 
1987 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 2002); N.Y. ARTS & 
CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1996); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 § 
2101 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-22-16 
(Michie 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-6-409 (1996). 
 682 See supra notes 679–81 and accompanying text. 
 683 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2. 
 684 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2. 
 685 See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153; 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 597.740. 
 686 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S. 
 687 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp.1996). 
 688 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03. 
 689 CAL. CIV. CODE § 989 (West 1982). 
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such works are of recognized quality and substantial public 
interest.690  “Substantial public interest” is determined by the trier 
of fact, as is a determination of “recognized quality.”691  CAPA 
extends moral rights protection for the life of the author plus fifty 
years,692 and statutory liability attaches to anyone (other than an 
artist in possession of his own work or a framer, conservator, or 
restorer not grossly negligent) who intentionally commits or 
authorizes any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or 
destruction of a work of fine art.693 
California’s moral rights law is also quite unusual in that it 
contains a provision granting artists the right to resale royalties694 
in the classic French droit de suite tradition.  By comparison, the 
Berne Convention recognizes this right in Article 14ter, but only to 
the extent permitted by national legislation.695  There is no U.S. 
federal recognition of this right.696  Only one other state, South 
Dakota, has enacted resale royalties legislation, but its law is very 
narrowly circumscribed, applying only to resale of state-owned 
works of art that do not constitute part of a sale of the building in 
which they are located.697 
In contrast to CAPA, NYAARA does not contain any formal 
recognition of a public interest in art, separate from the artist’s own 
moral rights.698  The grant of moral rights under NYAARA 
extends to “fine art or limited edition multiple[s] of not more than 
three hundred copies,” as well as to reproductions thereof.699  “Fine 
art” means paintings, sculpture, drawings, works of graphic art, 
and non-multiple prints.700  This statute contrasts with the federal 
 
 690 See id. 
 691 Id. § 989(d). 
 692 See id. § 987(g)(1). 
 693 See id. § 987(c). 
 694 See id. § 986(a). 
 695 Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 14ter(2). 
 696 Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law Framework 
for the Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights, 69 TUL. L. REV. 935, 949 (1995) (stating that 
while courts have refused to recognize moral rights directly, they have used existing legal 
doctrines to extend moral rights protection indirectly).  
 697 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-22-16(5) (Michie 1992). 
 698 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1996). 
 699 Id. § 14.03.1. 
 700 Id. § 11.01(9). 
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system, which does not protect moral rights for reproductions and 
protects limited editions only to the first 200 copies.701  NYAARA 
does not require a protected work to be of recognized quality or 
stature.702  Liability under NYAARA attaches to anyone, other 
than the artist or someone acting with his consent, who, in New 
York, knowingly displays in public or publishes “a work of fine art 
or limited edition . . . or a reproduction thereof in an altered, 
defaced, mutilated or modified form [representing to be, or] 
reasonably [likely to] be regarded as being[,] the work of the artist, 
and damage to the artist’s reputation is reasonably likely to 
result . . . .”703  This means that public display or publication and 
likelihood of damage to reputation are both elements that must be 
proven before liability attaches under NYAARA.704  The statute 
does not specify the duration of moral rights, but it refers to 
assertion of the rights by the artist himself,705 so presumably 
NYAARA is similar to VARA in that rights exist only during the 
artist’s lifetime.706 
The moral rights laws of certain other states differ in important 
ways from VARA, the two main state models, and the French and 
international moral rights regimes.  One such law is the 
Massachusetts Art Preservation Act (“MAPA”).707  This law 
contains a legislative finding that physical alteration or destruction 
of fine art is detrimental to the artist’s reputation and that there is a 
public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic 
creations.708  MAPA, on which New Mexico’s law was later 
 
 701 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). 
 702 See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01(9), 14.03(1).  New York has one of the 
largest Native American populations in the United States.  See 2000 Census, American 
Indian and Alaskan Native Tribes in the United States, 
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t18/tab047.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005); 
2000 Census, American Indian and Alaskan Native Tribes in New York State,  
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t18/tab001.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).   
 703 See id. §§ 14.03.1, 14.03.3(e). 
 704 See id. 
 705 See id. § 14.03.1. 
 706 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2004). 
 707 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1989 & Supp. 1996). 
 708 Id. 
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modeled,709 contains the broadest definition of protected works of 
fine art in any of the state laws and is much broader than VARA’s 
definition.  “Fine art” under MAPA means “any original work of 
visual or graphic art [in] any media[, including] but not limited to, 
any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft object, photograph, 
audio or video tape, film, hologram, or any combination thereof, 
[so long as it is] of recognized quality.”710  Under MAPA, not only 
the artist, but any union or artists’ organization authorized by him 
in writing has standing to bring suit to protect these rights on his 
behalf.711  Moral rights in Massachusetts endure for the life of the 
artist plus fifty years.712 
Louisiana’s moral rights law also contains unique protections 
not found in other domestic or foreign moral rights laws.  It 
specifically extends moral rights protection to all statutorily 
defined works of fine art, regardless of their date of creation.713  
Liability attaches not only in cases of display or publication within 
Louisiana of altered works of fine art, but also to “acts in violation 
of this [law] by a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of 
[Louisiana].”714  Thus, a public display of a mutilated work in 
another state by a Louisiana resident might be actionable within 
Louisiana.  A Louisiana corporation displaying distorted work on 
the Internet via a server located outside the state might also be 
subject to liability in Louisiana. 
3. Federal Preemption of State Moral Rights Laws 
To determine whether expanded domestic moral rights laws 
might better protect indigenous TKGRF, it is necessary to examine 
whether VARA preempts state moral rights laws and, if so, to what 
 
 709 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 2002).  New Mexico’s law is nearly 
identical in much of its wording to MAPA, but it applies only to “fine art in public view.” 
Id. § 13-4B-3(A).  “Public view” means “on the exterior of a public building or in an 
interior area of a public building.” Id. § 13-4B-2(E).  The status of New Mexico’s moral 
rights protections is critical from a TKGRF standpoint because so many Native 
Americans live in that state. 
 710 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b). 
 711 Id. § 85S(g). 
 712 Id. 
 713 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2155(G) (West 2004). 
 714 Id. § 51-2155(E). 
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extent.  If VARA totally preempted earlier state moral rights laws, 
then attempts to expand them further would obviously be a useless 
strategy for protecting TKGRF.  If, on the other hand, VARA has 
not preempted or has only partially preempted state moral rights 
laws, state legislatures would have the potential to improve 
indigenous TKGRF protection.  State law expansion would obviate 
the need to confront powerful entertainment lobbies opposed to 
federal moral rights or to win over federal policymakers who may 
be unsympathetic to greater TKGRF protection. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”) provides for general 
federal preemption of state copyright laws.715  This general 
preemption scheme provides that, on or after January 1, 1978, the 
1976 Act governs all legal and equitable rights equivalent to any of 
the exclusive rights within the general scope and subject matter of 
copyright in works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium (“§ 
106 rights”), regardless of creation date and regardless of whether 
such works are published.716  Certain exceptions to the general 
preemption scheme exist: most importantly, it does not apply to 
subject matter outside the scope of the 1976 Act or to state or 
common law rights not equivalent to § 106 rights.717  For example, 
state law causes of action for misappropriation, trade secret, 
trademark and trade dress violations, unfair competition, and rights 
of publicity or privacy are not subject to general preemption.718 
In 1990, with the passage of VARA, Congress added a new 
preemption provision pertaining solely to works of visual art.719  It 
provides that, as of June 1, 1991, “all legal or equitable rights that 
are equivalent [to those] conferred by § 106A [of the 1976 Act] 
with respect to works of visual art . . . are governed exclusively by 
[the relevant provisions of the 1976 Act (as amended by 
 
 715 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2004). 
 716 Id. § 301(a).  This type of preemption is referred to in this paper as “general 
preemption,” that is, federal preemption of state copyright law on grounds other than 
VARA/moral rights grounds.  Preemption on VARA/moral rights grounds under § 301(f) 
is discussed infra, notes 719–41 and accompanying text, and referred to in this paper as 
“VARA-type preemption.” 
 717 17 U.S.C. § 301(b). 
 718 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931. 
 719 17 U.S.C. § 301(f). 
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VARA)] . . . .”720  The statute also specifies that common law and 
state statutes are not preempted by federal copyright law to the 
extent that: 1) they cover causes of action commencing before June 
1, 1991; 2) they confer “rights that are not equivalent to any of the 
rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual 
art”; or 3) they concern violations of rights extending beyond the 
life of the author.721  Put another way, it appears from reading the 
moral rights preemption provision in § 301(f)—or “VARA-type 
preemption”—that Congress intended state moral rights statutes to 
apply where: (1) title in a protected work was transferred from the 
artist to another party before the effective date of VARA, (2) state 
law grants rights different from those provided by VARA, (3) state 
law protects copyrightable works not covered by the VARA 
definition of works of visual art, and (4) state law allows legal 
actions for events occurring after the artist’s death.722 
General preemption under § 301(a) and (b) applies to § 106 
rights, whereas VARA-type preemption under § 301(f) applies to § 
106A rights (moral rights).723  It is important to make the 
distinction between general preemption and VARA-type 
preemption, because voluminous case law exists to explain general 
preemption,724 whereas there is next to none dealing directly with 
VARA-type preemption.  Just as § 106 rights fundamentally differ 
from moral rights under § 106A, the applicable preemption rules 
also differ. 
Unfortunately, confusion on this issue is not uncommon among 
courts and commentators alike, with the result that the question of 
U.S. moral rights law preemption has become needlessly 
 
 720 Id. § 301(f)(1). 
 721 Id. § 301(f)(2). 
 722 Patrick Flynn, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Visual Artists 
Rights Act, 138 A.L.R. FED. 239, 248 (1997). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), at 21, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931. 
 723 See supra notes 719–22 and accompanying text. 
 724 See, e.g., Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2001); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l 
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D.Md. 2000); Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d 
494 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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blurred.725  Courts and legal scholars have extensively examined 
the legislative history in trying to determine the scope and 
application of VARA-type preemption, but little of binding 
precedential value has actually been decided.726 
A discussion of VARA-type preemption under § 301(f) can be 
found in House Report No. 101-514 (1990).727  It specifies that 
federal preemption will occur for works of visual art when a state 
grants legal or equitable rights equivalent to those embodied in 
§106A.728  But federal law does not preempt state causes of action 
relating to works not covered by VARA, including, specifically, 
audiovisual works, photographs produced for non-exhibition 
purposes, and works in which the copyright has been transferred 
before the effective date of VARA.729  Also, state artists’ rights 
laws that grant rights not equivalent to those under VARA are not 
preempted even when relating to works covered by VARA.730  The 
Report gives some specific examples of situations where VARA-
type preemption is not intended to occur, such as a cause of action 
for misattribution of a reproduction of a work of visual art or 
violation of a state-granted right to a resale royalty.731  It also 
clearly states that “the Copyright Act prior to [VARA] does not 
preempt state law misappropriation, unfair competition, breach of 
contract, and deceptive trade practices claims, and they will not be 
preempted [after passage of VARA].”732  Interestingly, though, the 
Report also says that state laws granting rights of attribution or 
integrity for works falling within the VARA definition of works of 
visual art will be preempted by federal law, even if the State 
ground is broader than that afforded under VARA.733 
 
 725 Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990—What it Does and What it 
Preempts, 23 PAC. L.J. 445, 508 (1992). 
 726 See generally Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1994); Zuber, supra note 
725. 
 727 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931. 
 728 Id. 
 729 Id. 
 730 Id. 
 731 Id. 
 732 Id. 
 733 Id. (emphasis added). 
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While some courts and legal scholars in the years since passage 
of VARA have speculated that the federal law may substantially 
preempt state moral rights laws, Congress’s determination that 
state moral rights laws constituted an important basis by which 
U.S. domestic law met Berne Convention requirements734 seems to 
contradict the argument that the legislative branch intended VARA 
to fully preempt, and thus severely limit or even destroy, the only 
other existing area of domestic moral rights law.735  Nor does this 
seem logical when protection given to artists under VARA is in 
some ways narrower than that available under precursor state laws 
at the time of Berne Convention accession.736  Yet this seems to be 
precisely what the few courts that have tangentially considered the 
issue have assumed,737 as well as some legal scholars.738 
In contrast, interpreting the VARA preemption provisions and 
the legislative history together to mean that Congress intended 
federal law to preempt state moral rights laws only to the limited 
extent those state laws directly conflict with VARA, allows for 
Congress to have acted consistently with its public position in 1988 
and also to have legislated in a proactive and forward-thinking way 
in 1990.739  This interpretation would cohere with the pre-VARA 
Congressional testimony of Ralph Oman, then Register of 
Copyrights.740  Concerning the potential preemptive effect of 
VARA on state moral rights laws, he said: “If a state decides to 
grant greater protection [than VARA], it would not be preempted 
 
 734 See id. 
 735 This assertion is the authors, however it is also made by Greg Vetter.  See Greg R. 
Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 
658 (2004). 
 736 JOHN MERRYMAN & ALBERT ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 257–80 (4th 
ed. 1998). 
 737 See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 136 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (Ct. App. 2d 1996). 
 738 See, e.g., Zuber, supra note 725, 492–502; NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.07[1]  (2d ed. 2000). 
 739 See Jane C. Ginsberg, Second Frankfurt-Columbia Symposium on Comparative Law, 
Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 463, 472 (1996). 
 740 Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright 
Liability of States: Hearings on H.R. 1131 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop., 
& the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989) 
(testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES 125 
by this act.  H.R. 131690 provides only a minimum threshold of 
protection and permits States to enact more expansive 
protection.”741  Of course, this is only the opinion of one individual 
who, while influential, was not a legislator.  It seems unlikely, 
however, that Congress would have intentionally acted in a manner 
diametrically opposed to the views of an expert of Mr. Oman’s 
stature, particularly in a field as arcane (at that time) as copyright 
and moral rights law. 
4. Expansion of Moral Rights Laws for TKGRF Protection 
From the TKGRF perspective, it would be helpful for states to 
pass moral rights legislation providing broad coverage to creative 
works of all types.  Extending state law moral rights protections to 
as much TKGRF material as possible, particularly such items as 
indigenous-made jewelry, weavings, pottery, kachina and Eskimo 
dolls, Native dance and dress paraphernalia, etc., would be a 
valuable addition to present legal protection for TKGRF.  
Enactment of broad state laws allowing creator rights to resale 
royalties would also be an obvious way to increase indigenous 
creators’ returns from sharing and use of their TKGRF with third 
parties. 
Since state laws that allow moral rights protection for terms 
extending beyond the life of the artist may survive a federal 
preemption challenge, state laws should be drafted to extend 
protection terms beyond the life of the artist for specific types of 
TKGRF.  Legislating in favor of an independent public interest 
element, similar to that in CAPA,742 might also present an avenue 
for avoiding preemption and for providing creative protection of 
qualifying indigenous works for an indefinite term, either on a 
case-by-case basis or as identifiable bodies of work.  Enjoining 
 
 741 Id. HR 131690 was the draft version of VARA under consideration at the time of this 
testimony.  
 742 Brian T. McCartney, Creepings and Glimmers of the Moral Rights of Artists in 
American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35 (1998) (“CAPA was enacted with 
two goals in mind.  First, ‘to uphold the artist’s reputation, since fine art is ‘an expression 
of the artist’s personality,’ thereby triggering the artist’s interest in protecting the work; 
and [second] to promote the ‘public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and 
artistic creations.’”). 
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further use of tribal designs or motifs by nonmembers of a tribe 
without tribal permission, for example, might be one interpretation 
of “preserving or restoring the integrity” of existing tribal works. 
Native Americans could, if funding and legal counsel obstacles 
could be overcome, explore the use of existing moral rights laws to 
protect their qualifying works of art.  The right of integrity, in 
particular, might be creatively used to prevent non-indigenous 
people from describing derivative or copied works as “Indian”-
inspired743 or from using motifs or designs of one or more 
identifiable tribes, unless the use of such foundational material is 
accurately portrayed, properly attributed, and does not damage the 
underlying indigenous artist’s reputation.744  Attempts to use the 
right of attribution to prevent distorting, later uses of collectively 
owned tribal work, however, would be difficult, since U.S. law 
may view collectively owned material as part of the public 
domain.745  But disseminated works based on tribal art that is 
normally not shared outside tribal members might be successfully 
argued to be mutilations or distortions damaging to the tribal 
artist’s reputation, depending on the factual circumstances of 
publication and customary legal limitations on access to the 
material within the tribe.  Particularly in California, the public 
interest element of moral rights law might also be effectively used 
to maintain the integrity of well-known tribal art. 
In conjunction with expanded moral rights legislation, courts 
should examine relevant customary law to determine analogous 
practices within indigenous societies concerning ownership, 
attribution, and integrity of artistic and other creative works.  
While United States courts in the past generally have not taken 
judicial notice of or inquired into Native American customary law, 
 
 743 For information on the conditions under which arts and crafts may be promoted or 
labeled as “Indian,” see IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).  As 
discussed elsewhere in this paper, however, IACA approaches the issue from a consumer 
protection or “truth-in-advertising” standpoint, rather than from a moral rights position. 
See generally Part III.A. 
 744 David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property Law 
and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can it Fit?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
93, 106 (2001). 
 745 Id. 
KREMERS FORMAT 1/25/2005  6:10 PM 
2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES 127 
Bulun Bulun746 and related cases should be recognized as relevant 
examples of emerging trends in common law; counsel for 
indigenous litigants should argue vigorously in favor of similar 
judicial inquiry and notice by U.S. courts. 
If more states were to enact broader moral rights legislation, 
both policymakers and the creating public would also become 
better educated about the nature of moral rights.  At present, due in 
part to lobbying pressure by big entertainment entities, VARA and 
the moral rights provisions of the Berne Convention have been so 
tightly circumscribed in the United States that they are rarely used 
or litigated, and the U.S. public is nearly as unfamiliar with moral 
rights now as it was in the early 1980s.747  Consequently, there is 
little surprise that international talk of requiring source attribution 
and prior informed consent in patent applications or withdrawal of 
indigenous consent to use TKGRF—equitable concepts in a sense 
very akin to the creator’s moral rights of attribution, integrity, and 
divulgation, though unarticulated as such—is a mental and 
intuitive stretch for U.S. lawyers, yet readily acceptable to many of 
their international colleagues.  Instead, in part because the United 
States lacks a longstanding foundation in this area of intellectual 
property law, United States policymakers sometimes fail to 
comprehend the unique void that moral rights and moral rights-like 
protections might fill, and they fail to grasp its potential value for 
protecting some otherwise problematic types of TKGRF material.  
With expanded use, more lawyers and legislators would develop an 
understanding of moral rights, and dismissive attitudes toward this 
law as unimportant or irrelevant to U.S. creators, or dangerous to 
U.S. free speech and enterprise, might then dissipate. 
Widespread perception outside the United States of the 
benignity of the droit de derogation748 makes its inclusion in 
planned protections for TKGRF much more palatable to the 
international community than it is to U.S. lawyers and legislators.  
 
 746 Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Pty. Ltd., 157 A.L.R. 193 (1998), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/1998/1082.html-
?query=%5e+bulun (last updated Sept. 8, 1998) (involving the copyright entitlements of 
an aboriginal people over the artwork of one of its members). 
 747 See generally NIMMER, supra note 610. 
 748 See Kuruk, supra note 634, at 830–31. 
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This moral rights tradition, followed in many countries, allows a 
creator the ability to prevent others from acting in “derogation” of 
his work.749  It is often explained as a right to prevent others from 
criticizing or taking derogatory action toward the work.  This is 
rightly a matter of serious concern and reservation for U.S. 
policymakers, for whom free speech values are paramount.  This 
right could present serious First Amendment problems in some 
scenarios.  Other, well-established intellectual property law, 
however, such as the Lanham Act §2, presents a similar challenge 
and has long successfully coexisted, in a carefully circumscribed 
way, with First Amendment freedoms.  Use of the droit de 
derogation as a potentially useful protection mechanism should not 
be prematurely dismissed merely because it abuts First 
Amendment protections. 
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in the 
developing world, are victims of a mutual unfamiliarity with the 
boundaries inherent in the First Amendment tradition on the one 
hand, and the moral rights tradition on the other.750  All parties to 
the TKGRF debate may lack a mutual appreciation of the deep 
degree to which these traditions are entrenched in the respective 
national legal and social psyches of the peoples involved.  Greater 
familiarity on both sides with the other’s legal traditions, including 
customary law traditions, might facilitate finding adequate 
international solutions to protect TKGRF much more rapidly and 
more cohesively than at present. 
U.S. legal scholars have a greater obligation to invest their time 
and effort into developing this awareness than do their foreign 
counterparts, if only because U.S. lawyers may be likely to know 
less about foreign legal traditions than their overseas colleagues do 
about U.S. law.  But arguably, the United States also stands to 
benefit most from including moral rights into its legal traditions.  If 
the moral rights tradition were ever fully brought into U.S. 
jurisprudence, a uniquely U.S. strain of this law would 
undoubtedly develop and become an important contribution to 
legal thought.  Domestic courts and legislators would undoubtedly 
 
 749 Id. 
 750 See generally Kuruk, supra note 634, at 825–27. 
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harness their well-known U.S. ingenuity to find creative ways to 
craft moral rights concepts in such a way that they could 
successfully coexist with the free speech, fair use, and other vital 
legal traditions that are unique to the U.S. 
In this way, the United States could create a model for an U.S.-
based intellectual property law that is more consonant with 
international norms, yet embodies some of the deepest principles 
upon which an open and free society is built.  This “blended” 
intellectual property model might be more amenable than our 
present regime to adoption and adaptation by other countries that 
are presently in search of useful drafting models for TKGRF and 
other intellectual property legislation.  This usage would in turn 
facilitate the spread of some of the U.S.’s cherished legal 
principles among other nations. 
For the immediate term, however, while expansion of domestic 
U.S. moral rights laws should ideally occur on both the federal and 
state levels, it would probably be easier to make headway among 
state legislatures.  Indigenous populations and their supporters 
likely would have greater success lobbying for legislative changes 
within their own state governments, given financial constraints and 
the considerable time needed to educate legislators about the 
meaning and importance of moral rights laws. 
One of the main questions likely to be raised by state 
legislators in this process is whether VARA preempts state moral 
rights legislation.  Because it is likely that federal law would not 
preempt large tracts of state moral rights law,751 even as presently 
written, state legislators might be persuaded to legislate in this area 
as an avenue for TKGRF protection.  This could be a useful step 
toward successfully helping to protect indigenous TKGRF within 
established regimes of intellectual property law. 
C. Establish a Domestic Geographical Indications Regime for 
TKGRF 
In addition to changes in trademark and moral rights 
protections, the United States should also establish a prospective 
 
 751 See supra note 645 and accompanying text. 
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domestic geographical indications regime for TKGRF.752  Besides 
offering a valuable addition to present intellectual property law 
protections for TKGRF, this would have the useful side effect of 
bringing the United States more clearly into compliance with its 
present TRIPS obligations.753  Creating a new domestic channel for 
TKGRF protection—in an area of law well-established in many 
countries—might also relieve growing pressure for sui generis 
laws that might entail greater legal uncertainty. 
Geographical indications law, like moral rights law, is well-
established in traditional European intellectual property law,754 but 
has not, until TRIPS, existed in U.S. jurisprudence.755  Since the 
signing of TRIPS in 1995, geographical indications law has gained 
broad global acceptance and legal legitimacy.756   TRIPS 
encourages expansion of geographical indications law for use as a 
trade-enhancing mechanism.757  TRIPS not only contains specific 
directives concerning the use and application of geographic 
indicators, it also mandates that all member states negotiate with 
each other to further develop this area of intellectual property 
protection.758 
According to the TRIPS definition, geographical indications 
are “indications which identify a good as originating in the 
territory of a Member [country], or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic 
of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”759  
Thus, under TRIPS, a geographic indication is a source indicator 
that is based both on geographic origin and on an additional 
identifying characteristic linked to that particular geographic 
 
 752 A geographical indications regime is a framework for the protection and enforcement 
of goods originating from a particular territory, region or locality. See generally TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 94, pt. II, § 3. 
 753 See Leigh Ann Lindquist, Champagne or Champagne? An Examination of U.S. 
Failure to Comply with the Geographical Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, 27 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 330–32 (1999). 
 754 Id. at 312. 
 755 Id. at 314. 
 756 Id. at 315. 
 757 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, pt. II, § 3. 
 758 Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 24.1. 
 759 Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 22.1. 
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origin.760  This is important when considering geographical 
indications as a method of TKGRF protection because, like that of 
most indigenous peoples, the Native American’s flora, fauna, and 
other TKGRF characteristics are often inextricably tied to a 
specific geographic location. 
Geographical indications are not trademarks; though both are 
source indicators, the protection these two types of intellectual 
property offer is fundamentally different.761  As discussed earlier in 
this paper, while certain special forms of trademarks can be 
adapted to function in a way that can be similar to geographical 
indications, trademarks exist mainly for the benefit of 
consumers—to prevent consumer confusion as to the source—and 
do not inherently require any qualifying link to a specific 
geographic origin.762  Hence, though they may in some 
circumstances appear similar, trademarks are not per se co-
extensive with geographical indications. 
While a U.S. certification mark in a TKGRF-related situation 
might closely approximate coverage given by a geographical 
indication,763 the mark would be limited to recognition and 
enforceability only in the United States, since there is no 
international system of trademark registration.764  But an 
international system of geographical indications might one day 
become accessible for TKGRF, and creating a new international 
geographical indications system of notice, registration, recognition, 
and mutual national enforcement is currently being discussed at the 
WTO.765  Since TKGRF owners can often be spread over several 
 
 760 Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312. 
 761 Id. at 311–12. 
 762 Id. 
 763 This would occur, for example, if the mark’s underlying standards were carefully 
drafted to tie product certification with geographic location, indigenous producer group, 
and traditional production method. 
 764 See generally WIPO, Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks (adopted June 27, 1989) [hereinafter Madrid 
Protocol], http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_protocol.pdf. 
 765 WTO, News, Intellectual Property Council Debates Call to Expand Geographical 
Indications Protections, Mar. 28, 2000, at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e-
/news00_e/trips_e.htm [hereinafter Call for GI Expansion].  The Madrid Protocol offers 
an international registration application system similar to that for patents under the PCT, 
but trademark applications filed under the Madrid Protocol still operate within a 
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national borders, this might be more useful for TKGRF protection 
than national trademark systems. 
Prior to TRIPS, two main types of common source indications 
were used to show geographical significance: 1) appellations of 
origin and 2) indications of source.766  Like moral rights, these 
types of intellectual property protection were first legally 
recognized in France, beginning in the early 19th century.767  
Gradually, both became formally recognized elsewhere in Europe, 
and eventually they were protected by an international treaty, 
beginning in 1883 with the Paris Convention768 and continuing in 
subsequent treaties into the 20th century.769  These culminated 
most recently in the geographical indications provisions of 
TRIPS.770 
While indications of source merely state where a product is 
made, appellations of origin signify the geographical region in 
which the product originates and the features of the product that 
are directly attributable to natural and human factors specific to 
that region.771  These features can include, for example, particular 
climate and soil characteristics of a specific locality or a 
traditional, region-specific method of manufacture.772  Examples 
would be Roquefort cheese, Portuguese port, and French 
Champagne. 
 
somewhat harmonized system of national registrations and national substantive laws.  See 
generally id.  
 766 Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312. 
 767 Id. 
 768 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10, Mar. 20, 1883, 
revised July 14, 1967,  828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm. 
 769 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on 
Goods, arts. 1(1) , 4, Apr. 14, 1891, revised Oct. 31, 1958, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo032en.htm; Lisbon Agreement for the Protection 
of Appellations of Origin and their International Registrations, Oct. 31, 1958, revised 
July 14, 1967, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo012en.htm. 
 770 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94. 
 771 Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312. 
 772 Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Battle between the United 
States and the European Union over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 108 (2001). 
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Because of this required link between product characteristics 
and identifiable geography, geographical indications could provide 
legal coverage for some aspects of TKGRF not readily protected 
by other types of intellectual property law.  Moreover, the 
collective ownership and limited term protection problems in 
copyright and patent law do not exist with geographical indications 
law, so this type of law would meet some of the criteria of TKGRF 
owners. 
Unfortunately, however, geographical indications law has 
traditionally only been used in connection with food and 
beverages, and this has also been the case under TRIPS until very 
recently.773  TRIPS applies to “goods” only,774 but its geographical 
indications provisions do not specify that they may be used solely 
for comestibles, even though slightly elevated protection is 
provided specifically for wines and spirits.775  Many developing 
countries feel that this higher level of protection for wines and 
spirits should apply to all agricultural goods.776  Even if this 
change were implemented, TKGRF nevertheless includes a wide 
spectrum of material that is neither agricultural in nature nor 
“goods.” 
Mexico has pioneered the expansion of the traditional notion of 
geographical indications law for TKGRF protection.777  It recently 
gave appellation of origin protection, under the name “Olinalá,” to 
certain types of traditionally lacquered articles made of a particular 
local wood and originating in the municipality of the same 
name.778  Mexican legislators also considered using geographical 
indications law to protect other unique ironwood carvings, dolls, 
and other artifacts traditionally created by indigenous Seri 
tribespeople.779  In both situations, before the new protective 
 
 773 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, pt. II, § 3, art. 22.60. 
 774 Id. art. 22.1. 
 775 Id. art. 23. 
 776 See Call for GI Expansion, supra note 765. 
 777 See Existing IP Protection Report, supra note 627, annex II, p. 2. 
 778 Id. annex II, p. 4. 
 779 Id. at 2.  Trademark protection, rather than geographical indications, was the legal 
protection vehicle ultimately chosen for the Seri creations, since protection was required 
for a number of different types of products made by a variety of traditional manufacturing 
methods. Id. 
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legislation was passed, indigenous producers found themselves 
facing increasingly stiffer competition from copies made by 
mestizo craftspeople using cheaper mass production methods.780  
The Mexico case is an example of creative thinking aimed at new 
ways to protect TKGRF and the possibilities offered by 
geographical indications law, and the United States should 
carefully consider the same avenue of protection. 
Many indigenous stakeholders have identified other 
problematic areas of TKGRF for which geographical indications 
law might be a useful protective tool.  For example, because some 
indigenous national dress is made according to traditional methods 
and from distinctive local materials, such dress often incorporates 
detailed and specific information about the geographic origin of 
both the dress and its wearer.  Geographical indications law might 
provide a protective avenue for this kind of creative material.    
Distinctive indigenous textiles and handicrafts incorporating 
peculiarly local vegetable dyes, wool, or fibers obtainable only 
from local plants or animals might be especially susceptible to this 
type of protection. 
One major obstacle standing in the way of harmonized global 
development of geographical indications, whether for TKGRF 
protection or for any other use, is the underlying philosophical 
difference between the United States and the European Union in 
this area of law.781  Unlike the European Union, the United States 
disregards locality per se as a valid protective property right under 
intellectual property law.782  Any indigenous group wishing to 
expand geographical indications use for TKGRF protection can 
expect to face obstacles from the United States, due to its general 
opposition in the WTO to any expansion of geographical 
indications law.783  While U.S. officials often explain that this 
 
 780 Id. 
 781 See generally Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312–14 (noting the different approaches 
between European and U.S. vintners); see also Goldberg, supra note 772, at 107. 
 782 Goldberg, supra note 772, at 109. 
 783 Interestingly, the position of the U.S. Trade Representative on geographical 
indications at the WTO is inconsistent with at least one current project of the U.S. 
government. See infra text accompanying note 793. 
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difference of opinion rests on legal grounds,784 the main reasons 
may instead be economic and political.785 
U.S. trademark law does not allow registration of geographic 
terms as trademarks, because they are primarily descriptive and 
thus not sufficiently distinctive.786  By contrast, Europe has long 
allowed protection of certain products based solely on 
geographical indications.787  The inherent difficulty with the U.S. 
legal position is twofold: 1) geographical indications by their very 
nature are fundamentally different from trademarks,788 and 2) 
viable geographical indications convey very particularized 
information about origin, which might be viewed as somewhat 
analogous to the “distinctiveness” requirement of U.S. trademark 
law.789 
Continued U.S. government opposition to geographical 
indications is particularly important to the U.S. wine industry.790  
The government’s resistance to expansion of this area of law may 
be the most difficult obstacle for TKGRF advocates to overcome.  
European immigrants brought with them much of the original 
grape stock used to produce U.S. wines today.791  Naturally, once 
they had established vineyards in their new country, they labeled 
their products with the same familiar regional names they had used 
in Europe.792  Developing and marketing U.S.-produced wines and 
spirits, and educating U.S. consumers to buy them, have been a 
very costly investment for domestic vintners to date, and U.S. 
growers are determined to protect this investment for as long as 
possible.793  Provisions on geographical indications were 
ultimately included in TRIPS, despite staunch U.S. opposition to 
them, but the current treaty language is the result of a hard-fought 
 
 784 Goldberg, supra note 772, at 138. 
 785 Lindquist, supra note 753, at 343; Goldberg, supra note 772, at 149. 
 786 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2004). 
 787 Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312. 
 788 See id. at 312–13. 
 789 Id. 
 790 Lindquist, supra note 753, at 313. 
 791 Id. 
 792 Id. 
 793 See generally id.; Goldberg, supra note 772. 
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battle—one that continues today.794  Geographical indications 
remained highly contested at the recent WTO ministerial summit 
in Cancún, Mexico, and the dispute will probably remain unsettled 
well into the future.795 
Despite continuing U.S. opposition, geographical indications 
have received an unprecedented level of global attention post-
TRIPS.796  As geographical indications law becomes more widely 
familiar, it is likely to be increasingly used in many countries as a 
vehicle for emerging TKGRF protection.797  Other than the 
ramifications for U.S. trade protectionism in wine and spirits, there 
appears to be no reason why a well thought out, strictly 
prospective, geographical indications law system for TKGRF 
could not also be implemented in the United States.  Implementing 
such a system for TKGRF would probably have the added benefit 
of helping to alleviate current international doubts about the U.S.’s 
 
 794 Id. 
 795 See generally WTO, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, at 
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
17, 2004).  Special interest groups in the U.S. have successfully entrenched their 
opposition at home even after TRIPS was signed.  As author Leigh Ann Lindquist notes, 
Congress has now codified certain regulations of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms relating to wine and spirit labeling.  This has had the effect of memorializing in 
national law the semi-generic, and thus relatively unprotected, nature of some wine 
names in the U.S. market.  This Congressional response to successful lobbying by the 
wine industry has made it considerably more difficult, both for the E.U. to have these 
same names recognized as protected geographical indications, and for the U.S. Trade 
Representative to utilize them in any meaningful way in the further negotiations on 
geographical indications that are required of all members under TRIPS Article 24. 
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 324–29. 
 796 See WTO, TRIPS Material on the WTO Website, at http://www.wto.org/english-
/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 797 U.S. opposition may eventually crumble, as more U.S. agencies become familiar 
with the usefulness of this intellectual property law vehicle.  For instance, in response to 
a question I posed at a Washington, D.C. public discussion forum in the spring of 2003, 
one high-ranking official from the United States Agency for International Development 
confirmed the existence of ongoing U.S. assistance in Guatemala to develop, via 
geographical indications law, improved marketing and protection of Guatemalan coffee.  
The official admitted that this assistance seems inconsistent with the U.S. Trade 
Representative’s position on geographical indications at the WTO, but was enthusiastic 
about the apparent success of the Guatemalan program. See USAID, Global Coffee 
Crisis, USAID’s Response to the Global Coffee Crisis, at http://www.usaid.gov-
/locations/latin_america_caribbean/coffee.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2004). 
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good faith adherence to TRIPS.798  Additionally, it would provide 
another vehicle for expanded TKGRF legal protection within 
already-established intellectual property law regimes, consistent 
with present U.S. policy objectives. 
V. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, THE INTERNET, AND BEYOND: THE 
BROADER RELEVANCE OF THE TKGRF DEBATE TO U.S. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT 
Presently, many U.S. intellectual property practitioners do not 
see broad relevance in the current TKGRF discussion, despite the 
fact that it is receiving great attention and interest in many other 
countries.  However, understanding gained through study of 
traditional knowledge systems may have applications far beyond 
resolving the immediate intellectual property problems identified 
thus far in the TKGRF controversy.  And while relatively few 
public conflicts have arisen in the U.S. to date, with growing 
awareness of TKGRF legal issues among Native Americans, it is 
only a matter of time until this occurs. 
Equity and fairness require that the creative works, knowledge, 
and genetic resources in the custodianship of indigenous societies 
be protected to a degree at least equal to that given to more 
familiar forms of intellectual property in industrialized societies.  
Understanding how customary law manages TKGRF material 
within traditional societies may give us novel ideas on how to 
manage all intellectual property, including TKGRF, more 
effectively in Western society.  But careful examination of the 
components of traditional knowledge and customary legal 
management also offers us an avenue for understanding some of 
the voids and limitations of Western intellectual property law, not 
just with respect to TKGRF, but with respect to creative material 
and dissemination methods not yet conceived.  TKGRF study may 
reveal those areas of intellectual property law that hold the most 
promise for adaptation and application to future discoveries, 
innovations, or creations totally unrelated to present-day TKGRF. 
 
 798 See Lindquist, supra note 753, at 337–38 (discussing this facet of the geographical 
indications controversy). 
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The study of customary law and TKGRF—and how to 
interface these with Western intellectual property law—encourages 
the exploration of legal concepts in an original way.  The vast 
majority of lawyers, judges, and legal thinkers today are schooled 
almost exclusively in, or at least heavily influenced by, legal 
systems that originated in Roman law and that have many common 
characteristics.799  Most national legal systems, including that of 
the U.S., have generally dismissed customary law as irrelevant to 
modern society and jurisprudence.800  This dismissal has most 
often occurred summarily, without any examination of customary 
law precepts.801  Many Western thinkers have commonly held the 
assumption that customary law has nothing to do with “their” 
societies, so they do not need to know about it or consider what it 
may have to offer.802 
A few courts and national legislatures are beginning to suspect 
that this is an erroneous view.803  Collaborative study of legal 
systems not founded on Western principles of law may offer all 
cultures new ways of thinking and fruitful jurisprudential cross-
fertilization. 
This cannot happen however, succeed without far greater 
participation by indigenous people in national and international 
TKGRF dialogues.  Leaders from indigenous societies, traditional 
knowledge practitioners, and indigenous custodians of customary 
law must all participate much more in these discussions.  Only 
members of indigenous societies can help Western scholars to 
sense something of the true character, context, and appropriate 
usage of TKGRF material.  Absent this collaboration, fashioning 
effective legal protections may be impossible.  Protective 
mechanisms based solely on Western legal concepts are likely to 
prove increasingly flawed when tested over time. 
 
 799 See Saarland Univ., Inst. of Law and Informatics, Questions and Answers on Roman 
Law, at http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Rechtsgeschichte/Ius.Romanum/RoemRFAQ-e.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 800 See Steven R. Ratner, International Law: the Trials of Global Norms, FOREIGN 
POL’Y, Spring 1998, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/law/intllaw/2003/0624ratner-
.htm. 
 801 See id. 
 802 See id. 
 803 See, e.g., supra note 746 and accompanying text. 
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Synergistic brainstorming among Western and indigenous legal 
thinkers could be a fertile new source of legal ideas and structures 
that could help solve other novel IP problems.  In some 
Information Age contexts, flexible definitions of “intellectual 
property” may prove to be more useful than the traditional 
categories we have developed up to now.  This kind of conceptual 
growth could, in turn, lead to better problem-solving in other 
intellectual property areas, including biotechnology. 
As just one example of this, the Internet community, 
particularly in the open source movement, resembles many 
indigenous societies, in that it originates from a foundational 
structure based on principles of collective ownership and free 
sharing of benefits among community members.  One overarching 
goal is to optimize the community structural framework for the 
good of everyone.804  The Internet has retained these characteristics 
in many respects, but it has now morphed into a more complex 
organism.805  It consists increasingly of discrete layers: information 
controllers and information users, all of whom possess, or wish to 
possess, varying access and usage rights to the communal 
content.806 
Both of these structural stages are analogous in some respects 
to traditional indigenous societies.  Most traditional communities 
exhibit similar characteristics and have developed effective ways 
to control—yet share fully for the greater community—access to 
and use of community knowledge and genetic resources, as well as 
members’ individual contributions to associated tangible and 
intangible creative works.807  Perhaps customary law and practice 
could give us a better idea of how to regulate the Internet for the 
good of the many, rather than, as is increasingly the case, the 
corporate few. 
Similarly, many indigenous societies have developed strictly 
defined and carefully observed systems for use and development of 
the genetic resources and the natural environment in which they 
 
 804 See id. 
 805 See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Internet: Law at a Lightning Pace, Pike & 
Fischer Internet Law & Regulation, http://internetlaw.pf.com (last updated Sept. 2004). 
 806 Id. 
 807 See supra Part I.B.3.e. 
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live.808  These systems must be effective, since indigenous people, 
unlike majority populations, tend to live in a sustainable fashion in 
the natural world (at least until indigenous communities are 
intruded upon by outside influences).809  There is much to learn 
from these communities, not just about the nature and use of 
TKGRF itself, but about effective methods of legal management 
and the jurisprudence associated with stewardship of this material 
and of the natural environment. 
The world is rapidly transforming across many sectors—
agriculture, industry, health, medical, and entertainment.  The 
potentially rich avenues that TKGRF and indigenous people may 
offer concerning how to legislate and adjudicate symbiotically 
across biological, informational, and intellectual property systems 
must not be ignored. 
Because the Western world has done little to protect 
indigenous knowledge, while contributing much toward its 
decimation,810 the ability to return to the “reference book” of 
indigenous TKGRF, and to the biodiversity it sustains and 
complements, is becoming increasingly difficult.  This material 
must be protected and nurtured, not just scientifically, but 
jurisprudentially, or the cultures and natural habitat from which it 
has evolved will rapidly and permanently disappear.811  With this 
disappearance, a crucial part of the heritage of man and his 
roadmap—not just for his evolution, but for his ultimate survival—
will be lost forever. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined a variety of legal steps that could be 
taken to bring the United States new credibility and a position of 
 
 808 See, e.g., AUGUSTA MOLNAR ET AL., WHO CONSERVES THE WORLD’S FORESTS? 
COMMUNITY-DRIVEN STRATEGIES TO PROTECT FORESTS AND RESPECT RIGHTS 3–10 (2004) 
(describing community-driven conservation efforts of indigenous societies), 
http://www.forest-trends.org/whoweare/new/move/Who%20Conserves%2011-4-04.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 809 See, e.g., id. 
 810 See Farley, supra note 42, at 11–12. 
 811 Id. 
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respect in the TKGRF controversy, both at home and abroad.  The 
suggested steps are consistent with the stated U.S. policy goal of 
protecting indigenous TKGRF within established intellectual 
property law regimes.812  The proposed steps could also give rise to 
new opportunities to export U.S. legal doctrine relating to 
innovation and creativity, including freedom of speech and fair 
use.  In addition, the U.S. would reap the benefits of wider global 
acknowledgment of the validity of intellectual property laws, 
including TRIPS. 
The first step that must be taken towards meaningful TKGRF 
protection in the United States is widespread education about the 
availability of present intellectual property laws for this purpose.  
The recommendations for education contained in the USPTO 
Report813 should be implemented for all U.S. citizens, including 
Native Americans, without further delay.  Few U.S. citizens are 
familiar with the most basic concepts of patent, trademark, and 
copyright law, and education would help bring the public greater 
awareness of the proper and improper uses of all of these, 
including indigenous TKGRF.  Indigenous education about 
specialized trademarks, IACA, state-based certification programs, 
and the USPTO database of Native American tribal insignia would 
facilitate immediate, increased TKGRF protection. 
But legislative changes are also needed for truly meaningful 
protection of TKGRF to exist in the U.S.  Useful TKGRF 
protective activity can occur first in state legislatures.  Grassroots 
U.S. consciousness can be raised on TKGRF issues without having 
to confront powerful national lobbying interests that have thus far 
influenced federal policymakers away from instituting meaningful 
TKGRF protection.814  State legislatures should begin now to 
amend unfair competition and contract laws to require equitable 
minimum standards for TKGRF-related projects.  Legislators 
should enact appropriate safeguards, requiring all contracts to 
ensure prior informed consent of indigenous stakeholders, equal 
access to neutral legal counsel, and benefit-sharing appropriate to 
 
 812 See generally supra Part II.B. 
 813 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 814 Jennifer Amiott, Investigating the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Protections 
for Traditional Knowledge, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 7 (2003). 
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the communities involved.  States could become a present-day 
incubator for future federal TKGRF legislation, just as they shaped 
the moral rights landscape during the 1970s and 1980s for the 
federal legislation of 1990.815 
States lacking moral rights laws should promptly adopt them 
for all authors of creative works, indigenous and non-indigenous.  
To decrease likelihood of federal preemption, these laws should 
protect the broadest possible spectrum of creative material, be 
enforceable beyond the life of the artist (preferably along CAPA 
public interest lines),816 and provide for author rights to resale 
royalties. 
More state legislatures should create publicly funded 
certification systems, perhaps along the lines of the Alaska Silver 
Hand Program,817 to facilitate handicraft and other indigenous 
product protection.  As an alternative to state-administered 
programs, local funding could be made available for privately-run 
programs for infrastructure, marketing, and advertising efforts, or 
to otherwise support tribal holders who want to obtain certification 
and collective marks but lack the means to register and maintain 
them. 
Federal legislative changes are also needed for systematic, 
long-term TKGRF protection.  While the U.S. presently holds a 
leadership role in current international TKGRF discussions, this 
appears to be due to the U.S. preponderance in patenting, rather 
than because of widespread international respect or perceived 
legitimacy of the U.S. in the leadership position.  There is distaste 
for the U.S., in part because of the seeming arrogance of U.S. 
representatives, but also because of the narrow commercial scope 
of U.S. intellectual property law and perceived interests.818  Many 
delegates to the IGC talks privately state that U.S. interests in 
intellectual property, including TKGRF, are limited to corporate 
 
 815 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
 816 See supra notes 690–93 and accompanying text. 
 817 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 818 See Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L. 73, 110 (2003) (“U.S. copyright law differs in many of its features from the 
copyright systems of European countries by de-emphasizing moral rights and 
emphasizing exploitation of the commercial value of the created work.”). 
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moneymaking and global political influence, untempered by any 
deeper cultural, humanitarian, or historical concerns.819  Without 
domestic legislative changes, growing American isolation in 
international forums will probably force the U.S. to an 
embarrassing retreat, but not before much time, effort, and 
goodwill have been exhausted. 
Congress should promptly ratify the CBD; until this occurs, 
U.S. officials should be allowed to attend Working Group 
meetings only as nonparticipating observers.  The defective 
trademark provisions in IACA820 should be repaired immediately, 
allowing prompt implementation of originally intended indigenous 
protections, and the Board should make specialized legal expertise 
available to indigenous clients to advise them about the advantages 
of registering certification and collective trademarks for TKGRF.  
Until IACA is repaired and the trademark program implemented, 
U.S. government officials should desist from making misleading 
references in international forums to trademark opportunities 
available to indigenous people under IACA.821  Congress could 
probably take both of these legislative steps rapidly, if its interest 
in protecting TKGRF is indeed authentic. 
Other, more ambitious, federal efforts must also be 
implemented before meaningful TKGRF protection can exist in the 
United States.  Present domestic law does not require any equitable 
benefit-sharing or prior informed consent in the TKGRF context, 
source disclosure in patent applications, or conformity with the 
CBD.  This leaves the U.S. vulnerable to criticism that the U.S. 
pays lip service to the importance of TKGRF but in actuality 
provides meaningful protection only to the lucrative corporate 
interests that pad USPTO coffers. 
 
 819 Cf. id. (“For example, granting an intellectual property right to commercially exploit 
traditional knowledge may facilitate economic expansion and growth by permitting the 
expansion of capital.  But such protection may come at the cost of social and cultural 
development if economic expansion disturbs traditional social structures like the family 
or village network.  Similarly, intellectual property protection based on traditional social 
and cultural systems, such as reliance on the memory of tribal elders or village medicine 
men, may be at the cost of economic development.”). 
 820 See supra notes 414–30 and accompanying text. 
 821 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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Together with protecting TKGRF within existing IP laws, the 
additional linchpins of stated U.S. policy are “national treatment,” 
“private contractual solutions,” and “periodic reporting 
requirements.”822  Therefore, Congress should begin drafting 
legislation to enact enforceable national guidelines for private 
TKGRF contracting, and it should establish an oversight 
mechanism for periodic national reporting.  As U.S. officials 
presently advocate, leaving implementation details to national 
legislatures is appropriate: it respects the sovereignty of nations, 
and allows for adaptation to national legal traditions and 
consistency with the historical national development of intellectual 
property law.823  But national safeguards for TKGRF contracting 
must exist in every country, not just a few, and those safeguards 
must adhere generally to emerging international standards of fair, 
non-exploitative, and honest treatment of indigenous TKGRF 
custodians.824  The United States should take a leadership role in 
protecting TKGRF by legislating its fair treatment at home. 
Minimum legislative standards must require that all TKGRF 
contracts contain appropriate safeguards ensuring prior informed 
consent of contracting parties, equal access to neutral legal 
counsel, and benefit-sharing appropriate to the communities 
involved.  Instituting a geographical indications law for TKGRF 
and a broader moral rights law would also noticeably expand 
domestic indigenous TKGRF protection under familiar intellectual 
property law principles.825 
Finally, in the case of TKGRF-related inventions, formal 
recognition by courts and government agencies of an equitable link 
between patent enforceability and proper source attribution and 
benefit-sharing is crucial.  Other than national minimum 
contracting guidelines,826 a link to enforceability, rather than to 
patentability, would expand TKGRF protection more effectively 
than any other measure.  This step could be taken immediately by 
 
 822 See supra notes 332–38 and accompanying text. 
 823 Lourie Statements, supra note 212. 
 824 Id. 
 825 See Lindquist, supra note 753, at 310; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610. 
 826 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.b. 
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U.S. courts, obviating any need to amend TRIPS, which would 
surely take years before consensus could be reached. 
Taking these steps—or even laying significant and concrete 
groundwork to take them—would thrust the U.S. into the spotlight 
as a model for effectively protecting TKGRF within established 
intellectual property and contract law regimes.  This approach 
minimizes both experimentation in untested new areas of law and 
potential disruption to prior intellectual property rights holders.827  
Implementing this scheme in the United States would likely 
influence other countries to adopt similar legislation, relieving 
pressure to rapidly draft an international TKGRF treaty. 
Rather than pursuing its present obstructionist path, the U.S. 
should also participate in an open-minded and good faith manner 
with international efforts to explore larger TKGRF questions.828  
The United States should help examine and honestly assess current 
Western intellectual property institutions and laws, including its 
own patent system, to analyze shortcomings and make 
improvements.  Though USPTO officials should continue as active 
participants in TKGRF policy formulation, they should no longer 
be the main spokespeople for U.S. delegations to international 
forums.  No agency can objectively assess itself, especially under 
the scrutiny of an international audience.  The USPTO, due to its 
funding sources and clientele, is especially vulnerable to 
allegations of bias.829   
De facto USPTO leadership of U.S. delegations has had an 
unnecessarily corrosive effect on U.S. credibility in the TKGRF 
arena,830 and it should immediately be discontinued.  Since 
TKGRF issues affect the entire spectrum of intellectual property 
law, the USPTO in fact has no greater subject matter expertise in 
TKGRF than counsel from the Copyright Office, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, or other federal agencies formulating TKGRF 
policy and procedure.  Instead, independent intellectual property 
 
 827 See Nuño Pires de Carvalho, supra note 213, at 372. 
 828 TAUBMAN PRESENTATION, supra note 48. 
 829 Coombe, supra note 110, at 281. 
 830 Id. 
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counsel, perhaps from within the Office of the Solicitor General, or 
elsewhere, should coordinate U.S. policymaking in TKGRF. 
The United States, with its long tradition of ideological, 
religious, and racial diversity, should also take the lead in 
including indigenous representatives in all TKGRF discussions.  
U.S. officials should ensure that as many indigenous 
representatives—especially elders—participate in the search to 
preserve and protect indigenous TKGRF.  The U.S. has many 
indigenous people who could contribute invaluable insights,831 and 
it possesses an exceedingly well-educated and diverse population 
of indigenous and nonindigenous legal thinkers, all of whom could 
provide leadership in international efforts.  U.S. participants should 
also cultivate a new attitude of humility in their role as leaders in 
this important international work effort. 
These adjustments in domestic law and policy would germinate 
a new fluidity of thinking among U.S. lawyers, judges, and 
scholars, not just in the TKGRF arena, but in many other areas of 
law as well.  Experience gained now through creating effective 
legal interfaces among extraordinarily diverse peoples, systems of 
jurisprudence, and dispute resolution mechanisms may be 
singularly useful in the future.  More creative and expansive legal 
thinking is a necessary prerequisite to visionary problem-solving in 
many blossoming legal interface situations, particularly in 
cyberspace and biotechnology. 
Ultimately, these skills could also facilitate peaceful interaction 
with other new civilizations that will undoubtedly possess 
unfamiliar systems of law.  Such systems are likely to be 
noticeably divergent from ours, especially in their governance of 
inventions and technology, information, and creative works.  
Finding successful, new ways to deal with legal diversity in the 
TKGRF context is an invaluable opportunity to prepare to meet 
similar challenges, in new contexts, in the future. 
 
 831 See generally L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 750–52 (2001) (discussing the growing population of 
indigenous people in the United States). 
